Gender Attitudes and Public Opinion Towards Electoral Gender Quotas in Brazil

Research on public opinion towards affirmative action shows that citizens often support the principle of equality while simultaneously rejecting policies that promote it in a pattern described as the “principle-policy puzzle.” The scholarship also shows that ideology and prejudice towards the targeted group explain the puzzle with respect to racial affirmative action. In this article, we use unique survey questions included in the 2014 round of the AmericasBarometer in Brazil to show that citizens tend to support electoral gender quotas while rejecting gender-based egalitarianism in a reversed version of the “principle-policy puzzle.” We argue that a different type of gender attitudes, namely benevolent sexism, shapes support for gender quotas as well as for the principle of equality. While benevolent sexists tend to reject gender equality based on views about gender complementarity and stereotypes about women's purity, they also support quotas as policies to foster such values. Our findings suggest that even though the political and scholarly debates can provide sound normative reasons for the adoption of quotas across different contexts, public support for them often relies on paternalistic views and expectations about the role of women in politics.     

The attitudinal view and the integration of the particular object of emotions

In recent years, Julien Deonna and Fabrice Teroni have proposed to understand emotions as embodied evaluative attitudes we take towards objects that figure in nonevaluative representational states. Although their account nicely explains some of the key features that emotions are widely taken to have, it runs into a version of what I call the problem of integration. In the case of the attitudinal view, the integration problem takes the form of explaining how, from the point of view of the subject, the bodily responses that make up the attitude part of the emotion and the representational states that provide the particular object of the emotion come to form an intentionally structured unitary experience, that is, one in which the bodily responses are intentionally directed towards the object. I argue that what explains this integration is the way in which the experience of bodily responses and the experience of the representational states interact. This, I propose, produces what I call an experience of convergence. I also suggest that understanding emotional experience in this way not only solves the problem of the integration but also provides a more solid ground for the claim that emotions qua embodied attitudes are evaluative.     

Effect of social organisation on interspecific differences in overmarking behaviour of foals in African equids

Animal Cognition - Overmarking remains an unstudied topic in juvenile mammals. We have previously documented a very high rate of overmarking by foals in four captive African equid species: mountain...     

Gibbons exploit information about what a competitor can see

Animal Cognition - How much nonhuman animals understand about seeing has been the focus of comparative cognition research for decades. Many social primates (and other species) are sensitive to cues...     

Do dogs rescue their owners from a stressful situation? A behavioral and physiological assessment

Animal Cognition - Rescue behavior is considered a type of pro-social response, defined as a voluntary action directed to benefit another individual who is in a stressful or dangerous situation. In...     

Age influences domestic dog cognitive performance independent of average breed lifespan

Animal Cognition - Across mammals, increased body size is positively associated with lifespan. However, within species, this relationship is inverted. This is well illustrated in dogs (Canis...     

Where and when to look: Sequential effects at the millisecond level

Attention, Perception, & Psychophysics - Learning and imitating a complex motor action requires to visually follow complex movements, but conscious perception seems too slow for such tasks....     

Effects of power on perceived and objective group variability: evidence that more powerful groups are more variable

The perception of group variability is affected by social power and status. Three different mechanisms may be responsible for these effects: (a) the power of the perceiver affects perceived group variability; (b) the power of the perceived group affects its perceived variability; and (c) the power of the group affects its actual variability. Two studies are reported to tease apart these three mechanisms and provide support for the third. In the first study, high- and low-power groups interacted and subsequently judged each other. In the second study, participants observed and rated the Study 1 groups, either knowing their power relationship or not. Results suggest that members of high-power groups manifest greater interpersonal variability than members of low-power groups.     

Unrealistic optimism and perceived control: role of personal competence

This work analyzed the effects of unrealistic optimism in the interaction between the emotional valence of future events, the perception of control over these events, and the person with whom one compares oneself. It was hypothesized that, if the person of comparison is judged as very competent, a pessimistic bias should be produced. Likelihood of four different types of events (positive and controllable, positive and uncontrollable, negative and controllable, and negative and uncontrollable) were rated by 133 university students (22 men and 111 women) for themselves, for an average student, for their best friend, and for a bright friend. A pessimistic bias was observed on the relative likelihood of the events when the comparison was made between oneself and a competent and bright friend, when events were perceived as controllable, especially positive ones. Not enough is known, however, to provide meaningful interpretation at present; that must await further data and theoretical development.