Information integration in multiple cue judgment: a division of labor hypothesis

There is considerable evidence that judgment is constrained to additive integration of information. The authors propose an explanation of why serial and additive cognitive integration can produce accurate multiple cue judgment both in additive and non-additive environments in terms of an adaptive division of labor between multiple representations. It is hypothesized that, whereas the additive, independent linear effect of each cue can be explicitly abstracted and integrated by a serial, additive judgment process, a variety of sophisticated task properties, like non-additive cue combination, non-linear relations, and inter-cue correlation, are carried implicitly by exemplar memory. Three experiments investigating the effect of additive versus non-additive cue combination verify the predicted shift in cognitive representations as a function of the underlying combination rule.     

Encouraging Cooperation: Revisiting Solidarity and Commitment Effects in Prisoner's Dilemma Games1

Pre‐play discussion consistently increases cooperation in dilemma interactions. Most explanations of this “cheap‐talk” effect are based on either commitment or group solidarity effects. Because discussion about the upcoming dilemma allows participants to make promises and creates group solidarity, the 2 explanations are often confounded. This paper aims to clarify past results by having participants engage in an unrelated discussion prior to a dilemma interaction. We find that solidarity effects can be induced by minimal group categorizations, but are relatively weak. Discussions involving consequential but unrelated coordination tasks are shown to prime cooperative norms and increase cooperation with both in‐group and out‐group members. Our findings suggest that cheap talk may work for even cheaper reasons than previously thought.     

Some Comments on Pareto Thinking,Test Validity,and Adverse Impact: When ‘and’ is optimal and ‘or’ is a trade‐off

De Corte, Lievens, and Sackett add to the literature on selection test validity and adverse impact (AI). Their Pareto‐based weighting scheme essentially asks organizations if they are willing to give up some validity to hopefully achieve some reduction in AI. We considered their approach and conclusions in relation to the regression weighting method we used, and we offer five points that reflect our observations as well as our shared goals. We hope our comments, like their work in this field, will invigorate the pursuit of new ways of examining, and one day resolving, the persistent concern regarding the AI associated with valid selection tests.     

``Mistakes'

A suggestion famously made by Peter Winch and carried through to present discussions holds that what constitutes the social as a kind consists of something shared – rules or practices commonly learned, internalized, or otherwise acquired by all members belonging to a society. This essays argues against the explanatory efficacy of appeals to this shared something as constitutive of a social kind by examining a violation of social norms or rules, viz., mistakes. I argue that an asymmetric relation exists between the notion of mistakes and that of the social. In particular, mistakes do not presuppose a concept of the social, but the concept of the social requires prior specification of a category of mistakes. But no such prior specification proves possible. The very notion of a mistake is so inchoate that it makes it impossible to provide the kind of regimentation required for a rule-governed domain. Thus, there may be recognized mistakes even in the absence of a unified system or common knowledge of norms.Later writers attempt to avoid Winch's over-strong assumption that something shared and internal constitutes the social but cannot. Extending recent work by Stephen Turner, I argue that ``the social' is not a domain that is susceptible to lawlike treatment, but rather a heterogeneous, motley collection. For absent the assumption of a shared something, no social object exists to be explained. So, I conclude, we have at present no clear way of marking out the social as a coherent or unified domain of inquiry.     

Epistemological Strata and the Rules of Right Reason

It has been commonplace in epistemology since its inception to idealize away from computational resource constraints, i.e., from the constraints of time and memory. One thought is that a kind of ideal rationality can be specified that ignores the constraints imposed by limited time and memory, and that actual cognitive performance can be seen as an interaction between the norms of ideal rationality and the practicalities of time and memory limitations. But a cornerstone of naturalistic epistemology is that normative assessment is constrained by capacities: you cannot require someone to do something they cannot or, as it is usually put, ought implies can. This much we take to be uncontroversial. We argue that differences in architectures, goals and resources imply substantial differences in capacity, and that some of these differences are ineliminable. It follows that some differences in goals and architectural and computational resources matter at the normative level: they constrain what principles of normative epistemology can be used to describe and prescribe their behavior. As a result, we can expect there to be important epistemic differences between the way brains, individuals, and science work.     

Personnel Selection with Top‐Score‐Referenced Banding: On the Inappropriateness of Current Procedures

The method of selecting among job applicants using statistically based banding has been proposed over the last 10 years as a way to increase workforce diversity. The method continues to be reviewed by academics and considered by practitioners. Although the goal of increasing workforce diversity is important, statistical banding of scores remains controversial. We present a set of unique, statistically and theoretically based criticisms of a form of banding (top‐score‐referenced banding) that is widely used in hundreds of jobs in the public sector throughout the United States. We suggest that even within the premises of such banding, the wrong formula is used to estimate the standard error of measurement and standard error of the difference. One consequence is that too many individuals are labeled as essentially equal with respect to test scores. A related consequence is that test scores within a single band are statistically different and should therefore be treated as such for selection purposes. A more logically and statistically defensible procedure for responding to diversity concerns is to continue to attend to adverse impact issues at each step of the recruiting and test development process.     

Binding feature dimensions in visual short-term memory

We explored several possible influences on binding in visual short-term memory (VSTM) performance. The task was to report whether a test object was the same (“old” trials) or different (“new” trials) from any of the sample objects seen a second ago. The objects were composed of two features that varied from continuous to discrete shapes and colors. In “old” trials the test object appeared either in the same or different position. In “new” trials the test object differed along both features, requiring storage of only one feature per object; along one feature, requiring no binding but storage of all features; or it was created by recombining features from the sample, which requires binding. Existing storage hypotheses are unable to explain the similar sensitivity (d′) obtained in the two last conditions when position remained the same and may suggest that links are created between positions and features. Highest sensitivity occurred when the test object remained at the same position, required no binding, and discrete features were used. Object-type × position, and feature combination × position interactions occurred, suggesting different storage modes depending on whether objects change position during retention.     

Efficacy of a Manualized and Workbook-Driven Individual Treatment for Social Anxiety Disorder

Social anxiety disorder is a prevalent and impairing disorder for which viable cognitive-behavioral therapies exist. However, these treatments have not been easily packaged for dissemination and may be underutilized as a result. The current study reports on the findings of a randomized controlled trial of a manualized and workbook-driven individual cognitive-behavioral treatment for social anxiety disorder (Hope, Heimberg, Juster, & Turk, 2000; Hope, Heimberg, & Turk, 2006). This treatment package was derived from an empirically supported group treatment for social anxiety disorder and intended for broad dissemination, but it has not previously been subjected to empirical examination on its own. As a first step in that examination, 38 clients seeking treatment for social anxiety disorder at either the Adult Anxiety Clinic of Temple University or the Anxiety Disorders Clinic of the University of Nebraska-Lincoln were randomly assigned to receive either immediate treatment with this cognitive-behavioral treatment package or treatment delayed for 20 weeks. Evaluation at the posttreatment/postdelay period revealed substantially greater improvements among immediate treatment clients on interviewer-rated and self-report measures of social anxiety and impairment. Three-month follow-up assessment revealed maintenance of gains. Clinical implications and directions for future research are discussed.     

On Taboos: The Danish Cartoon Crisis 2005–20081

Abstract : The international crisis following the publication of 12 Muhammad cartoons in the Danish newspaper Jyllands‐Posten (September 30, 2005) raises the general question of how to exercise the freedom of expression in relation to religious taboos. After briefly reviewing the Cartoon Crisis from September 2005 to the bombings on the Danish Ambassay in Pakistan in June 2008, the article addresses Lutheran resources for coping with secularisation and desecularisation, in particular as regards the taboos that persist as a part of religious and humanistic values. The thesis is that the Lutheran doctrine of the two kingdoms has given rise to two models of interpretation that have both been historically active. The doctrine of the two regiments has been interpreted both as a ‘liberalist’ argument for a principled separation of religion and politics, and as a ‘social‐conservative’ (later Social Democratic) argument for the view that the state should take care of its citizens' welfare through education, the legal system and social services. In today's global and multi‐religious world, this leads us to ask the question to what extent a welfare society, for the sake of peace and social order, should, or should not, protect religious sensitivities. Should religious communities always be kept out of public life, or can they be recognised as non‐governmental organizations in civil society, hence as potential partners for the state?