How examples may (and may not) constrain creativity

Three experiments were performed to test Smith, Ward, and Schumacher’s (1993) conformity hypothesis— that people’s ideas will conform to examples they are shown in a creative generation task. Conformity was observed in all three experiments; participants tended to incorporate critical features of experimenter-provided examples. However, examination of total output, elaborateness of design, and the noncritical features did not confirm that the conformity effect constrained creative output in any of the three experiments. Increasing the number of examples increased the conformity effect (Experiment 1). Examples that covaried features that are naturally uncorrelated in the real world led to a greater subjective rating of creativity (Experiment 2). A delay between presentation and test increased conformity (Experiment 3), just as models of inadvertent plagiarism would predict. The explanatory power of theoretical accounts such as activation, retrieval blocking, structured imagination, and category abstraction are evaluated.     

Generalized and lateralized effects of concurrent verbal rehearsal upon performance of sequential movements of the fingers by the left and right hands.

College student subjects performed a sequential typing task requiring bilaterally synchronized movements (Experiment 1) or unilaterally synchronized movements (Experiment 2) singly, and concurrently with silent and vocal rehearsal of verbal lists varying in redundancy. Rehearsal interfered with bilaterally synchronized movements more when the right hand was leading the sequence than when the left hand led, and with movements of the right more than the left hand in unilaterally synchronized movements. Results are interpreted in terms of intrahemispheric and general capacity competition between the concurrent performances.     

Perception of less irregular and more irregular stimuli.

Berlyne's stimuli were presented in a stereoscope to test his hypothesis that Ss prefer the more irregular member of a pair of stimuli. 32 Ss, screened for normal acuity and phorias, were tested. Contrary to Berlyne's hypothesis and consistent with earlier stereoscopic studies, Ss tend to report more frequently the less irregular member of a pair of stimuli. These data can be explained by an information-conflict model; however, the clearest implication of this study was that experiments concerned with familiarity of stimuli should be qualified by the method.     

Prospective and retrospective judgments of time as a function of amount of information processed.

The subjects, 120 college students, sorted cards for 42 sec with instructions to process 0, 1, or 2 bits of information per card (response uncertainty) and then were asked to make an absolute judgement of the interval's duration. Half of the subjects knew this judgement would be required before the interval (prospective paradigm); half did not (retrospective paradigm). Judged time was an inverse linear function of response uncertainty under the prospective paradigm, whereas no significant function was obtained under the retrospective paradigm.     

Therapeutic rationale,monetary incentive and fear behavior: a methodological note on analogue research

Analogue research has been questioned as a means of evaluating clinical procedures (e.g. Cooper, Furst and Bridger, 1969). A major criticism has been the failure to include adequate controls. Placebo conditions have varied markedly in their similarity to active treatment procedures (Caputo, Nau and Borkovec, 1973), have not provided equally credible therapeutic rationales (Borkovec and Nau, 1972), and have thus generated differing expectancies and demands for improvement.To evaluate a therapy procedure, a comparison condition is needed in which no treatment intervenes between pre- and post-test measures, yet which provides adequate incentive for improvement. Rimm and Mahoney (1969) used a ‘contingent reinforcement’ placebo condition in which tokens, exchangeable for money, were dispensed for improvement in a graded approach to a feared stimulus. Little improvement occurred, suggesting a lack of effectiveness of money alone in improving approach behavior. However, as no therapeutic rationale was presented, it is likely that little expectancy for improvement occurred.The present study provided a ‘no treatment’ condition in which Ss participated in three test sessions with no intervening treatment procedure. Unlike Rimm and Mahoney (1969), two conditions provided a rationale explaining why Ss had maintained their fear and why no real therapy was needed to eliminate it. Also, monetary reward (a $5.00 bill rather than tokens) was dispensed only upon picking up the feared object. A follow-up session assessed the lasting effects of rationale and monetary incentive in the absence of extrinsic reinforcement. Thus, the present study attempted to determine the effect of therapeutic rationale and/or the possibility of receiving money, in the absence of ‘therapy’, on subclinical fear.     

The True Self and Psychological Health: Emerging Evidence and Future Directions

A variety of philosophical and psychological perspectives converge to suggest that a happy and meaningful life is the product of living in accord with one’s true self. This idea similarly appears throughout literature, film, and folk wisdom. The current paper examines both theoretical and lay conceptions of the true self and reviews the empirical evidence that supports its role in psychological health, with a particular emphasis on current research that demonstrates that both the accessibility and ease of thinking about one’s true self‐concept is associated with the experiences of meaning and satisfaction. The merits of different approaches to defining the true self, measurement issues, and directions for future research are discussed.     

The role of recollection and partial information in source monitoring

Two experiments were conducted to assess the degree to which source monitoring required recollective details or could be based on vaguer partial information. Source judgments were followed by remember-know judgments during testing. On the authors' assumption that remember judgments are highly correlated with the presence of recollective details, the results showed that accurate source monitoring did not necessarily require such recollective details. Rather, the high proportion of correct source judgments that were associated with know responses suggests that source-monitoring processes can successfully use the partial information that is recorded in vaguer memories. Consequently, source monitoring can be based on recollection but can also effectively use qualitative characteristics that lack clarity and sufficient amounts of details to give rise to the subjective feeling of remembering.     

Guilty,But Not Ashamed: “True” Self‐Conceptions Influence Affective Responses to Personal Shortcomings

The current research examined how true self‐conceptions (who a person believes he or she truly is) influence negative self‐relevant emotions in response to shortcomings. In Study 1 (N = 83), an Internet sample of adults completed a measure of authenticity, reflected on a shortcoming or positive life event, and completed state shame and guilt measures. In Study 2 (N = 49), undergraduates focused on true versus other determined self‐attributes, received negative performance feedback, and completed state shame and guilt measures. In Study 3 (N = 138), undergraduates focused on self‐determined versus other determined self‐aspects, reflected on a shortcoming or neutral event, and completed state shame, guilt, and self‐esteem measures. In Study 4 (N = 75), undergraduates thought about true self‐attributes, an achievement, or an ordinary event; received positive or negative performance feedback; and completed state shame and guilt measures. In Study 1, differences in true self‐expression positively predicted shame‐free guilt (but not guilt‐free shame) following reminders of a shortcoming. Studies 2–4 found that experimental activation of true self‐conceptions increased shame‐free guilt and generally decreased guilt‐free shame in response to negative evaluative experiences. The findings offer novel insights into true self‐conceptions by revealing their impact on negative self‐conscious emotions.