Unvaxxed and unafraid: Unvaccinated Americans perceive less disease risk than do vaccinated Americans

Is disease risk perception accurately calibrated among the unvaccinated? People shift their attitudes to rationalize their choices, so those who choose to be unvaccinated may be motivated to feel less at risk. In three studies (total N = 1446), we asked Americans how worried they were about catching/spreading influenza and COVID-19 and whether they were vaccinated against those diseases. Unvaccinated participants felt less at risk of catching/spreading the diseases they were unvaccinated against than vaccinated participants. For instance, unvaccinated participants felt ∼24% less at risk of catching/spreading COVID-19 and had ∼28% stronger intention to engage in activities that carried a high risk of COVID-19 transmission (Study 3). Overall, those who choose to be the most vulnerable to disease feel and act the least vulnerable.     

Why be nice? Psychological constraints on the evolution of cooperation

Animals often aid others without gaining any immediate benefits. Although these acts seem to reduce the donor's fitness, they are only apparently altruistic. Donors typically help because they or their kin receive future benefits or avoid costly punishment. Reciprocal altruism--alternating the roles of donor and recipient--has been a well-studied form of cooperation among non-kin because of its intuitive appeal in explaining human cooperation. Despite immense theoretical interest, little empirical evidence substantiates the biological importance of reciprocal altruism in non-human animals. We propose that this is because psychological mechanisms constrain its application in cooperative contexts. In particular, we contend that cognitive limitations such as temporal discounting, numerical discrimination and memory make reciprocity difficult for animals.     

Mellow Monday and furious Friday: The approach-related link between anger and time representation

Time can be represented spatially in two prevalent metaphors; ego-moving has the self moving “forward” towards the future while time-moving has the future moving “forward” towards the self. Anger also is represented spatially by an approach-related motivation. Because time and anger share an approach-related spatial representation, we hypothesised a link between anger and the ego-moving time perspective. In Study 1, participants naturally adopting an ego-moving representation of time had higher trait anger than those adopting a time-moving representation. Study 2 showed that processing an angry event (vs. an emotionally neutral event) predicted more ego-moving spatial interpretations of time. In Study 3, a scheduling task priming ego-moving (vs. time-moving) time representation prompted higher state anger. Our results reveal a novel bi-directional link between the seemingly unrelated but similarly embodied abstract domains of anger and time.     

Grammatical pattern learning by human infants and cotton-top tamarin monkeys

There is a surprising degree of overlapping structure evident across the languages of the world. One factor leading to cross-linguistic similarities may be constraints on human learning abilities. Linguistic structures that are easier for infants to learn should predominate in human languages. If correct, then (a) human infants should more readily acquire structures that are consistent with the form of natural language, whereas (b) non-human primates' patterns of learning should be less tightly linked to the structure of human languages. Prior experiments have not directly compared laboratory-based learning of grammatical structures by human infants and non-human primates, especially under comparable testing conditions and with similar materials. Five experiments with 12-month-old human infants and adult cotton-top tamarin monkeys addressed these predictions, employing comparable methods (familiarization-discrimination) and materials. Infants rapidly acquired complex grammatical structures by using statistically predictive patterns, failing to learn structures that lacked such patterns. In contrast, the tamarins only exploited predictive patterns when learning relatively simple grammatical structures. Infant learning abilities may serve both to facilitate natural language acquisition and to impose constraints on the structure of human languages.     

Action comprehension in non-human primates: motor simulation or inferential reasoning?

Some argue that action comprehension is intimately connected with the observer's own motor capacities, whereas others argue that action comprehension depends on non-motor inferential mechanisms. We address this debate by reviewing comparative studies that license four conclusions: monkeys and apes extract the meaning of an action (i) by going beyond the surface properties of actions, attributing goals and intentions to the agent; (ii) by using environmental information to infer when actions are rational; (iii) by making predictions about an agent's goal, and the most probable action to obtain the goal given environmental constraints; (iv) in situations in which they are physiologically incapable of producing the actions. Motor theories are, thus, insufficient to account for primate action comprehension in the absence of inferential mechanisms.     

Rule learning by cotton-top tamarins

Previous work suggests that human infants are capable of rapidly generalizing patterns that have been characterized as abstract algebraic rules (Science 283 (1999) 77), a process that may play a pivotal role in language acquisition. Here we explore whether this capacity is uniquely human and evolved specifically for the computational problems associated with language, or whether this mechanism is shared with other species, and therefore evolved for problems other than language. We used the same materials and methods that were originally employed in tests of human infants to assess whether cotton-top tamarin monkeys can extract abstract algebraic rules. Specifically, we habituated subjects to sequences of consonant-vowel syllables that followed one of two patterns, AAB (e.g. wi wi di) or ABB (le we we). Following habituation, we presented subjects with two novel test items, one with the same pattern as that presented during habituation and one with a different pattern. Like human infants, tamarins were more likely to dishabituate to the test item with a different pattern. We conclude that the capacity to generalize rule-like patterns, at least at the level demonstrated, did not evolve specifically for language acquisition, though it remains possible that infants might use such rules during language acquisition.     

The relationship between problem solving and inhibitory control: cotton-top tamarin (Saguinus oedipus) performance on a reversed contingency task

To explore the relationship between problem solving and inhibitory control, the authors present 4 experiments on cotton-top tamarins (Saguinus oedipus) using a reverse-reward contingency task. In Experiment 1, 1 group of tamarins was given a choice between a small and a large quantity of food. Whichever quantity the tamarins reached for first, they received the alternative. The tamarins consistently picked the larger quantity, thereby receiving the smaller. A 2nd group of tamarins was given the same task, except that if they reached for the larger quantity of food, they received nothing. The tamarins continued to pick the larger quantity, even though this resulted in no food. In addition, most of the tamarins continued to pick the larger quantity even when the food payoff for choosing the smaller quantity was increased (Experiment 2) or when the visual salience of the food was reduced (Experiment 3). Experiment 4 was based on the finding that chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) that have been trained on the concept of number can solve the reversed contingency task if the food is replaced by Arabic numerals. With the help of a color association, and a higher cost incurred by picking the color associated with 3 food items, the tamarins learned to pick the color associated with 1 food item. These results are compared with those obtained from studies of other primate species, highlighting the importance of comparative studies of problem solving that use comparable methods.