What can functional neuroimaging tell the experimental psychologist?

I argue here that functional neuroimaging data—which I restrict to the haemodynamic techniques of fMRI and PET—can inform psychological theorizing, provided one assumes a “systematic” function-structure mapping in the brain. In this case, imaging data simply comprise another dependent variable, along with behavioural data, that can be used to test competing theories. In particular, I distinguish two types of inference: function-to-structure deduction and structure-to-function induction. With the former inference, a qualitatively different pattern of activity over the brain under two experimental conditions implies at least one different function associated with changes in the independent variable. With the second type of inference, activity of the same brain region(s) under two conditions implies a common function, possibly not predicted a priori. I illustrate these inferences with imaging studies of recognition memory, short-term memory, and repetition priming. I then consider in greater detail what is meant by a “systematic” function-structure mapping and argue that, particularly for structure-to-function induction, this entails a one-to-one mapping between functional and structural units, although the structural unit may be a network of interacting regions and care must be taken over the appropriate level of functional/structural abstraction. Nonetheless, the assumption of a systematic function-structure mapping is a “working hypothesis” that, in common with other scientific fields, cannot be proved on independent grounds and is probably best evaluated by the success of the enterprise as a whole. I also consider statistical issues such as the definition of a qualitative difference and methodological issues such as the relationship between imaging and behavioural data. I finish by reviewing various objections to neuroimaging, including neophrenology, functionalism, and equipotentiality, and by observing some criticisms of current practice in the imaging literature.     

A mini-review of fMRI studies of human medial temporal lobe activity associated with recognition memory

This review considers event-related functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies of human recognition memory that have or have not reported activations within the medial temporal lobes (MTL). For comparisons both between items at study (encoding) and between items at test (recognition), MTL activations are characterized as left/right, anterior/posterior, and hippocampus/surrounding cortex, and as a function of the stimulus material and relevance of item/source information. Though no clear pattern emerges, there are trends suggesting differences between item and source information, and verbal and spatial information, and a role for encoding processes during recognition tests. Important future directions are considered.     

A mini-review of fMRI studies of human medial temporal lobe activity associated with recognition memory.

This review considers event-related functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies of human recognition memory that have or have not reported activations within the medial temporal lobes (MTL). For comparisons both between items at study (encoding) and between items at test (recognition), MTL activations are characterized as left/right, anterior/posterior, and hippocampus/surrounding cortex, and as a function of the stimulus material and relevance of item/source information. Though no clear pattern emerges, there are trends suggesting differences between item and source information, and verbal and spatial information, and a role for encoding processes during recognition tests. Important future directions are considered.     

Reference and Imperfective Paradox

Philosophical Studies -     

WHAT MAKES A QUANTUM PHYSICS BELIEF BELIEVABLE? MANY-WORLDS AMONG SIX IMPOSSIBLE THINGS BEFORE BREAKFAST

An extraordinary, if circumscribed, positive shift has occurred since the mid-twentieth century in the perceived status of Hugh Everett III's 1956 theory of the universal wave function of quantum mechanics, now widely called the Many-Worlds Interpretation (MWI). Everett's starkly new interpretation denied the existence of a separate classical realm, contending that the experimental data can be seen as presenting a state vector for the whole universe. Since there is no state vector collapse, reality as a whole is strictly deterministic. Explained jointly by the dynamical variables and the state vector, “this reality is not the reality we customarily think of, but is a reality composed of many worlds,” wrote Everett's colleague Bryce DeWitt. In this essay, I account briefly for the change of status in conventional scientific terms, yet chiefly in extended terms of three sets of ideas that I argue can be understood to affect believability in both scientific and religious contexts, illuminating helpfully the MWI phenomenon, and its engagement with theology: orthodoxy and heresy, language and reference, and faith and agnosticism. One's orientation relative to the variable content of these dynamic, socially oriented categories helps to make belief in ideas as metaphysically challenging as Everettian Quantum Mechanics, or particular ideas about God, either more or less believable. The categories will have the same function in a theology engaging Everett's theory, and in any theology at all written in a society deeply marked by what I further argue is a subtle, powerful, and pervasive mode of quasi-scientific thinking we can call societal constructive agnosticism, of which anyone doing theology today must be aware.