Religious Beliefs,Religious Contexts,and Perceived Interactions with Ex-Offenders

Religious institutions can provide a means of support and resources for many people, particularly, individuals who have criminal histories, specifically parolees, sex offenders, and insanity acquittees. When these individuals are released into the community, they often face difficulties in acquiring shelter, work, and social support. Out of their own volition or as a result of faith-based prison programs, they might turn to religious institutions for help reintegrating into the community. However, whether congregation members are more or less accepting of these individuals is unaddressed in the current literature. Two studies assess the relationship between religious beliefs, religious contexts, legal attitudes, and perceived social interactions with parolees, sex offenders, and insanity acquittees. Results suggest that religious beliefs, legal attitudes, and religious contexts play an important role in individuals’ perceived interactions with these individuals. Religious contexts, specifically, might facilitate more positive social interactions with parolees. Implications are discussed.     

Reactionary Deconversion from Mormonism: Polarization of Ideological and Behavioral Religiosity Among Active and Former Mormons

In contrast to a growing body of literature examining the experiences and trends of those who leave their faith tradition—particularly among Christian denominations—relatively little is known about those who specifically disaffiliate from Mormonism, although some evidence suggests that former Mormons may be especially likely to embrace secularity or irreligion rather than other religious beliefs and practices. Pursuant to empirically investigating this reactionary dynamic, the current study compared the relative religiosity and secularity of an online sample of active Mormons (n?=?194) and former Mormons (n?=?109) using the Abbreviated Religiousness Measure (ARM), an updated questionnaire of multidimensional religiosity. Results supported the ARM’s improved psychometrics and its hypothesized three-factor structure with both subsamples. Additionally, multivariate and univariate results indicated that active and former Mormon participants from our sample, significantly polarized in their self-reported level of religious beliefs, rituals, and influence on daily behaviors, with active Mormon reporting high religiosity and former Mormons reporting low religiosity or high secularity. Although these results comport with reactionary deconversion dynamics found in other high cost religions, limits to generalizability are discussed. Reasons for and implications of this reactionary phenomenon are also posited.     

Solving the problem of creeping minimalism

Abstract

In this paper I discuss the so-called problem of creeping minimalism, the problem of distinguishing metaethical expressivism from its rivals once expressivists start accepting minimalist theories about truth, representation, belief, and similar concepts. I argue that Dreier’s ‘explanation’ explanation is almost correct, but by critically examining it we not only get a better solution, but also draw out some interesting results about expressivism and non-representationalist theories of meaning more generally.     

No evidence for unethical amnesia for imagined actions: A failed replication and extension

In a recent study, Kouchaki and Gino (2016) suggest that memory for unethical actions is impaired, regardless of whether such actions are real or imagined. However, as we argue in the current study, their claim that people develop “unethical amnesia” confuses two distinct and dissociable memory deficits: one affecting the phenomenology of remembering and another affecting memory accuracy. To further investigate whether unethical amnesia affects memory accuracy, we conducted three studies exploring unethical amnesia for imagined ethical violations. The first study (N = 228) attempts to directly replicate the only study from Kouchaki and Gino (2016) that includes a measure of memory accuracy. The second study (N = 232) attempts again to replicate these accuracy effects from Kouchaki and Gino (2016), while including several additional variables meant to potentially help in finding the effect. The third study (N = 228) is an attempted conceptual replication using the same paradigm as Kouchaki and Gino (2016), but with a new vignette describing a different moral violation. We did not find an unethical amnesia effect involving memory accuracy in any of our three studies. These results cast doubt upon the claim that memory accuracy is impaired for imagined unethical actions. Suggestions for further ways to study memory for moral and immoral actions are discussed.     

On Doubt

Despite the prominence of doubt in philosophy since Descartes, the published philosophical literature includes no extended treatment of the nature of doubt. In this paper, I summarize the main contributions that have been made to the subject and then develop a commonsense functionalist account of doubt by specifying (a significant part of) the functional role of doubt that something is the case. After adding two further wrinkles, I show how the resulting account can be used to address the questions of how doubt is related to belief and whether suspension of judgment can be identified with (some appropriate level or levels of) doubt. Although the account is partisan, it should hold interest for those who favor other positions in the philosophy of mind, since (a) much of the account can be taken on board by those in other camps, and (b) the paper demonstrates how a sufficiently detailed account of doubt can be put to work addressing longstanding questions of interest across philosophical sub-disciplines.     

Epistemic Normativity and Cognitive Agency

On the assumption that genuinely normative demands concern things connected in some way to our agency, i.e. what we exercise in doing things with or for reasons, epistemologists face an important question: are there genuine epistemic norms governing belief, and if so where in the vicinity of belief are we to find the requisite cognitive agency? Extant accounts of cognitive agency tend to focus on belief itself or the event of belief‐formation to answer this question, to the exclusion of the activity of maintaining a system of beliefs. This paper argues that a full account of epistemic normativity will need to make sense of this activity as a core locus of cognitive agency. This idea is used to motivate the conclusion that one important and often overlooked kind of epistemic norms is the kind of norms governing the various cognitive activities by which we check, sustain, and adjust our belief systems.     

Effectiveness of a Classroom Mindfulness Coloring Activity for Test Anxiety in Children

To evaluate the effectiveness of mindfulness-based structured versus unstructured coloring on test anxiety, 52 participants (53.8% female; M_age = 10.92 years, SD =.82) were randomly assigned to either a structured mandala (n = 26) or free coloring condition (n = 26), and completed a standardized anxiety measure to assess anxiety before and after coloring, immediately before a spelling test. Results revealed an overall decrease in anxiety for both groups. However, a significant gender by group interaction demonstrated that while both genders experienced anxiety reduction in the mandala condition, males reported a greater anxiety reduction in the free coloring condition while females only benefited from the mandala condition. Possible explanations for these gender effects are explored and future directions discussed.     

Individual Differences in Commitment to Value‐Based Beliefs and the Amplification of Perceived Belief Dissimilarity Effects

The commitment to beliefs (CTB) framework (Maxwell‐Smith & Esses, 2012) proposes that there are individual differences in the extent to which people generally follow beliefs that are a reflection of their values. The current research hypothesized that CTB would amplify the effects of perceived belief dissimilarity or incompatibility, such that individuals higher in CTB would display more pronounced reactions to belief‐relevant groups, events, or individuals seen as incompatible with their value‐based beliefs. We tested our hypothesis in three studies that assessed participants' CTB and their perceptions of belief dissimilarity or incompatibility with regard to other religious groups (Study 1), political parties during a national election (Study 2), and their romantic partner (Study 3). CTB amplified the effects of perceived belief dissimilarity or incompatibility on people's biases toward other religious groups, voting intentions and behavior in a national election, and their evaluative and behavioral responses toward their romantic partner. These results collectively suggest that perceptions of belief dissimilarity or incompatibility are particularly important cues for individuals with higher levels of CTB as they encounter other people or events that are relevant to their beliefs.