Generalized and lateralized effects of concurrent verbal rehearsal upon performance of sequential movements of the fingers by the left and right hands.

College student subjects performed a sequential typing task requiring bilaterally synchronized movements (Experiment 1) or unilaterally synchronized movements (Experiment 2) singly, and concurrently with silent and vocal rehearsal of verbal lists varying in redundancy. Rehearsal interfered with bilaterally synchronized movements more when the right hand was leading the sequence than when the left hand led, and with movements of the right more than the left hand in unilaterally synchronized movements. Results are interpreted in terms of intrahemispheric and general capacity competition between the concurrent performances.     

Perception of less irregular and more irregular stimuli.

Berlyne's stimuli were presented in a stereoscope to test his hypothesis that Ss prefer the more irregular member of a pair of stimuli. 32 Ss, screened for normal acuity and phorias, were tested. Contrary to Berlyne's hypothesis and consistent with earlier stereoscopic studies, Ss tend to report more frequently the less irregular member of a pair of stimuli. These data can be explained by an information-conflict model; however, the clearest implication of this study was that experiments concerned with familiarity of stimuli should be qualified by the method.     

Prospective and retrospective judgments of time as a function of amount of information processed.

The subjects, 120 college students, sorted cards for 42 sec with instructions to process 0, 1, or 2 bits of information per card (response uncertainty) and then were asked to make an absolute judgement of the interval's duration. Half of the subjects knew this judgement would be required before the interval (prospective paradigm); half did not (retrospective paradigm). Judged time was an inverse linear function of response uncertainty under the prospective paradigm, whereas no significant function was obtained under the retrospective paradigm.     

Therapeutic rationale,monetary incentive and fear behavior: a methodological note on analogue research

Analogue research has been questioned as a means of evaluating clinical procedures (e.g. Cooper, Furst and Bridger, 1969). A major criticism has been the failure to include adequate controls. Placebo conditions have varied markedly in their similarity to active treatment procedures (Caputo, Nau and Borkovec, 1973), have not provided equally credible therapeutic rationales (Borkovec and Nau, 1972), and have thus generated differing expectancies and demands for improvement.To evaluate a therapy procedure, a comparison condition is needed in which no treatment intervenes between pre- and post-test measures, yet which provides adequate incentive for improvement. Rimm and Mahoney (1969) used a ‘contingent reinforcement’ placebo condition in which tokens, exchangeable for money, were dispensed for improvement in a graded approach to a feared stimulus. Little improvement occurred, suggesting a lack of effectiveness of money alone in improving approach behavior. However, as no therapeutic rationale was presented, it is likely that little expectancy for improvement occurred.The present study provided a ‘no treatment’ condition in which Ss participated in three test sessions with no intervening treatment procedure. Unlike Rimm and Mahoney (1969), two conditions provided a rationale explaining why Ss had maintained their fear and why no real therapy was needed to eliminate it. Also, monetary reward (a $5.00 bill rather than tokens) was dispensed only upon picking up the feared object. A follow-up session assessed the lasting effects of rationale and monetary incentive in the absence of extrinsic reinforcement. Thus, the present study attempted to determine the effect of therapeutic rationale and/or the possibility of receiving money, in the absence of ‘therapy’, on subclinical fear.     

The activation of unrelated and canceled intentions

The intention superiority effect is the finding that intentions to perform an activity are stored in a heightened state of activation. The effect has also been generalized to the finding that once an intention is fulfilled, it is inhibited relative to more neutral material about which no intentionality has been formed. In two experiments, we tested some ecological and naturally occurring situations taken from the literature on prospective memory and demonstrated that they have consistent consequences for the activation level of an intention. In Experiment 1, a constellation of unrelated activities displayed heightened activation prior to completion and displayed inhibition after completion. In Experiment 2, canceling the intention resulted in inhibition just as completing the intention does in this paradigm. The results are discussed in terms of their practical and theoretical importance to theories of prospective memory.     

How chance explains

What explains the outcomes of chance processes? We claim that their setups do. Chances, we think, mediate these explanations of outcome by setup but do not feature in them. Facts about chances do feature in explanations of a different kind: higher-order explanations, which explain how and why setups explain their outcomes. In this paper, we elucidate this 'mediator view' of chancy explanation and defend it from a series of objections. We then show how it changes the playing field in four metaphysical disputes concerning chance. First, it makes it more plausible that even low chances can have explanatory power. Second, it undercuts a circularity objection against reductionist theories of chance. Third, it redirects the debate about a prominent argument against epistemic theories of chance. Finally, it sheds light on potential chancy explanations of the Universe's origin.     

Fear and Implicit Racism: Whites’ Support for Voter ID laws

Oftentimes, Whites are unaware that they may have slighted Blacks. Although researchers have spent a considerable amount of attention disentangling this form of implicit (unconscious) racial bias from explicit (conscious) racial bias, we are less clear about the conditions that cause implicit racism to matter in American politics. In this article, we offer a theory of how fear and Whites' unconscious racial bias are tightly linked in memory, and triggering this emotion can make these implicit attitudes more salient in public opinion. To test our theory, we focus on Whites’ opinions toward voter ID laws. Our expectation is that inducing fear should cause implicit racism to play an important role in Whites’ evaluation of the policy. Using an adult national experiment over two waves, we induced several emotions to elicit fear, anger, or relaxation. The findings show that the fear condition causes Whites high in implicit racism to be more supportive of voter ID laws than similar individuals in the anger and control conditions. On the other hand, fear does not cause Whites high in explicit racism to be more supportive of voter ID laws.