The Dark Side of Helping: Does Returning the Favor from Coworkers Hurt Employee Work Engagement?

This study investigated the potential "dark side" of helping behavior at work -- operationalized as provision of social support to coworkers. Drawing from the emotional contagion literature and Conservation of Resources (COR) theory, we proposed and tested a moderated mediational model to examine the mechanisms by which social support received from one's coworkers contribute to the support recipient's work engagement. Employing data from a 12-week-long weekly diary among 142 acute care nurses, we did not find support for the proposed negative relationship between providing social support to coworkers and support providers' work engagement, nor for the overall mediational effect of the relationship between received coworker support and work engagement through support provision. However, we found that some work contextual factors (i.e., stable social support climates from coworkers and supervisors) moderated the weekly processes through which nurses' repaying social support received from coworkers predicts their subsequent work engagement. Specifically, providing support to coworkers had stronger beneficial effects on providers' engagement when coworker/supervisor support climates were relatively low; support received from coworkers had stronger indirect beneficial effects on nurses' engagement when coworker/supervisor support climates were relatively low. Our study findings highlight the complexity of the relationship between social support dynamics and work engagement, and that emotional contagion and COR theory may be insufficient, on their own, to explain social support dynamics between coworkers. We also discuss implications of the findings for managerial practices related to support dynamics at work.     

(Why) do I think what you think? Epistemic social tuning and implicit prejudice

This research examines whether people who experience epistemic motivation (i.e., a desire to acquire knowledge) came to have implicit attitudes consistent with the apparent beliefs of another person. People had lower implicit prejudice when they experienced epistemic motivation and interacted with a person who ostensibly held egalitarian beliefs (Experiments 1 and 2). Implicit prejudice was not affected when people did not experience epistemic motivation. Further evidence shows that this tuning of implicit attitudes occurs when beliefs are endorsed by another person, but not when they are brought to mind via means that do not imply that person's endorsement (Experiment 3). Results suggest that implicit attitudes of epistemically motivated people tune to the apparent beliefs of others to achieve shared reality.     

Does expertise and thinking mode matter for accuracy in judgments of job applicants’ cognitive ability?

The present research examined the role of thinking mode for accuracy in recruiters and laypeople’s judgments of applicants’ cognitive ability. In Study 1, students who relied on their intuition were somewhat less accurate. In Study 2, an experimental manipulation of thinking mode (intuitive vs analytical) revealed no apparent differences in accuracy. Moreover, there were no differences in accuracy or agreement between recruiters and laypeople. Examination of the use of specific resume content suggested that intuitive thinking corresponds to basing one’s judgments more on the way that applicants present themselves in their personal letter and less on diagnostic biographical information such as SAT scores. The findings point to the possibility that professional recruiters may not possess intuitive expertise in this context.     

Early understanding of emotion: Evidence from natural language

Abstract

Young children's early understanding of emotion was investigated by examining their use of emotion terms such as happy, sad, mud, and cry. Five children's emotion language was examined longitudinally from the age of 2 to 5 years, and as a comparison their reference to pains via such terms as burn, sting, and hurt was also examined. In Phase 1 we confirmed and extended prior findings demonstrating that by 2 years of age terms for the basic emotions of happiness, sadness, anger, and fear are commonly used by children as are terms for such related states as crying and hurting. At this early age children produce such terms to refer to self and to others, and to past and future as well as to present states. Over the years from 2 to 5 children's emotion vocabulary expands, their discussion of hypothetical emotions gets underway, and the complexity of their emotion utterances increases. In Phase 2 our analyses go beyond children's production of emotion terms to analyses of their conception of emotion. We focus especially on when children use emotion terms to refer to subjective experiential states of persons. From their earliest uses of these terms in our data children     

The Psychometric Properties of the Personality Assessment Inventory-Short Form (PAI-SF) in Inpatient Forensic and Civil Samples

Research focusing on the Personality Assessment Inventory (PAI) has increased substantially over the past decade. However, there has been relatively little focus on the PAI short-form (PAISF). The current study evaluated the psychometric characteristics of the PAI-SF clinical scales using participants admitted to a large northeastern hospital under forensic (N?=?178) and civil (N?=?320) statutes. Results indicate that the internal consistency of the PAI-SF clinical scales is adequate for both the Forensic (range of alphas: 0.74 to 0.88) and Civil (0.79 to 0.91) samples, and assumptions of item-scale convergence and divergence were generally met with some exceptions. Finally, the PAI-SF exhibited strong agreement with the full-form PAI scores overall, and at the upper extreme (T?≥?70) of the distributions for both samples. The results are discussed in terms of how they extend prior research on the PAI-SF.     

Two kinds of naturalism in ethics

What are the conditions on a successful naturalistic account of moral properties? In this paper I discuss one such condition: the possibility of moral concepts playing a role in good empirical theories on a par with those of the natural and social sciences. I argue that Peter Railton’s influential account of moral rightness fails to meet this condition, and thus is only viable in the hands of a naturalist who doesn’t insist on it. This conclusion generalises to all versions of naturalism that give a significant role to a dispositional characterisation of moral properties. I also argue, however, that the epistemological and semantic motivations behind naturalism are consistent with a version of naturalism that doesn’t insist on the explanatory condition. The conclusion is that those naturalists who are attracted to accounts of moral properties such as Railton’s would do better not to insist on this\break condition.