Why additional presentations help identify a stimulus

Nosofsky (1983) reported that additional stimulus presentations within a trial increase discriminability in absolute identification, suggesting that each presentation creates an independent stimulus representation, but it remains unclear whether exposure duration or the formation of independent representations improves discrimination in such conditions. Experiment 1 replicated Nosofsky's result. Experiments 2 (masking the ISI between two-presentations) and 3 (manipulating stimulus duration without changing number of presentations or overall trial duration) ruled out an explanation in terms of extended opportunities for stimulus sampling, from either a sensory buffer during additional ISIs or increased stimulus exposure, respectively. Experiment 4 (comparing two and three-presentations, other factors controlled) provided some limited additional support for Nosofsky's original claim that additional stimulus presentations can create either independent or duplicate representations. Experiments 5 and 6 (both manipulating ISI) demonstrated that a key factor in the additional stimulus presentation effect is the overall trial duration. We discuss the results in relation to models of absolute identification, their relative emphasis on stimulus sampling versus response selection, and the mechanisms by which duplicate representations could be created.     

The phenomenology of minority–majority status: Effects on innovation in argument generation

In three experiments, we manipulated participants' perceived numerical status and compared the originality and creativity of arguments generated by members of numerical minorities and majorities. Independent judges, blind to experimental conditions, rated participants' written arguments. In Studies 1 and 2, we found that participants assigned to a numerical minority generated more original arguments when advocating their own position than did numerical majorities. In Study 3, an equal‐factions control group was included in the design, and all participants were instructed to argue for a counter‐attitudinal position. Those in the numerical minority generated more creative arguments than those in both the majority and equal‐factions conditions, but not stronger arguments. We propose cognitive and social processes that may underlie our obtained effects and discuss implications for minority influence research. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Let your preference be your guide? Preferences and choices are more tightly linked for North Americans than for Indians

Using experimental paradigms from economics and social psychology, the authors examined the cross-cultural applicability of 3 widely held assumptions about preference and choice: People (a) recruit or construct preferences to make choices; (b) choose according to their preferences; and (c) are motivated to express their preferences in their choices. In 6 studies, they compared how middle-class North American and Indian participants choose among consumer products. Participants in both contexts construct nonrandom preferences at similar speeds. Those in Indian contexts, however, are slower to make choices, less likely to choose according to their personal preferences, and less motivated to express their preferences in their choices. The authors infer that the strong link between preferences and choices observed among North Americans is not a universal feature of human nature. Instead, this link reflects the disjoint model of agency, which prescribes that people should choose freely on the basis of their preferences. In contrast, Indian contexts reflect and promote a conjoint model of agency, according to which agency is responsive to the desires and expectations of important others and may require restraining one's preferences. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2008 APA, all rights reserved).     

Cultural influences on neural substrates of attentional control

Behavioral research has shown that people from Western cultural contexts perform better on tasks emphasizing independent (absolute) dimensions than on tasks emphasizing interdependent (relative) dimensions, whereas the reverse is true for people from East Asian contexts. We assessed functional magnetic resonance imaging responses during performance of simple visuospatial tasks in which participants made absolute judgments (ignoring visual context) or relative judgments (taking visual context into account). In each group, activation in frontal and parietal brain regions known to be associated with attentional control was greater during culturally nonpreferred judgments than during culturally preferred judgments. Also, within each group, activation differences in these regions correlated strongly with scores on questionnaires measuring individual differences in culture-typical identity. Thus, the cultural background of an individual and the degree to which the individual endorses cultural values moderate activation in brain networks engaged during even simple visual and attentional tasks.     

Exposure effects and associative learning

The contributions of initial stimulus affect and of associative learning to the effects of repeated stimulus exposures were examined in two experiments. Stimuli that were initially positive and stimuli that were initially negative were presented for different number of times, and subjects rated these stimuli afterward on a number of affective dimensions. In all cases, except when negative affect was associatively paired with every stimulus exposure, affective responses became increasingly more positive with increasing exposures. The results were taken to indicate that the exposure effect can overcome an initially negative stimulus affect when the conditions of the mere exposure hypothesis are satisfied. Initial stimulus affect and associative learning of affect were shown to be independent factors, the first influencing the intercept of the exposure function, the second its slope.