The problem of evil and the attributes of God

In discussions of the probabilistic argument from evil, some defenders of theism have recently argued that evil has no evidential force against theism. They base their argument on the claim that there is no reason to think that we should be able to discern morally sufficient reasons which God presumably has for permitting the evil which occurs. In this paper I try to counter this argument by discussing factors which suggest that we should generally be able to discern why God permits evil events. I close by suggesting that the theist use the evidential force which evil does have as a reason to question her understanding of the divine attributes.     

Toward an understanding of social consequences of “feminine immodesty” about personal achievements

Two studies examine the hypothesis that females who are immodest about their achievements are perceived more negatively than are males who are immodest. The assumptions that there are social consequences of immodesty, and that women and girls believe there to be such consequences, have been raised in self-presentational explanations of women's tendencies to undervaluate and underestimate their performances. This study provides a test of this assumption is a sample of 236 high school students and 144 teachers. Each judged the intelligence, personality, popularity, and adjustment of a very successful (hypothetical) high school student who was presented as male or female, mdoest or immodest. Two replications allowed this assumptions to be tested for diverse areas of success. Results showed consistent and negative social consequences of immodesty, which were, however, differentially worse for girls in only one of four tests. Other significant effects revealed that the characteristics of the judges was a factor. The findings are interpreted in the context of assumptions in both the popular culture and the research literature that feminine immodesty may be perceived differently than immodesty on the part of males. Directions for future research to elucidate these findings are offered.The help of Mr. W. Alden, Assistant Superintendent, and the teachers at Mt. Greylock High School is gratefully acknowledged. We would also like to thank the Massachusetts teachers who participated in the study during their annual convention, as well as the high school students who participated. This study was supported by research funds from the Bronfman Science Center, Williams College.     

Making probability judgments of future product failures: The role of mental unpacking

When consumers mentally unpack (i.e., imagine) the reasons for product failure, their probability judgments of future product failures are higher than when no mental unpacking is undertaken. However, increasing the level of mental unpacking does not lead to monotonically increasing effects on probability judgments but results in inverted U-shaped relationships. Using a two-factor structure, we propose that when consumers undertake mental unpacking, there will be two conflicting processes; while imagining causes for an event will lead to greater perceived probability, the greater difficulty in generating reasons for an event will lead to lower perceived probability.