Learning subjective health complaints

Symptom episodes often show a spatio-temporal structure, that is, they occur in a specific context for a certain duration. Repeated experiences may therefore be construed as associative learning trials, in which context elements are turned into predictive cues, triggering anticipatory processes conducive to subjective health complaints. A series of experiments, using inhalations of air enriched with CO2 and external (odors) or internal (mental images) stimuli as cues, is discussed to show that subjective health complaints may occur upon presenting the cue alone. Learned symptoms may be unrelated to bodily responses and easily generalize to new related cues. Better learning occurs to cues with a negative affective valence and in participants scoring high for negative affectivity. Our findings are relevant to the understanding of medically unexplained ("functional") syndromes and the poor relationship between objective and subjective health indicators in general.     

Perception of pictorial eye gaze by baboons (Papio papio)

Pictorial faces looking left or right were presented to baboons (Papio papio) before the display of a target letter in the left or right hemifield of a monitor screen. Baboons had to provide go or no-go responses taking into account the identity of the target letter. The 1st 6 experiments showed no reliable effect of eye gaze on discrimination speed, using either schematic gazes or pictures of real gazes. Experiment 7 showed that eye gazes facilitated target processing when eye cues were perfect predictors of target location. Findings suggest that baboons do not spontaneously process eye-gaze direction but can learn to do so if the gaze has a predictive value. Implications of these findings on baboons' perspective-taking abilities are discussed.     

Postural orientation: age-related changes in variability and time-to-boundary

The relation between age-specific postural instability and the detection of stability boundaries was examined. Balance control was investigated under different visual conditions (eyes open/closed) and postural orientations (forward/backward lean) while standing on a force platform. Dependent variables included center of pressure variability and the time-to-contact of the center of pressure with the stability boundaries around the feet (i.e., time-to-boundary). While leaning maximally, older individuals (ages 55-69) showed increased center of pressure variability compared to no lean, while younger subjects (ages 24-38) showed a decrease. These significant differences were found only in anterior-posterior direction. No significant age-specific differences were found between eyes open and eyes closed conditions. Time-to-boundary analysis revealed reduced spatio-temporal stability margins in older individuals in both anterior-posterior and medio-lateral directions. Time-to-boundary variability, however, was not significantly different between the groups in both medio-lateral and anterior-posterior direction. These results show the importance of boundary relevant center of pressure measures in the study of postural control, especially concerning the lateral instability often observed in older adults.     

Global visual completion of quasi-regular shapes

The topic of amodal completion has often been investigated by using partly occluded shapes that are regular. In research that has typically been done with displays such as these regular shapes, it has been shown that global aspects of a shape can determine completion. To see how robust these global influences in the completion process are, we investigated quasi-regular shapes, ie shapes with a certain overall regularity but not based on metrical identities. First, in experiment 1 participants had to complete quasi-regular shapes in a drawing task. Then, in experiment 2 the primed-matching paradigm was used. Results from both experiments provided evidence for global completions. In experiment 3 we found that multiple global completions can be primed, which, as a control experiment showed, cannot be explained by some inability of the visual system to see the difference between the different completions. These data support the notion that global influences on visual occlusion are apparent even when the partly occluded stimulus is outside the domain of regular shapes. Implications for a global approach are provided.     

When timing the mind one should also mind the timing: biases in the measurement of voluntary actions

Trevena and Miller (2002, this issue) provide further evidence that readiness potentials occur in the brain prior to the time that participants claim to have initiated a voluntary movement, a contention originally forwarded by Libet, Gleason, Wright, and Pearl (1983). In their examination of this issue, though, aspects of their data lead them to question whether their measurement of the initiation of a voluntary movement was accurate. The current article addresses this concern by providing a direct analysis of biases in this task. This was done by asking participants to make subjective timing decisions regarding a stimulus that could be measured objectively. Our findings suggest that their timing task was indeed biased such that participants' tend to report events as happening approximately 70 ms later than they actually happened. Implications for the original Libet et al. claims are discussed.     

Physical,neural, and mental timing

The conclusions drawn by Benjamin Libet from his work with colleagues on the timing of somatosensorial conscious experiences has met with a lot of praise and criticism. In this issue we find three examples of the latter. Here I attempt to place the divide between the two opponent camps in a broader perspective by analyzing the question of the relation between physical timing, neural timing, and experiential (mental) timing. The nervous system does a sophisticated job of recombining and recoding messages from the sensorial surfaces and if these processes are slighted in a theory, it might become necessary to postulate weird operations, including subjective back-referral. Neuroscientifically inspired theories are of necessity still based on guesses, extrapolations, and philosophically dubious manners of speech. They often assume some neural correlate of consciousness (NCC) as a part of the nervous system that transforms neural activity in reportable experiences. The majority of neuroscientists appear to assume that the NCC can compare and bind activity patterns only if they arrive simultaneously at the NCC. This leads to a search for synchrony or to theories in terms of the compensation of differences in neural delays (latencies). This is the main dimension of the Libet discussion. Examples from vision research, such as "temporal-binding-by-synchrony" and the "flash-lag" effect, are then used to illustrate these reasoning patterns in more detail. Alternatively one could assume symbolic representations of time and space (symbolic "tags") that are not coded in their own dimension (not time in time and space in space). Unless such tags are multiplexed with the quality message (tickle, color, or motion), one gets a binding problem for tags. One of the hidden aspects of the discussion between Libet and opponents appears to be the following. Is the NCC smarter than the rest of the nervous system, so that it can solve the problems of local sign (e.g., "where is the event"?) and timing (e.g., "when did it occur?" and "how long did it last?") on its own, or are these pieces of information coded symbolically early on in the system? A supersmart NCC appears to be the assumption of Libet's camp (which includes Descartes, but also mystics). The wish to distribute the smartness evenly across all stages of processing in the nervous system (smart recodings) appears to motivate the opponents. I argue that there are reasons to side with the latter group.     

A computational account of altered error processing in older age: Dopamine and the error-related negativity

When participants commit errors or receive feedback signaling that they have made an error, a negative brain potential is elicited. According to Holroyd and Coles’s (in press) neurocomputational model of error processing, this error-related negativity (ERN) is elicited when the brain first detects that the consequences of an action are worse than expected. To study age-related changes in error processing, we obtained performance and ERN measures of younger and high-functioning older adults. Experiment 1 demonstrated reduced ERN amplitudes in older adults in the context of otherwise intact brain potentials. This result could not be attributed to uncertainty about the required response in older adults. Experiment 2 revealed impaired performance and reduced response- and feedback-related ERNs of older adults in a probabilistic learning task. These age changes could be simulated by manipulation of a single parameter of the neurocomputational model, this manipulation corresponding to weakened phasic activity of the mesencephalic dopamine system.     

Phonological sensitivity and the acquisition of new words in children

Two studies are reported which aimed to examine the relationship between phonological sensitivity and the acquisition of new words that systematically differed in the familiarity of their sound structures. In the first study measures of phonological sensitivity, phonological short-term memory, vocabulary, and nonverbal ability were administered to forty-one 5-year-old children. Phonological sensitivity was related to the paired-associate learning of phonologically unfamiliar words, but not to the learning of familiar words. In the second study a group of 14 nonreading 5-year-old children received phonological sensitivity training. A control group was trained in semantic categorization. After the training, the phonological sensitivity group did perform better on measures of letter knowledge and phonological sensitivity (rhyme and first-sound categorization) and appeared to learn phonologically unfamiliar words more easily. The findings of both studies suggest that phonological sensitivity can support the acquisition of novel words.     

A sociohistorical view of group psychotherapy in the United States: the ideology of individualism and self-liberation

A deep strain of individualism permeates American culture, rooted in the political-economic ideology of capitalism. The ideal of a self-governing individual is promoted, independent from social, historical, and cultural forces, whose thoughts and emotions are located within the construct of a masterful self, ready to be filled and expanded. This article traces the influence of self-liberatory ideology in American group psychotherapy through the religious revivalist and Mental Hygiene movements. The "progressivism" of pioneering group theorists is examined in terms of revisionist psychology and self-liberatory practice. Psychodrama and T-groups are demonstrated to be precursors to the encounter group movement in which the belief in self-liberation reached its zenith. Early group analytic approaches are seen to eschew transpersonal and group dynamic processes.