GENDER AS A MODERATOR OF THE RELATION BETWEEN RACE-RELATED STRESS AND MENTAL HEALTH SYMPTOMS FOR AFRICAN AMERICANS

The present study tested gender as a moderator of the relationship between race-related stress and mental health symptoms among African American adults. Because African American women are exposed to stressors associated with race and gender, we hypothesized that African American women would have higher levels of race-related stress and more severe mental health outcomes related to experiences of race-related stress compared to African American men. Multivariate analyses revealed that African American men had higher stress appraisals for institutional racism than did women. No significant gender differences were found for cultural and individual racism. Moderated regression analyses revealed that increases in stress appraisals for individual racism were associated with increases in anxiety and obsessive-compulsive symptoms for African American women. Race-related stress had no significant effects on mental health symptoms for African American men. The findings suggest that gender is an important factor in determining the impact of race-related stress on mental health.     

Summation: Further assessment of a configural theory

Rats received Pavlovian conditioning in which food was signalled by a visual stimulus, A+, an auditory stimulus, B+, and a compound composed of different visual and auditory stimuli, CD+. Test trials were then given with the compound AB. Experiments 1 and 2A revealed stronger responding during AB than during CD. In Experiment 2B, there was no evidence of a summation of responding during AB when A+ B+ training was conducted in the absence of CD+ trials. A further failure to observe abnormally strong responding during ABwas found in Experiment 3 for which the training trials with A+ B+ CD+ were accompanied by trials in which C and D were separately paired with food. The results are explained in terms of a configural theory of conditioning, which assumes that responding during a compound is determined by generalization from its components, as well as from other compounds to which it is similar.     

How to Argue Against Active Euthanasia

Most arguments against active euthanasia, as do most arguments in applied ethics generally, take place within the framework of what can broadly be referred to as a modern, as opposed to an ancient, approach to moral theory. In this paper, I argue that this fact works to the disadvantage of opponents of active euthanasia, and that if there is a successful argument against active euthanasia, it will be of the latter sort. In Part I, I attempt to clarify thedistinction between modern and ancient approaches with which I am concerned. In Part II, I attempt to show that any argument against active euthanasia that is of the first sort is bound to fail. In Part III, I propose an argument against active euthanasia of the second sort that I believe has a better chance for success. In Part IV, I consider some objections that can be raised against this argument and attempt to show how they can be overcome.     

Self-Knowledge of Personality: Do People Know Themselves?

The intuition that we have privileged and unrestricted access to ourselves – that we inevitably know who we are, how we feel, what we do, and what we think – is very compelling. Here, we review three types of evidence about the accuracy of self-perceptions of personality and conclude that the glass is neither full nor empty. First, studies comparing self-perceptions of personality to objective criteria suggest that self-perceptions are at least tethered to reality – people are not completely clueless about how they behave, but they are also far from perfect. Second, studies examining how well people’s self-perceptions agree with others’ perceptions of them suggest that people’s self-views are not completely out of synch with how they are seen by those who know them best, but they are also far from identical. Third, studies examining whether people know the impressions they make on others suggest that people do have some glimmer of insight into the fact that others see them differently than they see themselves but there is still a great deal people do not know about how others see them. The findings from all three approaches point to the conclusion that self-knowledge exists but leaves something to be desired. The status of people’s self-knowledge about their own personality has vast implications both for our conception of ourselves as rational agents and for the methods of psychological inquiry.