Promotion and prevention choices between stability and change

Two situations involving choice between stability and change were examined: task substitution, which deals with choosing between resuming an interrupted activity and doing a substitute activity, and endowment, which deals with choosing between a possessed object and an alternative object. Regulatory focus theory (E. T. Higgins, 1997, 1998) predicts that a promotion focus will be associated with openness to change, whereas a prevention focus will be associated with a preference for stability. Five studies confirmed this prediction with both situational induction of and chronic personality differences in regulatory focus. In Studies 1 and 2, individuals in a prevention focus were more inclined than individuals in a promotion focus to resume an interrupted task rather than do a substitute task. In Studies 3-5, individuals in a prevention focus, but not individuals in a promotion focus, exhibited a reluctance to exchange currently possessed objects (i.e., endowment) or previously possessed objects.     

CONTINGENT REINFORCEMENT OF ABSTINENCE WITH INDIVIDUALS ABUSING COCAINE AND MARIJUANA

Two males diagnosed with cocaine dependence received a behavioral intervention comprised of contingency management and the community reinforcement approach. During the initial phase of treatment, reinforcement was delivered contingent on submitting cocaine-free urine specimens. The community reinforcement approach involved two behavior therapy sessions each week. Almost complete cocaine abstinence was achieved, but regular marijuana use continued. During a second phase, reinforcement magnitude was reduced, but remained contingent on submitting cocaine-free specimens. Behavior therapy was reduced to once per week. Cocaine abstinence and regular marijuana use continued. Next, reinforcement was delivered contingent on submitting cocaine- and marijuana-free specimens. This modified contingency resulted in an abrupt increase in marijuana abstinence and maintenance of cocaine abstinence. One- and 5-month follow-ups indicated that cocaine abstinence continued, but marijuana smoking resumed. These results indicate that the behavioral intervention was efficacious in achieving abstinence from cocaine and marijuana; maintenance, however, was achieved for cocaine only.     

Is dissonance phenomenologically aversive?

This study examined whether dissonance is, phenomenologically, an aversive state. Experimental subjects were induced to write counterattitudinal essays under a high-choice condition. One group of subjects was led to believe that a pill, which they had just taken in the context of a separate experiment, would cause them to feel pleasantly excited. A second group was led to believe that the pill would make them feel tense. A third group was given no information about the pill's potential side effects, while a fourth group expected to have no side effects at all. In this last condition, the results yielded the usual dissonance effect: subjects stated attitudes more congruent with the essay than did subjects in a survey control condition. When subjects were given an opportunity to attribute their arousal to an arousing, but nonaversive pill (i.e., the pleasant excitement condition), this effect was unchanged. In contrast, when subjects could attribute their arousal to an aversive pill (i.e., in the tensè and the no information conditions), this effect was virtually eliminated. These results are consistent with the notion that dissonance is an aversive state and that subjects will seize, when possible, an external attribution for this state.     

Accuracy and differentiation in social prediction: A developmental perspective1

Two studies examined the accuracy and differentiation of 4–5-yearolds‘, 8–9-year-olds’, and undergraduates' predictions of the preferences of peers and nonpeers. In Study 1 each subject was presented with separate arrays of snacks, meals, and activities depicted on cards and were asked to select their own preferences and the preferences of peers and nonpeers (“grown-ups” for the children, and “4- to 5-year-olds” for the undergraduates). In Study 2 each subject selected his or her own preference, the preference of peers, and the preferences of both older nonpeers (“grown-ups”) and younger nonpeers (“2-year-olds”). For all age groups, including 4–5-year-olds: (1) the preference predictions differentiated peers from nonpeers, as well as older nonpeers from younger nonpeers; (2) it was very rare for a subject to select his or her own preferences for the preference predictions of both peers and nonpeers. There were no consistent developmental differences either in the tendency to select one's own preferences when predicting the preferences of others or in the tendency to differentiate predictions for peers and nonpeers. In contrast, there was a clear developmental increase in predictive accuracy, with 4–5-year-olds being relatively inaccurate in predicting the preferences of nonpeers. The inadequacy of constructs such as “assumed similarity” and “egocentrism” as explanations for the general accuracy in predicting peers' preferences and the 4–5-year-olds' inaccuracy in predicting nonpeers' preferences is discussed. Possible alternative variables underlying developmental increases in judgmental accuracy, such as “social reference,”“self reference,” and “social category knowledge,” are then proposed.     

Self-liking and self-competence separate self-evaluation from self-deception: associations with personality, ability, and achievement

The similarities between measures of self-evaluation and self-deception are reviewed, and a method for discriminating between them is proposed, using personality profiles and relations to ability and achievement. Across two samples, the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (RSES) and Tafarodi's measures of self-evaluation were used to demonstrate that the RSES and Self-Liking are more similar to Self-Deceptive Enhancement than is self-competence. Further, Self-Competence is uniquely associated with cognitive ability and both academic and creative achievement. It is concluded that, along with self-liking, self-competence is a useful form of self-evaluation that should be measured and taken into account in research that has traditionally focused on self-esteem.