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111.
John Lippitt 《International Journal for Philosophy of Religion》2007,61(3):131-150
In this article, I offer a brief account of some of Kierkegaard’s key concerns about friendship: its “preferential” nature
and its being a form of self-love. Kierkegaard’s endorsement of the ancient idea of the friend as “second self” involves a
common but misguided assumption: that friendship depends largely upon likeness between friends. This focus obscures a vitally important element, highlighted by the so-called “drawing” view of friendship.
Once this is emphasized, we can see a significant aspect - though by no means all - of Kierkegaard’s worry as misplaced. However,
the “drawing” view also enables us to begin to see what a “Kierkegaardian” friendship might look like. 相似文献
112.
Lidia Obojska 《Journal of Philosophical Logic》2007,36(6):641-657
The new system of axioms we propose is based on the foundational theory of De Giorgi et al. Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa, Preprints di Matematica 26: 1 (1996) slightly modified. In that paper (which is dedicated to a new axiomatic framework for mathematics, informatics
and logic) the authors use two kinds of primitive notions: relations and qualities. Since their system is based on the distribution
paradigm, they start from distinction. We propose to shift the perspective and to start from unity and then from within unity
to pass to distinction; to this end we apply ideas of Lesniewski, Nijhoff International Philosophy Series 44 (1992). We introduce only one kind of entity as a primitive notion, namely relations, and treat qualities as articulations
of relations. The new concept of “primary relation” permits the introduction of a dynamic, non-standard form of identity,
which we hope will find application in various fields where self-referential structures are required. 相似文献
113.
114.
Peter Carruthers 《The Journal of Ethics》2007,11(3):275-297
This paper argues that navigating insects and spiders possess a degree of mindedness that makes them appropriate (in the sense
of “possible”) objects of sympathy and moral concern. For the evidence suggests that many invertebrates possess a belief-desire-planning
psychology that is in basic respects similar to our own. The challenge for ethical theory is find some principled way of demonstrating
that individual insects do not make moral claims on us, given the widely held belief that some other “higher” animals do make such claims on us. 相似文献
115.
Paulo A. S. Veloso Renata P. de Freitas Petrucio Viana Mario Benevides Sheila R. M. Veloso 《Journal of Philosophical Logic》2007,36(5):489-509
We compare fork arrow logic, an extension of arrow logic, and its natural first-order counterpart (the correspondence language)
and show that both have the same expressive power. Arrow logic is a modal logic for reasoning about arrow structures, its
expressive power is limited to a bounded fragment of first-order logic. Fork arrow logic is obtained by adding to arrow logic
the fork modality (related to parallelism and synchronization). As a result, fork arrow logic attains the expressive power
of its first-order correspondence language, so both can express the same input–output behavior of processes. 相似文献
116.
Christina M. Gschwandtner 《Continental Philosophy Review》2007,40(3):231-249
In this article I examine Jean-Luc Marion's two-fold criticism of Emmanuel Levinas’ philosophy of other and self, namely that
Levinas remains unable to overcome ontological difference in Totality and Infinity and does so successfully only with the notion of the appeal in Otherwise than Being and that his account of alterity is ambiguous in failing to distinguish clearly between human and divine other. I outline
Levinas’ response to this criticism and then critically examine Marion's own account of subjectivity that attempts to go beyond
Levinas in its emphasis on a pure or anonymous appeal. I criticize this move as rather problematic and turn instead back to
Levinas for a more convincing account of the relations between self, human other, and God. In this context, I also show that
Levinas in fact draws quite careful distinctions between human and divine others. 相似文献
117.
José Luis Bermúdez 《The Journal of Ethics》2007,11(3):319-335
In Thinking without Words I develop a philosophical framework for treating some animals and human infants as genuine thinkers. This paper outlines
the aspects of this account that are most relevant to those working in animal ethics. There is a range of different levels
of cognitive sophistication in different animal species, in addition to limits to the types of thought available to non-linguistic
creatures, and it may be important for animal ethicists to take this into account in exploring issues of moral significance
and the obligations that we might or might not have to non-human animals.
I am grateful for comments on an earlier version from Robert Francescotti and Clare Palmer. 相似文献
118.
119.
Joelle C. Ruthig Tara L. Haynes Raymond P. Perry Judith G. Chipperfield 《Social Psychology of Education》2007,10(1):115-137
Although optimism has several benefits, there are potential drawbacks associated with “too much of a good thing”. Within an
academic context, a possible determinant of the adaptiveness of optimistic bias is whether students have a sense of control
over academic outcomes: optimistically-biased (OB) achievement expectations paired with perceptions of academic control may
enhance performance and well-being; optimistic bias in the absence of perceived control may result in disappointment, poor
performance, and diminished well-being. The current longitudinal study examined academic control cognitions (ACC) among OB
college students (n = 319) versus non-optimistically biased (non-OB) students (n = 321). We also examined the effects of academic optimistic bias on composite measures of college performance (perceived
success, final psychology course grades, cumulative GPA, course attrition) and well-being (positive and negative emotions,
health behaviors, future optimism) 6 months later; and determined whether ACC accounted for those associations. Significant
MANCOVAs showed OB students had greater ACC, better subsequent well-being, and outperformed their non-OB counterparts. These
well-being and performance differences remained significant after statistically accounting for initial aptitude and ACC. Overall,
academic optimistic bias was accompanied by perceived controllability over scholastic outcomes, yet beyond the effects of
ACC, optimistic bias was associated with better year-end performance and well-being. Findings have implications for maximizing
the successful transition of first-year college students. 相似文献
120.
Richard Bradley 《Synthese》2007,156(3):513-535
Richard Jeffrey regarded the version of Bayesian decision theory he floated in ‘The Logic of Decision’ and the idea of a probability
kinematics—a generalisation of Bayesian conditioning to contexts in which the evidence is ‘uncertain’—as his two most important
contributions to philosophy. This paper aims to connect them by developing kinematical models for the study of preference
change and practical deliberation. Preference change is treated in a manner analogous to Jeffrey’s handling of belief change:
not as mechanical outputs of combinations of intrinsic desires plus information, but as a matter of judgement and of making
up one’s mind. In the first section Jeffrey’s probability kinematics is motivated and extended to the treatment of changes
in conditional belief. In the second, analogous kinematical models are developed for preference change and in particular belief-induced
change that depends on an invariance condition for conditional preference. The two are the brought together in the last section
in a tentative model of pratical deliberation.
This paper is one of a pair dedicated to Richard Jeffrey and prepared for a workshop held in his memory at the 26th International
Wittgenstein Symposium. My thanks to the organisers of, and the participants in, this workshop and to two anonymous referees
for their comments. 相似文献