The force of dissimilar analogies in bioethics

Although analogical reasoning has long been a popular method of reasoning in bioethics, current literature does not sufficiently grasp its variety. We assert that the main shortcoming is the fact that an analogy’s value is often judged on the extent of similarity between the source situation and the target situation, while in (bio)ethics, analogies are often used because of certain dissimilarities rather than in spite of them. We make a clear distinction between dissimilarities that aim to reinforce a similar approach in the source situation and the target situation and dissimilarities that aim to undermine or denounce a similar approach. The former kind of dissimilarity offers the analogy more normative force than if there were no dissimilarities present; this is often overlooked by authors who regard all relevant dissimilarities as detrimental to the analogy’s strength. Another observation is that an evaluation of the normative force of an analogy cannot be made independently of moral principles or theories. Without these, one cannot select which elements in an analogy are morally relevant nor determine how they should be interpreted.     

Strategies in landmark use by orangutans and human children

Landmark use has been demonstrated in a variety of organisms, yet the manner in which landmarks are encoded and subsequently used appears to vary between and sometimes within species, even when faced with identical landmark arrays. In the present experiments, orangutans and human children were shown a square array of identical landmarks and were trained to locate a hidden goal in the centre of the array. In Experiments 1 and 2, the search space appeared to be discrete, with white gridlines dividing up the space, and in Experiments 3a and 3b, the search space was uniformly coloured, making it appear continuous. In all experiments, following training, subjects were given a single expansion test, to determine their landmark strategy use, based on peak search activity. The orangutans appeared to use absolute directional vectors from individual landmarks, with peak search activities on the inner corners of the square array, and they used this strategy persistently. In contrast, human children showed two landmark-based strategies, absolute directional vectors and a relational or “middle” strategy, with the majority of children starting their search in the middle region. Although some children, especially young children, persistently used one strategy like the orangutans, many changed strategies when the original one failed to yield the hidden goal.     

Species difference in the timing of gaze movement between chimpanzees and humans

How do humans and their closest relatives, chimpanzees, differ in their fundamental abilities for seeing the visual world? In this study, we directly compared the gaze movements of humans and the closest species, chimpanzees, using an eye-tracking system. During free viewing of a naturalistic scene, chimpanzees made more fixations per second (up to four) than did humans (up to three). This species difference was independent of the semantic variability of the presented scenes. The gap–overlap paradigm revealed that, rather than resulting from the sensitivity to the peripherally presented stimuli per se, the species difference reflected the particular strategy each species employed to solve the rivalry between central (fixated) and peripheral stimuli in their visual fields. Finally, when presented with a movie in which small images successively appeared/disappeared at random positions at the chosen presentation rate, chimpanzees tracked those images at the point of fixation for a longer time than did humans, outperforming humans in their speed of scanning. Our results suggest that chimpanzees and humans differ quantitatively in their visual strategies involving the timing of gaze movement. We discuss the functional reasons for each species’ employing such specific strategies.     

Trust in Nanotechnology? On Trust as Analytical Tool in Social Research on Emerging Technologies

Trust has become an important aspect of evaluating the relationship between lay public and technology implementation. Experiences have shown that a focus on trust provides a richer understanding of reasons for backlashes of technology in society than a mere focus of public understanding of risks and science communication. Therefore, trust is also widely used as a key concept for understanding and predicting trust or distrust in emerging technologies. But whereas trust broadens the scope for understanding established technologies with well-defined questions and controversies, it easily fails to do so with emerging technologies, where there are no shared questions, a lack of public familiarity with the technology in question, and a restricted understanding amongst social researchers as to where distrust is likely to arise and how and under which form the technology will actually be implemented. Rather contrary, ‘trust’ might sometimes even direct social research into fixed structures that makes it even more difficult for social research to provide socially robust knowledge. This article therefore suggests that if trust is to maintain its important role in evaluating emerging technologies, the approach has to be widened and initially focus not on people’s motivations for trust, but rather the object of trust it self, as to predicting how and where distrust might appear, how the object is established as an object of trust, and how it is established in relation with the public.     

?Psychische St?rung�� als Begr��ndung f��r staatliche Eingriffe in Grundrechte des Individuums

When dealing with ?old cases?? of preventive detention as well as retrospectively ordered preventive detention, a continuation of confinement should be possible if the offender involved suffers from a ??mental disorder?? which constitutes the danger of future serious violent or sexual crimes. In this psychiatric article it will be explained that the terms ??mental illness?? and also ??mental disorder?? must retain an empirical scientifically definable psychiatric content in order not to instigate deception. They must also be functionally defined in each judicial environment (police law, social law, civil law and criminal law) with respect to the capabilities of the individual which are impaired by the mental disorder. Such an approach could prevent a misuse of psychiatry for purely political security purposes.     

Coronary Intervention Improves Disease Specific Health-Related Quality of Life but Not Individualised Quality of Life: A Potential Response Shift Effect?

To explore potential response shift effects with different quality of life (QoL) instruments in cardiac patients undergoing coronary intervention. Study Design and Setting: Recalibration was assessed with the disease specific health-related quality of life (HRQL) instrument MacNew in combination with a then-test approach. Reconceptualisation and reprioritisation were assessed with the individualised QoL instrument SEIQoL-DW. Significant treatment effects were seen on the MacNew (global Δ: 0.6 ± 1.1, p = 0.004) but not on the SEIQoL-DW (Δ: 3.3 ± 16, p = 0.37) 6 months after coronary intervention. No recalibration effect was found on the MacNew then-test, while with the SEIQOL-DW potential response shift effects of reconceptualisation and reprioritisation were seen. For the first time response shift effects were explored in cardiac patients undergoing coronary intervention. This study confirmed that there is a clinically significant improvement in disease specific HRQL over time following successful coronary interventions. However, no treatment effect was seen for individualised QoL with the SEIQoL-DW. This might be due to reconceptualisation and reprioritisation response effects. Future studies need to focus on exploring response shift effects, and the interrelationship between its different components, captured by different patient reported outcome instruments in larger patient groups undergoing coronary interventions.     

Bilingual Therapeutics: Integrating the Complementary Perspectives and Practices of Motivational Interviewing and Dialectical Behavior Therapy

Informed by the practice of code-switching or style-switching in linguistics, “bilingual therapeutics” is proposed as the complementary integration of two evidence-based practices in psychotherapy: motivational interviewing (MI) and dialectical behavior therapy (DBT). Unique features of MI and DBT are presented, current research of each practice is reviewed, and their similarities and distinctions are discussed. It is proposed that fluency in both “languages” of MI and DBT may usher in a new therapeutic perspective to enhance client case conceptualization, illuminate subtleties of the therapeutic process, and foster more intentional and deliberate practitioners. Specifically, MI and DBT code-switching may help recruit and retain clients in formal treatment (e.g.,”speaking” MI more prominently to prepare clients for 12-month standard DBT) and promote consultation among therapists. The complementary integration of MI and DBT also suggests the emergence of a linguistic “third space,” including “spirit as synthesis” and “improvisational dance.”     

Mental Illness and Mental Health: The Two Continua Model Across the Lifespan

Mental health has long been defined as the absence of psychopathologies, such as depression and anxiety. The absence of mental illness, however, is a minimal outcome from a psychological perspective on lifespan development. This article therefore focuses on mental illness as well as on three core components of positive mental health: feelings of happiness and satisfaction with life (emotional well-being), positive individual functioning in terms of self-realization (psychological well-being), and positive societal functioning in terms of being of social value (social well-being). The two continua model holds that mental illness and mental health are related but distinct dimensions. This model was studied on the basis of a cross-sectional representative internet survey of Dutch adults (N = 1,340; 18–87 years). Mental illness was measured with the Brief Symptom Inventory and mental health with the Mental Health Continuum Short Form. It was found that older adults, except for the oldest-old, scored lower on psychopathological symptoms and were less likely to be mentally ill than younger adults. Although there were fewer age differences for mental health, older adults experienced more emotional, similar social and slightly lower psychological well-being. In sum, today’s older adults have fewer mental illness problems, but they are not in a better positive mental health than today’s younger adults. These findings support the validity of the two continua model in adult development.