What do eye movements reveal about the role of memory in visual search?

Horowitz and Wolfe (1998, 2003) have challenged the view that serial visual search involves memory processes that keep track of already inspected locations. The present study used a search paradigm similar to Horowitz and Wolfe's (1998), comparing a standard static search condition with a dynamic condition in which display elements changed locations randomly every 111 ms. In addition to measuring search reaction times, observers' eye movements were recorded. For target-present trials, the search rates were near-identical in the two search conditions, replicating Horowitz and Wolfe's findings. However, the number of fixations and saccade amplitude were larger in the static than in the dynamic condition, whereas fixation duration and the latency of the first saccade were longer in the dynamic condition. These results indicate that an active, memory-guided search strategy was adopted in the static condition, and a passive “sit-and-wait” strategy in the dynamic condition.     

Effects of individual aerobic performance on finish time in mountain running

It was hypothesized that for each mountain running competition, there is a certain individual performance level below which running times increase dramatically. The running times of 869 finishers of 3 international mountain running competitions have been analysed. A hyperbolic association was demonstrated between finish times in mountain running competitions and individual performance at the anaerobic threshold (VO2AT(Race)). Due to the non-linear association, there is an increasing effect on both the finish time and the change of finish time with decreasing aerobic performance. In all three competitions, the change of finish time is about 7 times more pronounced in mountain runners with the lowest VO2ATL,, compared to those with the highest values of VO2AT(Race). Both athletes and organizers should keep in mind these effects of decreasing aerobic performance on running times and potentially associated risks.     

A Non-Inferentialist, Anti-Realistic Conception of Logical Truth and Falsity

Anti-realistic conceptions of truth and falsity are usually epistemic or inferentialist. Truth is regarded as knowability, or provability, or warranted assertability, and the falsity of a statement or formula is identified with the truth of its negation. In this paper, a non-inferentialist but nevertheless anti-realistic conception of logical truth and falsity is developed. According to this conception, a formula (or a declarative sentence) A is logically true if and only if no matter what is told about what is told about the truth or falsity of atomic sentences, A always receives the top-element of a certain partial order on non-ontic semantic values as its value. The ordering in question is a told-true order. Analogously, a formula A is logically false just in case no matter what is told about what is told about the truth or falsity of atomic sentences, A always receives the top-element of a certain told-false order as its value. Here, truth and falsity are pari passu, and it is the treatment of truth and falsity as independent of each other that leads to an informational interpretation of these notions in terms of a certain kind of higher-level information.     

Zur Vereinheitlichung der logischen Symbolik

Ohne Zusammenfassung