New perceptual objects that capture attention produce inhibition of return

New perceptual objects are known to capture attention. We show that such attentional capture is similar to that produced by peripheral luminance changes, as opposed to symbolic central cues, in that it produces inhibition of return. Two experiments employed equiluminant texture changes that attracted attention, producing an initial attentional benefit (in detection and discrimination) followed by inhibition of return. However, when the display was altered so that the texture change did not define a new object, no facilitation or inhibition was observed. The results bolster recent claims of the importance of new perceptual objects and extend our understanding of the effect of such objects on attention.     

Effects of picture and even-a-penny-will-help appeals on anonymous donations to charity

The present research explored the effectiveness of a picture and the phrase "even a penny will help" on contributions to charity. Two experiments were conducted, one in the laboratory and one in the field. In both experiments the manipulation of a pleasant picture and the phrase created four types of signs: (1) picture-no phrase, (2) phrase-no picture, (3) picture-phrase, and (4) no picture-no phrase. In the field experiment patrons of local business anonymously put money in a donation box that displayed one of the four signs. In the laboratory experiment, 129 undergraduate students were randomly assigned to view one of the four signs placed on a donation box for a local charity. Analyses for both studies showed that more money was donated when the boxes displayed pictures. The phrase "even a penny will help" had no significant effect on donations.     

What if I am the one? Measuring individual differences in emotional sensitivity to probability and emotional reactivity to possibility

Current theories of risk perception point to the powerful role of emotion and the neglect of probabilistic information in the face of risk, but these tendencies differ across individuals. We propose a method for measuring individuals' emotional sensitivity to probability to assess how feelings about probabilities, rather than the probabilities themselves, influence decisions. Participants gave affective ratings (worry or excitement) to 14 risky events, each with a specified probability ranging from 1 in 10 to 1 in 10,000,000. For each participant, we regressed these emotional responses against item probabilities, estimating a slope (the degree to which emotional responses change with probability) and an intercept (the emotional reaction to an event with a fixed probability). These two parameters were treated as individual difference scores and included in models predicting reactions to several health risk scenarios. Both emotional sensitivity to probability (slope) and emotional reactivity to possibility (intercept) significantly predicted responses to these scenarios, above and beyond the predictive power of other well‐established individual difference measures.     

Fission May Kill You (But Not for the Reasons You Thought)

If a person, A, branches into B and C, then it is widely held that B and C are not identical to one another. Many think that this is because B and C have contradictory properties at the same time. In this paper, I show why this explanation cannot be right. I argue that contradictory properties at times are not necessary for non‐identity between descendants, and that contradictory properties at times are not sufficient for non‐identity. I also argue that the standard explanation cannot be salvaged by a shift to personal time. Appeals to a lack of continuity, or to the absence of unity of consciousness likewise fail. Rather, B and C are non‐identical simply because A branched into B and C. Why branching should be problematic for personal identity remains a deep puzzle though I offer some tentative suggestions.     

The ‘Magical’ Effect of Integration on Event Memory

Only a handful of studies have extended our understanding of retrieval induced forgetting (RIF) during development and even fewer have tested for RIF effects outside word‐list paradigms. The purpose of these experiments was to: (i) examine how partial retrieval of a witnessed event would impact subsequent retrieval of that event in school‐aged children; and (ii) examine the robustness of semantic integration as a boundary condition on RIF. Two experiments were conducted using the three traditional phases of the RIF paradigm: study phase, practice phase, and test phase. We found clear evidence of RIF in event memory. There was also evidence of the robust impact that integration instructions have on minimizing RIF. Integration appears to not only have a dampening effect on RIF, but integration instructions may also influence how children process all aspects of an experience, regardless of whether a person is passively or actively part of the experience.Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder: The Process of Parental Adaptation and Implications for Genetic Counseling

Obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) has primarily pediatric onset and well-documented unique impacts on family functioning. Limited research has assessed the understanding that parents of children with OCD have of the etiology of the condition, and there are no data regarding potential applications of genetic counseling for this population. We recruited 13 parents of 13 children diagnosed with OCD from the OCD Registry at British Columbia Children’s Hospital, and conducted qualitative semi-structured telephone interviews to explore participants’ experiences with their child’s OCD, causal attributions of OCD, and perceptions of two genetic counseling vignettes. Interviews were audio-recorded, transcribed, and analyzed using elements of grounded theory qualitative methodology. Analysis revealed key components and contextual elements of the process through which parents adapt to their child’s OCD. This adaptation process involved conceptualizing the meaning of OCD, navigating its impact on family dynamics, and developing effective illness management strategies. Adaptation took place against a backdrop of stigmatization and was shaped by participants’ family history of mental illness and their child’s specific manifestations of OCD. Parents perceived genetic counseling, as described in the vignettes, as being empowering, alleviating guilt and blame, and positively impacting treatment orientation. These data provide insight into the process of parental adaptation to pediatric OCD, and suggest that genetic counseling services for families affected by OCD may help facilitate adaptation to this illness.     

Behavior Analysts' Use of and Beliefs in Treatments for People with Autism: A 5‐Year Follow‐up

As autism prevalence rises, parents of children with autism rely upon professionals to recommend the most effective treatment for their children. Historically, these professionals have chosen a range of treatments from empirically supported to nonempirically supported treatments. This study replicated and extended that work by surveying Board Certified Behavior Analysts to determine what treatments they promoted and used. Results showed that although most respondents used evidence‐based, behavioral procedures, many did not. Influential stimuli most likely to contribute to behavior analysts' choices of treatments were beliefs in effectiveness, ease of implementation, and persuasion by others. Self‐reported reinforcers for treatment use included perceived observed success, praise from others, and financial gain. Behavior analysts continue to use a variety of nonscientifically supported treatments, including those that have been deemed ineffective and harmful to people with autism. Future training of Board Certified Behavior Analysts must stress adherence to the ethical code for certified behavior analysts, adherence to data‐based decision‐making, and strict fealty to the scientific process in which all behavior analysts have been trained. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Mental Simulation as Substitute for Experience

People spend a considerable amount of their time mentally simulating experiences other than the one in which they are presently engaged, as a means of distraction, coping, or preparation for the future. In this integrative review, we examine four (non‐exhaustive) cases in which mentally simulating an experience serves a different function, as a substitute for the corresponding experience. In each case, mentally simulating an experience evokes similar cognitive, physiological, and/or behavioral consequences as having the corresponding experience in reality: (i) imagined experiences are attributed evidentiary value like physical evidence, (ii) mental practice instantiates the same performance benefits as physical practice, (iii) imagined consumption of a food reduces its actual consumption, and (iv) imagined goal achievement reduces motivation for actual goal achievement. We organize these cases under a common superordinate category and discuss their different methodological approaches and explanatory accounts. Our integration yields theoretical and practical insights into when and why mentally simulating an experience serves as its substitute.