Is Family Expressiveness as Reported by Mothers and Fathers Related to Children’s Social Anxiety Symptoms?

We examined family expressiveness as reported by mothers and fathers with respect to children’s report of social anxiety symptoms. Participants consisted of a clinical sample of 178 youth (8–16 years) and their parents. The sample was largely homogenous (163 Caucasians, 6 African American, 4 Hispanic, 5 Asian/Native American; 118 boys, 60 girls), and for analytic purposes, divided into two age groups: young children between 8 and 10 years and preadolescents and adolescents between 11 and 16 years. Youth completed the Social Anxiety subscale of the Multidimensional Anxiety Scale for Children and parents completed the Expressiveness subscale of the Family Environment Scale. The Expressiveness subscale measures the extent to which family members openly and directly express their emotions. We hypothesized that low levels of family expressiveness, as reported by mothers and fathers, would be associated with heightened symptoms of social anxiety for both age groups of the youth. Contrary to predictions, no significant associations were observed between young children’s social anxiety and expressiveness. For older children, however, maternal reports of family expressiveness were negatively related to social anxiety symptoms (as predicted) whereas paternal reports of family expressiveness were positively related to youth’s social anxiety symptoms (counter to predictions). This later finding suggests that the more expressive the father perceived the family to be, the higher the symptoms of social anxiety reported by the older youth. Findings are discussed in terms of differential perceptions of family expressiveness and socialization by mothers and fathers and gender role stereotypes.     

Strong representationalism and centered content

I argue that strong representationalism, the view that for a perceptual experience to have a certain phenomenal character just is for it to have a certain representational content (perhaps represented in the right sort of way), encounters two problems: the dual looks problem and the duplication problem. The dual looks problem is this: strong representationalism predicts that how things phenomenally look to the subject reflects the content of the experience. But some objects phenomenally look to both have and not have certain properties, for example, my bracelet may phenomenally look to be circular-shaped and oval-shaped (and hence non-circular-shaped). So, if strong representationalism is true, then the content of my experience ought to represent my bracelet as being both circular-shaped and non-circular-shaped. Yet, intuitively, the content of my experience does not represent my bracelet as being both circular-shaped and non-circular-shaped. The duplication problem is this. On a standard conception of content, spatio-temporally distinct experiences and experiences had by distinct subjects may differ in content despite the fact that they are phenomenally indistinguishable. But this undermines the thesis that phenomenal character determines content. I argue that the two problems can be solved by applying a version of an idea from David Chalmers, which is to recognize the existence of genuinely centered properties in the content of perceptual experience.     

How Truth Behaves When There’s No Vicious Reference

In The Revision Theory of Truth (MIT Press), Gupta and Belnap (1993) claim as an advantage of their approach to truth “its consequence that truth behaves like an ordinary classical concept under certain conditions—conditions that can roughly be characterized as those in which there is no vicious reference in the language.” To clarify this remark, they define Thomason models, nonpathological models in which truth behaves like a classical concept, and investigate conditions under which a model is Thomason: they argue that a model is Thomason when there is no vicious reference in it. We extend their investigation, considering notions of nonpathologicality and senses of “no vicious reference” generated both by revision theories of truth and by fixed-point theories of truth. We show that some of the fixed-point theories have an advantage analogous to that which Gupta and Belnap claim for their approach, and that at least one revision theory does not. This calls into question the claim that the revision theories have a distinctive advantage in this regard.     

Development and Preliminary Validation of a New Measure to Assess Shame: The Shame Inventory

Research on the emotion of shame has increased significantly in recent years. However, there remains a need for more psychometrically sound measures of shame, including measures of shame in response to specific, idiographic experiences. The Shame Inventory was developed in order to assess both global feelings of shame as well as shame in response to specific life events or personal characteristics. Two studies were conducted to determine the preliminary psychometric properties of the Shame Inventory. Across both studies, results indicate that the inventory has high internal consistency, test-retest reliability, construct validity, and predictive validity. The Shame Inventory holds promise as a new measure designed to assess both global feelings of shame as well as specific shame-eliciting cues.     

Monetary reward increases attentional effort in the flanker task

An important question is whether monetary reward can increase attentional effort in order to improve performance. Up to now, evidence for a positive answer is weak. Therefore, in the present study, the flanker task was used to examine this question further. Participants had to respond sooner than a certain deadline in a flanker task. One group of participants received a performance-contingent monetary reward, whereas the other group earned a fixed amount of money. As a result, monetary reward significantly improved performance in comparison with the control group. The analysis of speed-accuracy trade-off functions revealed that monetary reward increased attentional effort, leading to an enhanced quality of stimulus coding. Little evidence was found that reward also improved selective spatial attention.     

The temporality of Merleau-Ponty’s intertwining

In his last work, The Visible and the Invisible, Merleau-Ponty explored the fact that we believe that perception occurs in our heads (“in the recesses of a body”) and, hence, assert that the perceptual world is “in” us, while also believing that we are “in” the world we perceive.  In this article, I examine how this intertwining of self and world justifies the faith we have in perception. I shall do so by considering a number of examples.  In each case, the object “in itself” will turn out to be neither within us nor outside of us, but rather at the intersection set by the intertwining. I will then turn to what this disclosure of this object reveals about human temporality and, indeed, about human being as a place (or “clearing”) that permits disclosure.     

Parent’s Perception of Their First Encounter with Child and Adolescent Psychiatry

Parents who came with their child to Child and Adolescent Psychiatry (CAP) for the first time were interviewed 1–2 weeks afterwards in the presence of the child and the therapists. In a grounded theory analysis they revealed uncertainty about their role in the first meeting as well as of future planning. What had been important to them were aspects like communication, sharing perspectives, and the reformulation of problems.     

Media making Muslims: the construction of a Muslim community in Germany through media debate

This article focuses on the ways in which Muslims actively participate in media debates about Islam and Muslims in Germany, and how they challenge or reinforce representations of themselves. It questions the narrative of powerlessness versus dominant actors in media and politics. Even though they were already perceived as part of a Muslim community, several prominent individuals in the German cultural and political sphere took an explicit position as Muslims—some insisting on their distance to religion. This paper aims at describing the various reasons and reflections accompanying this decision and argues that media images of Muslims steered individuals, who are not members of Islamic organizations let alone representatives of them, to become active or change their self-representation and act as Muslims. By demanding recognition as active members of German society, prominent Muslim individuals are creating new images of Muslims beyond an imaginary that is reducing them to their (alleged) religiosity and positioning them outside German national identity.