Why are there so few ethnic minorities in ecology and evolutionary biology? Challenges to inclusion and the role of sense of belonging

Social Psychology of Education - African Americans and other ethnic minorities are severely underrepresented in both graduate education and among the professoriate in ecology and evolutionary...     

Illocutionary harm

Philosophical Studies - A number of philosophers have become interested in the ways that individuals are subject to harm as the performers of illocutionary acts. This paper offers an account of the...     

Infants' use of social partnerships to predict behavior

The experiences of social partners are important motivators of social action. Can infants use such experiences to make predictions about how social agents will behave? Sixteen‐month‐old infants were introduced to two social pairs. Initial events established within‐pair cooperation as well as between‐pair conflict involving an individual from each pair. Following these events, infants looked longer when between‐pair members who had never previously interacted now cooperated – instead of conflicted – with each other. Thus, infants tracked the third‐person allegiances and inferred that the conflict would generalize across social partnerships. These findings demonstrate a critical feature of early social cognition and promote needed, further research on the role of social allegiances in social cognition across development.     

Tricks of Memory

Remembering an episode from even the recent past may involve a blend of fiction and fact. We discuss a straight-forward laboratory paradigm that is proving useful in the study of false memories of simple episodes. In this paradigm, subjects study lists of 15 related words ( bed, rest, awake ...) that are all related to a critical word that is not presented ( sleep ). Later, subjects recall and recognize the critical missing word with about the same probability that they remember words from the list. This memory illusion is resistant to people's attempts to avoid it. We argue that similar memory errors are commonplace and are a natural outcome of an intelligent cognitive system, which makes inferences about incoming information. Therefore, memory illusions, like perceptual illusions, are a consequence of normal human information processing and offer a window for examining basic cognitive processes.