Dissonance motivation: Its nature,persistence, and reinstatement

This paper examines whether arousal is a necessary component of the motivation to reduce dissonance. Alternative responses to attitude-behavior inconsistency include attitude change, explaining the behavior by a consonant cognition (i.e., low choice), and attributing the dissonance-induced state to an alternative source, such as the purported side effects of an ingested “drug.” For conditions in which there are few consonant cognitions (i.e., high choice), a comparison of different “drug” conditions in which attitude change does or does not occur was expected to clarify which components of the dissonance-induced state mediate attitude change. Attitude change occurred in high choice conditions where the “drug” was described as pleasant, but not in high choice conditions where the “drug” was described as unpleasant or in a low choice condition. In addition, when the “drug” was descibed as arousing there was, if anything, more attitude change than when the “drug” was described as nonarousing. These results suggest that unpleasantness and not arousal per se is the motivating factor in dissonance reduction. The effects of the passage of time and reinstating the counterattitudinal behavior on the alternative responses to attitude-behavior inconsistency were also examined. Subjects returned 2 weeks later, stated their attitudes, recalled their original counterattitudinal essay, and again stated their attitudes. Although there was a general decrease in attitude change during this period, the pattern of attitude change remained basically the same. Attitude change following reinstatement increased from its original level only in those conditions where it had been initially attenuated through misattribution or a consonant cognition.     

Promotion and prevention choices between stability and change

Two situations involving choice between stability and change were examined: task substitution, which deals with choosing between resuming an interrupted activity and doing a substitute activity, and endowment, which deals with choosing between a possessed object and an alternative object. Regulatory focus theory (E. T. Higgins, 1997, 1998) predicts that a promotion focus will be associated with openness to change, whereas a prevention focus will be associated with a preference for stability. Five studies confirmed this prediction with both situational induction of and chronic personality differences in regulatory focus. In Studies 1 and 2, individuals in a prevention focus were more inclined than individuals in a promotion focus to resume an interrupted task rather than do a substitute task. In Studies 3-5, individuals in a prevention focus, but not individuals in a promotion focus, exhibited a reluctance to exchange currently possessed objects (i.e., endowment) or previously possessed objects.     

CONTINGENT REINFORCEMENT OF ABSTINENCE WITH INDIVIDUALS ABUSING COCAINE AND MARIJUANA

Two males diagnosed with cocaine dependence received a behavioral intervention comprised of contingency management and the community reinforcement approach. During the initial phase of treatment, reinforcement was delivered contingent on submitting cocaine-free urine specimens. The community reinforcement approach involved two behavior therapy sessions each week. Almost complete cocaine abstinence was achieved, but regular marijuana use continued. During a second phase, reinforcement magnitude was reduced, but remained contingent on submitting cocaine-free specimens. Behavior therapy was reduced to once per week. Cocaine abstinence and regular marijuana use continued. Next, reinforcement was delivered contingent on submitting cocaine- and marijuana-free specimens. This modified contingency resulted in an abrupt increase in marijuana abstinence and maintenance of cocaine abstinence. One- and 5-month follow-ups indicated that cocaine abstinence continued, but marijuana smoking resumed. These results indicate that the behavioral intervention was efficacious in achieving abstinence from cocaine and marijuana; maintenance, however, was achieved for cocaine only.     

Is dissonance phenomenologically aversive?

This study examined whether dissonance is, phenomenologically, an aversive state. Experimental subjects were induced to write counterattitudinal essays under a high-choice condition. One group of subjects was led to believe that a pill, which they had just taken in the context of a separate experiment, would cause them to feel pleasantly excited. A second group was led to believe that the pill would make them feel tense. A third group was given no information about the pill's potential side effects, while a fourth group expected to have no side effects at all. In this last condition, the results yielded the usual dissonance effect: subjects stated attitudes more congruent with the essay than did subjects in a survey control condition. When subjects were given an opportunity to attribute their arousal to an arousing, but nonaversive pill (i.e., the pleasant excitement condition), this effect was unchanged. In contrast, when subjects could attribute their arousal to an aversive pill (i.e., in the tensè and the no information conditions), this effect was virtually eliminated. These results are consistent with the notion that dissonance is an aversive state and that subjects will seize, when possible, an external attribution for this state.     

Accuracy and differentiation in social prediction: A developmental perspective1

Two studies examined the accuracy and differentiation of 4–5-yearolds‘, 8–9-year-olds’, and undergraduates' predictions of the preferences of peers and nonpeers. In Study 1 each subject was presented with separate arrays of snacks, meals, and activities depicted on cards and were asked to select their own preferences and the preferences of peers and nonpeers (“grown-ups” for the children, and “4- to 5-year-olds” for the undergraduates). In Study 2 each subject selected his or her own preference, the preference of peers, and the preferences of both older nonpeers (“grown-ups”) and younger nonpeers (“2-year-olds”). For all age groups, including 4–5-year-olds: (1) the preference predictions differentiated peers from nonpeers, as well as older nonpeers from younger nonpeers; (2) it was very rare for a subject to select his or her own preferences for the preference predictions of both peers and nonpeers. There were no consistent developmental differences either in the tendency to select one's own preferences when predicting the preferences of others or in the tendency to differentiate predictions for peers and nonpeers. In contrast, there was a clear developmental increase in predictive accuracy, with 4–5-year-olds being relatively inaccurate in predicting the preferences of nonpeers. The inadequacy of constructs such as “assumed similarity” and “egocentrism” as explanations for the general accuracy in predicting peers' preferences and the 4–5-year-olds' inaccuracy in predicting nonpeers' preferences is discussed. Possible alternative variables underlying developmental increases in judgmental accuracy, such as “social reference,”“self reference,” and “social category knowledge,” are then proposed.     

Promoting us or preventing them: regulatory focus and manifestations of intergroup bias

Four studies examined whether situational and individual differences in individuals' regulatory focus influence how intergroup bias is expressed emotionally and behaviorally. Consistent with past findings on promotion focus, these studies found evidence that participants' promotion focus, whether measured or manipulated, was related to how extensively they demonstrated bias toward their ingroup in terms of cheerfulness- and dejection-related emotions and approach-related behaviors. Consistent with past findings on prevention focus, these studies also revealed that participants' prevention focus was related to how extensively they showed bias against an outgroup in terms of quiescence- and agitation-related emotions and avoidance-related behaviors. The implications for the self-regulatory functions of intergroup bias are discussed.     

Self-liking and self-competence separate self-evaluation from self-deception: associations with personality, ability, and achievement

The similarities between measures of self-evaluation and self-deception are reviewed, and a method for discriminating between them is proposed, using personality profiles and relations to ability and achievement. Across two samples, the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (RSES) and Tafarodi's measures of self-evaluation were used to demonstrate that the RSES and Self-Liking are more similar to Self-Deceptive Enhancement than is self-competence. Further, Self-Competence is uniquely associated with cognitive ability and both academic and creative achievement. It is concluded that, along with self-liking, self-competence is a useful form of self-evaluation that should be measured and taken into account in research that has traditionally focused on self-esteem.     

Audience-tuning effects on memory: the role of shared reality

After tuning to an audience, communicators' own memories for the topic often reflect the biased view expressed in their messages. Three studies examined explanations for this bias. Memories for a target person were biased when feedback signaled the audience's successful identification of the target but not after failed identification (Experiment 1). Whereas communicators tuning to an in-group audience exhibited the bias, communicators tuning to an out-group audience did not (Experiment 2). These differences did not depend on communicators' mood but were mediated by communicators' trust in their audience's judgment about other people (Experiments 2 and 3). Message and memory were more closely associated for high than for low trusters. Apparently, audience-tuning effects depend on the communicators' experience of a shared reality.