Self-motion perception influences number processing: evidence from a parity task

We investigated the role of horizontal body motion on the processing of numbers. We hypothesized that leftward self-motion leads to shifts in spatial attention and therefore facilitates the processing of small numbers, and vice versa, we expected that rightward self-motion facilitates the processing of large numbers. Participants were displaced by means of a motion platform during a parity judgment task. We found a systematic influence of self-motion direction on number processing, suggesting that the processing of numbers is intertwined with the processing of self-motion perception. The results differed from known spatial numerical compatibility effects in that self-motion exerted a differential influence on inner and outer numbers of the given interval. The results highlight the involvement of sensory body motion information in higher-order spatial cognition.     

A Process Model of the Formation of Spatial Presence Experiences

In order to bridge interdisciplinary differences in Presence research and to establish connections between Presence and “older” concepts of psychology and communication, a theoretical model of the formation of Spatial Presence is proposed. It is applicable to the exposure to different media and intended to unify the existing efforts to develop a theory of Presence. The model includes assumptions about attention allocation, mental models, and involvement, and considers the role of media factors and user characteristics as well, thus incorporating much previous work. It is argued that a commonly accepted model of Spatial Presence is the only solution to secure further progress within the international, interdisciplinary and multiple-paradigm community of Presence research.     

Who’s Afraid of Nagelian Reduction?

We reconsider the Nagelian theory of reduction and argue that, contrary to a widely held view, it is the right analysis of intertheoretic reduction. The alleged difficulties of the theory either vanish upon closer inspection or turn out to be substantive philosophical questions rather than knock-down arguments.     

Do examples of failure effectively prepare students for learning from subsequent instruction?

Studies on the productive failure (PF) approach have demonstrated that attempting to solve a problem prepares students more effectively for later instruction compared to observing failed problem-solving attempts prior to instruction. However, the examples of failure used in these studies did not display the problem-solving-and-failing process, which may have limited the preparatory effects. In this quasi-experiment, we investigated whether observing someone else engaging in problem solving can prepare students for instruction, and whether examples that show the problem-solving-and -failing process are more effective than those that only show the outcome of this process. We also explored whether the perceived model–observer similarity had an impact on the effectiveness of observing examples of failure. The results showed that observing examples effectively prepares students for learning from instruction. However, observing the model's problem-solving-and-failing process did not prepare students more effectively than merely looking at the outcome. Studying examples were more effective if model–observer similarity was high.     

Non-musicians also have a piano in the head: evidence for spatial–musical associations from line bisection tracking

The spatial representation of ordinal sequences (numbers, time, tones) seems to be a fundamental cognitive property. While an automatic association between horizontal space and pitch height (left-low pitch, right-high pitch) is constantly reported in musicians, the evidence for such an association in non-musicians is mixed. In this study, 20 non-musicians performed a line bisection task while listening to irrelevant high- and low-pitched tones and white noise (control condition). While pitch height had no influence on the final bisection point, participants’ movement trajectories showed systematic biases: When approaching the line and touching the line for the first time (initial bisection point), the mouse cursor was directed more rightward for high-pitched tones compared to low-pitched tones and noise. These results show that non-musicians also have a subtle but nevertheless automatic association between pitch height and the horizontal space. This suggests that spatial–musical associations do not necessarily depend on constant sensorimotor experiences (as it is the case for musicians) but rather reflect the seemingly inescapable tendency to represent ordinal information on a horizontal line.     

Konzepte der Identifizierung

The authors investigate primary, hysterical, narcissistic identification, and introjection as conceptualised by Freud, Melanie Klein’s projective identification, and Anna Freud’s identification with the aggressor and altruistic surrender. It is pointed out that hysterical identification, narcissistic identification, and introjection are unconscious processes leading into a state of primary identification, and that they can be distinguished on a clinical level as regards the emotional meaning the object has for the subject. In hysterical identification the aspects of an object with which one identifies and all its other aspects retain their emotional meaning, in narcissistic identification these other aspects also keep their emotional meaning, but in this case the aspects with which one identifies lose their emotional meaning, and in introjection all aspects of an object lose their emotional meaning. Furthermore, it is shown that hysterical or narcissistic identifications are the mechanisms underlying the identification with the aggressor, and that—along with projections—hysterical re-identification also plays a decisive role in projective identification and altruistic surrender, whereby in these latter processes the object identifies himself unconsciously with the contents projected onto him in a hysterical or narcissistic manner.     

Why There Cannot be a Single Probabilistic Measure of Coherence

Bayesian Coherence Theory of Justification or, for short, Bayesian Coherentism, is characterized by two theses, viz. (i) that our degree of confidence in the content of a set of propositions is positively affected by the coherence of the set, and (ii) that coherence can be characterized in probabilistic terms. There has been a longstanding question of how to construct a measure of coherence. We will show that Bayesian Coherentism cannot rest on a single measure of coherence, but requires a vector whose components exhaustively characterize the coherence properties of the set. Our degree of confidence in the content of the information set is a function of the reliability of the sources and the components of the coherence vector. The components of this coherence vector are weakly but not strongly separable, which blocks the construction of a single coherence measure.