Training social cognition: from imitation to Theory of Mind

Evidence for successful socio-cognitive training in typical adults is rare. This study attempted to improve Theory of Mind (ToM) and visual perspective taking in healthy adults by training participants to either imitate or to inhibit imitation. Twenty-four hours after training, all participants completed tests of ToM and visual perspective taking. The group trained to inhibit their tendency to imitate showed improved performance on the visual perspective-taking test, but not the ToM test. Neither imitation training, nor general inhibition training, had this effect. These results support a novel theory of social cognition suggesting that the same self-other discrimination process underlies imitation inhibition and perspective taking. Imitation, perspective taking and ToM are all pro-social processes--ways in which we reach out to others. Therefore, it is striking that perspective taking can be enhanced by suppressing imitation; to understand another, sometimes we need, not to get closer, but to pull away.     

What's social about social learning?

Research on social learning in animals has revealed a rich variety of cases where animals--from caddis fly larvae to chimpanzees--acquire biologically important information by observing the actions of others. A great deal is known about the adaptive functions of social learning, but very little about the cognitive mechanisms that make it possible. Even in the case of imitation, a type of social learning studied in both comparative psychology and cognitive science, there has been minimal contact between the two disciplines. Social learning has been isolated from cognitive science by two longstanding assumptions: that it depends on a set of special-purpose modules--cognitive adaptations for social living; and that these learning mechanisms are largely distinct from the processes mediating human social cognition. Recent research challenges these assumptions by showing that social learning covaries with asocial learning; occurs in solitary animals; and exhibits the same features in diverse species, including humans. Drawing on this evidence, I argue that social and asocial learning depend on the same basic learning mechanisms; these are adapted for the detection of predictive relationships in all natural domains; and they are associative mechanisms--processes that encode information for long-term storage by forging excitatory and inhibitory links between event representations. Thus, human and nonhuman social learning are continuous, and social learning is adaptively specialized--it becomes distinctively "social"--only when input mechanisms (perceptual, attentional, and motivational processes) are phylogenetically or ontogenetically tuned to other agents.     

Social blockade of taste-aversion learning in Norway rats (Rattus norvegicus): is it a social phenomenon?

In Experiment 1, hooded rats (Rattus norvegicus) were exposed to a novel diet in a food dish or on a conspecific; they were allowed to consume the same diet and then were injected with a toxin LiCl. Later both groups ate more of the novel diet than animals that had not been exposed, and the conspecific-exposed group ate more than the dish-exposed group. Reducing aversion learning by exposure on a conspecific is known as social blockade. We examined if this effect is because a conspecific intensifies dietary cues and thereby increases latent inhibition. Experiment 2 failed to show that diet on a conspecific is a more effective conditioned stimulus for taste-aversion learning than diet in a dish, and Experiment 3 showed that diet in a dish is an effective overshadowing stimulus in aversion learning but diet on a conspecific is not. These results suggest that social blockade cannot readily be assimilated to a latent-inhibition model and may be a distinctly social form of learning.     

Do rats in a two-action test encode movement egocentrically or allocentrically?

Two-action tests of imitation compare groups that observe topographically different responses to a common manipulandum. The general aim of the two experiments reported here was to find a demonstrator-consistent responding effect in a procedure that could be elaborated to investigate aspects of what was learned about the demonstrated lever response. Experiment 1 was a pilot study with rats of a variant of the two-action method of investigating social learning about observed responses. Groups of observer rats (Rattus norvegicus) saw a demonstrator push a lever up or down for a food reward. When these observers were subsequently given access to the lever and rewarded for responses in both directions, their directional preferences were compared with two 'screen control' groups that were unable to see their demonstrators' behaviour. Demonstrator-consistent responding was found to be restricted to observers that were able to see demonstrator performance, suggesting that scent cues alone were insufficient to cue a preference for the demonstrators' response direction and thereby that the rats learned by observation about body movements (imitation) or lever movement (emulation). Experiment 2 assessed responding on two levers, one that had been manipulated by the demonstrator, and a second, transposed lever positioned some distance away. Demonstrator-consistent responding was abolished when actions were observed and performed in different parts of the apparatus, suggesting that observed movement was encoded allocentrically with respect to the apparatus rather than egocentrically with respect to the actor's body. With particular reference to the influence of scent cues, the results are discussed in relation to the strengths and weaknesses of this and other varieties of the two-action procedure as tests of imitation in animals and human infants. Electronic Publication     

Working memory recall precision is a more sensitive index than span

Delayed adjustment tasks have recently been developed to examine working memory (WM) precision, that is, the resolution with which items maintained in memory are recalled. However, despite their emerging use in experimental studies of healthy people, evaluation of patient populations is sparse. We first investigated the validity of adjustment tasks, comparing precision with classical span measures of memory across the lifespan in 114 people. Second, we asked whether precision measures can potentially provide a more sensitive measure of WM than traditional span measures. Specifically, we tested this hypothesis examining WM in a group with early, untreated Parkinson's disease (PD) and its modulation by subsequent treatment on dopaminergic medication. Span measures correlated with precision across the lifespan: in children, young, and elderly participants. However, they failed to detect changes in WM in PD patients, either pre‐ or post‐treatment initiation. By contrast, recall precision was sensitive enough to pick up such changes. PD patients pre‐medication were significantly impaired compared to controls, but improved significantly after 3 months of being established on dopaminergic medication. These findings suggest that precision methods might provide a sensitive means to investigate WM and its modulation by interventions in clinical populations.     

False belief in infancy: a fresh look

Can infants appreciate that others have false beliefs? Do they have a theory of mind? In this article I provide a detailed review of more than 20 experiments that have addressed these questions, and offered an affirmative answer, using nonverbal ‘violation of expectation’ and ‘anticipatory looking’ procedures. Although many of these experiments are both elegant and ingenious, I argue that their results can be explained by the operation of domain‐general processes and in terms of ‘low‐level novelty’. This hypothesis suggests that the infants' looking behaviour is a function of the degree to which the observed (perceptual novelty) and remembered or expected (imaginal novelty) low‐level properties of the test stimuli – their colours, shapes and movements – are novel with respect to events encoded by the infants earlier in the experiment. If the low‐level novelty hypothesis is correct, research on false belief in infancy currently falls short of demonstrating that infants have even an implicit theory of mind. However, I suggest that the use of two experimental strategies – inanimate control procedures, and self‐informed belief induction – could be used in combination with existing methods to bring us much closer to understanding the evolutionary and developmental origins of theory of mind.     

A demonstration of observational learning in rats using a bidirectional control

Hungry rats observed a conspecific demonstrator pushing a single manipulandum, a joystick, to the right or to the left for food reward and were then allowed access to the joystick from a different orientation. The effects of right-pushing vs left-pushing observation experience on (1) response acquisition, (2) reversal of a left-right discrimination, and (3) responding in extinction, were examined. Rats that had observed left-pushing made more left responses during acquisition than rats that had observed right-pushing, and rats that had observed demonstrators pushing in the direction that had previously been reinforced took longer to reach criterion reversal and made more responses in extinction than rats that had observed demonstrators pushing in the opposite direction to that previously reinforced. These results provide evidence that rats are capable of learning a response, or a response-reinforcer contingency, through conspecific observation.     

Baby steps: investigating the development of perceptual–motor couplings in infancy

There are cells in our motor cortex that fire both when we perform and when we observe similar actions. It has been suggested that these perceptual‐motor couplings in the brain develop through associative learning during correlated sensorimotor experience. Although studies with adult participants have provided support for this hypothesis, there is no direct evidence that associative learning also underlies the initial formation of perceptual–motor couplings in the developing brain. With the present study we addressed this question by manipulating infants’ opportunities to associate the visual and motor representation of a novel action, and by investigating how this influenced their sensorimotor cortex activation when they observed this action performed by others. Pre‐walking 7–9‐month‐old infants performed stepping movements on an infant treadmill while they either observed their own real‐time leg movements (Contingent group) or the previously recorded leg movements of another infant (Non‐contingent control group). Infants in a second control group did not perform any steps and only received visual experience with the stepping actions. Before and after the training period we measured infants’ sensorimotor alpha suppression, as an index of sensorimotor cortex activation, while they watched videos of other infants’ stepping actions. While we did not find greater sensorimotor alpha suppression following training in the Contingent group as a whole, we nevertheless found that the strength of the visuomotor contingency experienced during training predicted the amount of sensorimotor alpha suppression at post‐test in this group. We did not find any effects of motor experience alone. These results suggest that the development of perceptual–motor couplings in the infant brain is likely to be supported by associative learning during correlated visuomotor experience.