Evaluation of antecedent stimulus parameters for the treatment of escape-maintained aberrant behavior

We evaluated a methodology for identifying the range of stimulus features of antecedent stimuli associated with aberrant behavior in demand contexts in natural settings. For each participant, an experimental analysis of antecedents (Phase 1) was conducted to confirm the hypothesis that task instructions occasioned increases in aberrant behavior. During Phase 2, specific stimulus features associated with the presentation of task instructions were assessed by evaluating the child's behavior across two distinct settings, therapists, and types of tasks in a sequential fashion. Aberrant behavior occurred immediately across settings and therapists, presumably because the presence of a discriminative stimulus for escape-maintained behavior (the delivery of a task instruction) occasioned aberrant behavior. However, aberrant behavior decreased initially across tasks, suggesting that familiarity with the task might be a variable. During Phase 3, an experimental (functional) analysis of consequences was conducted with 2 participants to verify that aberrant behavior was maintained by negative reinforcement. During Phase 4, a treatment package that interspersed play with task instructions was conducted to disrupt the ongoing occurrence of aberrant behavior. Immediate and durable treatment effects occurred for 2 of the 3 participants.     

Relative mislocalization of briefly presented stimuli in the retinal periphery

We studied the ability to localize flashed stimuli, using a relative judgment task. When observers are asked to localize the peripheral position of a probe with respect to the midposition of a spatially extended comparison stimulus, they tend to judge the probe as being more toward the periphery than is the midposition of the comparison stimulus. We report seven experiments in which this novel phenomenon was explored. They reveal that the mislocalization occurs only when the probe and the comparison stimulus are presented in succession, independent of whether the probe or the comparison stimulus comes first (Experiment 1). The size of the mislocalization is dependent on the stimulus onset asynchrony (Experiment 2) and on the eccentricity of presentation (Experiment 3). In addition, the illusion also occurs in an absolute judgment task, which links mislocalization with the general tendency to judge peripherally presented stimuli as being more foveal than they actually are (Experiment 4). The last three experiments reveal that relative mislocalization is affected by the amount of spatial extension of the comparison stimulus (Experiment 5) and by its structure (Experiments 6 and 7). This pattern of results allows us to evaluate possible explanations of the illusion and to relate it to comparable tendencies observed in eye movement behavior. It is concluded that the system in charge of the guidance of saccadic eye movements is also the system that provides the metric in perceived visual space.     

Splitting a Difference of Opinion: The Shift to Negotiation

Negotiation is not only used to settle differences of interest but also to settle differences of opinion. Discussants who are unable to resolve their difference about the objective worth of a policy or action proposal may be willing to abandon their attempts to convince the other and search instead for a compromise that would, for each of them, though only a second choice yet be preferable to a lasting conflict. Our questions are: First, when is it sensible to enter into negotiations and when would this be unwarranted or even fallacious? Second, what is the nature of a compromise? What does it mean to settle instead of resolve a difference of opinion, and what might be the dialectical consequences of mistaking a compromise for a substantial resolution? Our main aim is to contribute to the theory of argumentation within the context of negotiation and compromise formation and to show how arguing disputants can shift to negotiation in a dialectically virtuous way.     

Motivational reserve: motivation-related occupational abilities and risk of mild cognitive impairment and Alzheimer disease

Midlife motivational abilities, that is, skills to initiate and persevere in the implementation of goals, have been related to mental and physical health, but their association with risk of mild cognitive impairment (MCI) and Alzheimer's disease (AD) has not yet been directly investigated. This relation was examined with data from the German Study on Ageing, Cognition, and Dementia in Primary Care Patients (AgeCoDe). A total of 3,327 nondemented participants (50.3% of a randomly selected sample) aged 75-89 years were recruited in primary care and followed up twice (after 1.5 and 3 years). Motivation-related occupational abilities were estimated on the basis of the main occupation (assessed at follow-up II) using the Occupational Information Network (O* NET) database, which provides detailed information on worker characteristics and abilities. Cox proportional hazards models were used to evaluate the relative risk of developing MCI and AD in relation to motivation-related occupational abilities, adjusting for various covariates. Over the 3 years of follow-up, 15.2% participants developed MCI and 3.0% developed AD. In a fully adjusted model, motivation-related occupational abilities were found to be associated with a reduced risk of MCI (HR: 0.77; 95% CI: 0.64-0.92). Motivation-related occupational abilities were associated with reduced risk of AD in ApoE ε4 carriers (HR: 0.48; CI: 0.25-0.91), but not in noncarriers (HR: 0.99; CI: 0.65-1.53). These results suggest that midlife motivational abilities are associated with reduced risk of MCI in general and with reduced risk of AD in ApoE ε4 carriers. Revealing the mechanisms underlying this association may inform novel prevention strategies for decelerating cognitive decline in old age.     

Treatment Outcome of 18-Month, Day Hospital Mentalization-Based Treatment (MBT) in Patients with Severe Borderline Personality Disorder in the Netherlands

Psychoanalytically oriented day hospital therapy, later manualized and named mentalization-based treatment (MBT), has proven to be a (cost-) effective treatment for patients with severe borderline personality disorder and a high degree of psychiatric comorbidity (BPD) in the United Kingdom (UK). As to yet it has not been shown whether manualized day hospital MBT would yield similar results when conducted by an independent institute outside the UK. We investigated the applicability and treatment outcome of 18-month, manualized day hospital MBT in the Netherlands by means of a prospective cohort study with 45 Dutch patients with severe BPD and a high degree of comorbid Axis I and Axis II disorders. Outcomes were assessed each six months. Symptom distress, social and interpersonal functioning, and personality pathology and functioning all improved significantly, with effect sizes between 0.7 and 1.7. Suicide attempts, acts of self-harm, and care consumption were also significantly reduced. The results indicate that MBT can effectively be implemented in an independent treatment institute outside the UK. This study also supports the clinical effectiveness of manualized day hospital MBT in patients with severe BPD and a high degree of psychiatric comorbidity.     

Neural control of voluntary eye closure: a case study and an fMRI investigation of blinking and winking

The current paper describes a rare case of a patient who suffered from unilateral apraxia of eye closure as a result of a bilateral stroke. Interestingly, the patient's ability to voluntarily close both eyelids (i.e. blinking) was not affected, indicating that different neural mechanisms control each type of eye closure. The stroke caused damage to a large part of the right frontal cortex, including the motor cortex, pre-motor cortex and the frontal eye field (FEF). The lesion in the left hemisphere was restricted to the FEF. In order to further study the neural mechanisms of eye closure, we conducted an fMRI study in a group of neurological healthy subjects. We found that all areas of the oculomotor cortex were activated by both left and right winking, including the FEF, supplementary eye field (SEF), and posterior parietal cortex (PPC). Blinking activated FEF and SEF, but not PPC. Both FEF and PPC were significantly more active during winking than blinking. Together, these results provide evidence for a critical role of the FEF in voluntary unilateral eye closure.     

Avoiding negative vs. achieving positive outcomes in hard and prosperous economic times

Three studies suggest that business cycle fluctuations trigger distinct motivational orientations that selectively affect economic judgment and decision making. Economic contractions induce avoidance motivation and affect negative economic sentiment, but leave approach motivation and positive economic sentiment unaffected. In contrast, economic expansions induce approach motivation and positive economic sentiment, but do not affect avoidance motivation or negative economic sentiment (study 1). Moreover, economic contractions induce risk aversion for negative outcomes, but not for positive outcomes, while economic expansions instigate risk seeking for positive outcomes, but not for negative outcomes (study 2). A time-series study based on consumer spending over eight decades mirrors the findings of the experimental studies: The consumption of products associated with avoiding negative outcomes increases during economic contractions, but not during expansions. In contrast, the consumption of products associated with achieving positive outcomes increases in expansions, but is unaffected by contractions (study 3).     

Four empirical tests of Unconscious Thought Theory

According to Unconscious Thought Theory, people make better decisions after unconscious than after conscious thought (Dijksterhuis, Bos, Nordgren, & van Baaren, 2006a). Unconscious Thought Theory yields four specific predictions. First, an exact replication of Dijksterhuis et al. (2006a) study should indicate that unconscious decisions are superior to conscious decisions. Second, decisions should improve with duration of conscious thought. Third, unconscious decisions should be superior to conscious decisions, even if unconscious decisions are deliberated while having access to information. Fourth, unconscious decisions should be based on a weighting strategy. We report results of four studies, featuring 480 participants, that yield no evidence in favor of these predictions. Therefore our findings cast doubt on Unconscious Thought Theory and its advice to base decisions on unconscious thought. The results of our studies suggest that it is better to base decisions on conscious thought while having access to information.