A comparison of attachment outcomes in enactment-based versus therapist-centered therapy process modalities in couple therapy

Attachment issues are viewed by many therapists as lying at the heart of couple distress. It is critical to empirically validate therapy processes that facilitate couples in responding to each other's attachment needs. This study examined enactments as a therapy process and change mechanism to promote secure attachment in couple therapy. Sixteen couples were randomly assigned to 1 of 2 experimental groups--1 group received 3 therapist-centered sessions followed by 3 enactment-based sessions, and a second group received 3 enactment-based sessions followed by 3 therapist-centered sessions. To measure between-session and within-session change, each spouse completed presession and postsession measures of attachment security each week. Results showed that couples who received enactment-based sessions first reported greater increases in attachment security than those receiving therapist-centered sessions first. These same couples continued to show improvement after switching to the therapist-centered sessions. Conversely, couples who received therapist-centered sessions first did not increase attachment after switching to enactment-based sessions. For wives, enactment-based sessions produced the greatest improvement in attachment, yet both therapy process modalities led to some improvement. Conversely, for husbands, attachment improved only when they received enactment-based sessions first. Enactment-based sessions may therefore be more important for husbands than wives. Overall, with some qualification it appears that enactment-based therapy process may improve attachment more than a therapist-centered process. These observed trends and findings are generally consistent with previous research supporting use of enactments in couple therapy.     

Papier Mâché Problems in Epistemology: A Defense of Strong Internalism*

I attempt to persuade the reader that externalism admits of no plausible interpretation. I argue that reliability is a concept with very different contours from epistemic justification, and that attempts to explicate justification in terms of reliability must fail. I address several other forms of externalism, and also mixed forms of justification. I then argue that externalist theories of justification cannot close the gap between mere true belief and knowledge. I suggest that a fourth condition on knowledge is required, regardless of whether justification is internalist or externalist. I argue that with such a fourth condition a strong internalist theory of justification is adequate to the task that remains in making true belief knowledge. Additionally, strong internalism is more satisfying to our intuitions than externalism and mixed forms of justification. This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Alternative antecedents, probabilities, and the suppression of fallacies in Wason's selection task

Three experiments examined the influence of a second rule on the pattern of card selections on Wason's selection task. In Experiment 1 participants received a version of the task with a single test rule or one of two versions of the task with the same original test rule together with a second rule. The probability of q was manipulated in the two-rules conditions by varying the size of the antecedent set in the second rule. The results showed a significant suppression of q card and not-p card selections in the alternative-rule conditions, but no difference as a function of antecedent set size. In Experiment 2 the size of the antecendent set in the two-rules conditions was manipulated using the context of a computer printing double-sided cards. The results showed a significant reduction of q card selections in the two-rules conditions, but no effect of p set size. In Experiment 3 the scenario accompanying the rule was manipulated, and it specified a single alternative antecedent or a number of alternative antecedents. The q card selection rates were not affected by the scenario manipulation but again were suppressed by the presence of a second rule. Our results suggest that people make inferences about the unseen side of the cards when engaging with the task and that these inferences are systematically influenced by the presence of a second rule, but are not influenced by the probabilistic characteristics of this rule. These findings are discussed in the context of decision theoretic views of selection task performance (Oaksford & Chater, 1994).