Why Bayesian Psychologists Should Change the Way They Use the Bayes Factor

The discussion following Bem’s (2011 Bem, D. J. (2011). Feeling the future: Experimental evidence for anomalous retroactive influences on cognition and affect. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 100, 407–425. doi: 10.1037/a0021524[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) psi research highlights that applications of the Bayes factor in psychological research are not without problems. The first problem is the omission to translate subjective prior knowledge into subjective prior distributions. In the words of Savage (1961 Savage, L. J. (1961). The foundations of statistical inference reconsidered. In J. Neyman, (Ed.), Proceedings of the Fourth Berkeley Symposium on Mathematical Statistics and Probability, Volume 1: Contributions to the Theory of Statistics, pp. 575–586. BerkeleyCA: University of California. [Google Scholar]): “they make the Bayesian omelet without breaking the Bayesian egg.” The second problem occurs if the Bayesian egg is not broken: the omission to choose default prior distributions such that the ensuing inferences are well calibrated. The third problem is the adherence to inadequate rules for the interpretation of the size of the Bayes factor. The current paper will elaborate these problems and show how to avoid them using the basic hypotheses and statistical model used in the first experiment described in Bem (2011 Bem, D. J. (2011). Feeling the future: Experimental evidence for anomalous retroactive influences on cognition and affect. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 100, 407–425. doi: 10.1037/a0021524[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]). It will be argued that a thorough investigation of these problems in the context of more encompassing hypotheses and statistical models is called for if Bayesian psychologists want to add a well-founded Bayes factor to the tool kit of psychological researchers.     

Can we distinguish an “I” and “ME” during listening?—an event-related EEG study on the processing of first and second person personal and possessive pronouns

Theoretically, stimuli can be related to the self as subject (“I”) or object (“ME”) of experience. This event-related brain potential (ERP) study investigated whether listening to personal and possessive pronouns elicits different modes of self-processing regarding time-course and neural sources. Going beyond previous research, first (1PP) and second person (2PP) pronouns were included to determine the specificity of self-processing. Participants listened passively to German pronouns while the electroencephalogram was recorded. Modulation of ERPs revealed a processing advantage for the 2PP personal pronoun “du” (“you”) already in early time windows. Regarding possessive pronouns, N1 amplitudes indicated increased attention orientation to the 1PP pronoun “mein” (“my”), whereas during later time windows, processing of 1PP and 2PP possessive pronouns did not differ but differed from the third person pronoun “sein” (“his”). ERP source imaging suggests that primary sensory brain regions (auditory cortex), the insula and cortical midline structures are differentially involved into these two processing modes. The results support the idea of distinct self-processing modes (“I” and “ME”) and confirm their dynamic nature. Moreover, they demonstrate that on a neural level neither “I” or “ME” are invariantly tied to the first person, in line with the hypothesis that self-processing is relational and context-dependent.     

Telehealth mask wearing training for children with autism during the COVID‐19 pandemic

SARS‐CoV‐2 is the virus causing COVID‐19 and is spread through close person‐to‐person contact. The use of face masks has been described as an important strategy to slow its transmission. We evaluated the effects of coaching caregivers via telehealth technologies to teach face mask wearing to children with autism spectrum disorder. Six participants with a history of challenging behavior associated with mask wearing were recruited from different parts of the world, and trained using graduated exposure, shaping, and contingent reinforcement. By the end of the intervention, all participants wore a face mask for a period of 10 min without exhibiting challenging behavior. The skills generalized to a novel mask or a community setting. Mask wearing did not affect the percentage of oxyhemoglobin saturation of participants, and caregivers found the intervention useful. The findings support previous tolerance training treatment evaluations in children with developmental disorders exhibiting resistance to healthcare routines.     

Integration processes during frequency graph comprehension: Performance and eye movements while processing tree maps versus pie charts

Frequency graph types differ in the way how data are translated into visual representations. We compared 2 visualization methods, a traditional circular representation (pie chart) and a rectangular representation (constant column width tree map), which were hypothesized to differ regarding the cognitive ease of visual comparison processes. Performance was evaluated in tasks involving proportion and comparison judgments under both highly controlled and more realistic circumstances. The results showed performance benefits (in terms of reduced response times or error rates) for rectangular representations. Additional eye movement analyses revealed that this benefit was mainly due to a facilitation of scanning the graph for relevant information. The results suggest that facilitating comparison processes by representing the critical variable in less complex visual dimensions (i.e., straight length with constant orientation instead of surface area or curved length) eventually enhances the efficiency of integration processes during graph comprehension.     

The social structure of cooperation and punishment

The standard theories of cooperation in humans, which depend on repeated interaction and reputation effects among self-regarding agents, are inadequate. Strong reciprocity, a predisposition to participate in costly cooperation and the punishment, fosters cooperation where self-regarding behaviors fail. The effectiveness of socially coordinated punishment depends on individual motivations to participate, which are based on strong reciprocity motives. The relative infrequency of high-cost punishment is a result of the ubiquity of strong reciprocity, not its absence.     

Mind and movement

Voluntary movements embrace both intentional, conscious and post-intentional, largely automatic processes. Here, we examine these types of processes and the relations between them during preparation and execution of voluntary movements. First, a general overview is given about how intentional and post-intentional components are interleaved to enable successful control of purposeful movements. Second, we briefly describe some post-intentional processes that are triggered by preceding intentions. Third, we discuss findings according to which such post-intentional processes or their results can become accessible to conscious awareness. Under such conditions, automatic and conscious processes can co-occur. We show that intentional interventions into post-intentional processes can be overridden by automatic processes, can interfere with automatic processes and can be independent so that their outcomes add to those of automatic processes.     

Temporal discounting of monetary rewards in children and adolescents with ADHD and autism spectrum disorders

It has been difficult to differentiate attention‐deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and autism spectrum disorder (ASD) in terms of some aspects of their cognitive profile. While both show deficits in executive functions, it has been suggested that they may differ in their response to monetary reward. For instance, children with ADHD prefer small immediate over large delayed rewards more than typically developing controls. One explanation for this is that they discount the value of rewards to a higher degree as they are moved into the future. The current study investigated whether children with ADHD can be differentiated from those with ASD in terms of reward discounting. Thirty‐nine children (8–16 y) with ADHD, 34 children with ASD and 46 typically developing controls performed a hypothetical monetary temporal discounting task. Participants were instructed to make repeated choices between small variable rewards (0, 5, 10, 20, 30€) delivered immediately and large rewards delivered after a variable delay. Children with ADHD but not ASD discounted future rewards at a higher rate than typically developing controls. These data confirm steeper discounting of future rewards in ADHD and add to a small but growing literature showing that the psychological profile of ADHD can be distinguished from that of ASD in terms of disrupted motivational processes.