Visual image retention does not contribute to modulation of event-related potentials by mental rotation

Rotation of a visual image in mind is associated with a slow posterior negative deflection of the event-related potential (ERP), termed rotation-related negativity (RRN). Retention of a visual image in short-term memory is also associated with a slow posterior negative ERP, termed negative slow wave (NSW). We tested whether short-term memory retention, indexed by the NSW, contributes to the RRN. ERPs were recorded in the same subjects in two tasks, a mental rotation task, eliciting the RRN, and a visual short-term memory task, eliciting the NSW. Over both right and left parietal scalp, no association was found between the NSW and the RRN amplitudes. Furthermore, adjusting for the effect of the NSW had no influence on a significant association between the RRN amplitude and response time, an index of mental rotation performance. Our data indicate that the RRN reflects manipulation of a visual image but not its retention in short-term memory.     

The Construct of Self-Expansiveness and the Validity of the Transpersonal Scale of the Self-Expansiveness Level Form

The self-concept is usually seen as individualistic and/or social-relational, although sometimes it is viewed as ecological, temporal, or biological, constituting differing perspectives that are not well unified. The construct of self-expansiveness, which shows how the self-concept can expand from a narrow individualistic identification to wider social, ecological, temporal, and biological identifications to very expansive transpersonal identifications, is discussed as an integrating framework for understanding the self-concept. Three validation studies using the Self-Expansiveness Level Form Transpersonal Scale (Friedman, 1981 Friedman, H. 1981. The Self-Expansiveness Level Form: A conceptualization and measurement of a transpersonal construct., Atlanta: Unpublished dissertation, Georgia State University.  [Google Scholar]), a measure of transpersonal self-expansiveness, were conducted with a known transpersonal/spiritual sample and student samples, comparing it with various spirituality measures across samples. Generally, results support that scale's construct and criterion validity and, consequently, the validity of the underlying construct of self-expansiveness.     

Nominalism and Idealism

The article considers, in a historical setting, the links between varieties of nominalism—the extreme nominalism of the Quine-Goodman variety and the trope nominalism current today—and types of idealism. In so doing arguments of various twentieth century figures, including Husserl, Bradley, Russell, and Sartre, as well as a contemporary attack on relations by Peter Simons are critically examined. The paper seeks to link the rejection of realism about universals with the rejection of a mind-independent “world”—in short, linking nominalism with idealism.     

Depression at 3 Months Poststroke in the Elderly: Predictors and Indicators of Prevalence

The prevalence and determinants of depression in 79 elderly patients were assessed at 3 months poststroke. Predictor variables included gender, age, history of previous stroke, and hemispheric location of stroke. Indicator variables included two measures of physical functioning and seven aspects of cognitive functioning. Results indicated that 56% of patients had impairment in activities of daily living, and 39% reported clinically significant levels of depression. Prevalence of cognitive impairment ranged from 31% on a measure of basic cognitive functioning, through to 89% on a measure of complex attention. The results from a hierarchical multiple regression analysis showed that the combination of predictor and indicator variables explained 53% of the variance in depression scores. The three individual variables of history of previous stroke, physical functioning, and simple attention all made significant unique contributions to the variance in depression scores. The contribution of these findings to the ongoing debate concerning lesion location and poststroke depression is discussed.     

Contributing to Discourse

For people to contribute to discourse, they must do more than utter the right sentence at the right time. The basic requirement is that they add to their common ground in an orderly way. To do this, we argue, they try to establish for each utterance the mutual belief that the addressees have understood what the speaker meant well enough for current purposes. This is accomplished by the collective actions of the current contributor and his or her partners, and these result in units of conversation called contributions. We present a model of contributions and show how it accounts for a variety of features of everyday conversations.