Affect in the aftermath: how goal pursuit influences implicit evaluations

Previous research has shown that the activation of a goal leads to more implicit positivity toward goal-relevant stimuli. We examined how the actual pursuit of a goal influences subsequent implicit positivity toward such stimuli. Participants were consciously or non-consciously primed with a goal, or not, and then completed a goal-relevant task on which they succeeded or failed. We then measured their goal-relevant implicit attitudes. Those who were primed with the goal (consciously or non-consciously) and experienced success exhibited more implicit positivity toward the goal, compared with the no-goal condition. Experiencing failure in the goal priming conditions reduced implicit positivity toward the goal, indicating disengagement from the goal. We discuss the theoretical implications for understanding the role of implicit attitudes in self-regulation.     

Libertarian Free Will and the Physical Indeterminism Luck Objection

Libertarian free will is, roughly, the view that agents (or, agent-involving events) cause actions to occur or not occur: Maddy’s decision to get a beer causes her to get up off her comfortable couch to get a beer, though she almost chose not to get up. Libertarian free will notoriously faces the luck objection, according to which agential states do not determine whether an action occurs or not, so it is beyond the control of the agent, hence lucky, whether an action occurs or not: Maddy’s reasons for getting beer in equipoise with her reasons to remain in her comfortable seat do not determine that she will get up or stay seated, so it seems beyond her control, hence lucky, that she gets up. In this paper I consider a sub-set of the luck objection called the Physical Indeterminism Luck Objection, according to which indeterministic physical processes cause actions to occur or not, and agent’s lack control over these indeterministic physical processes, so agent’s lack control over, hence it is lucky, whether action occurs or not. After motivating the physical indeterminism luck objection, I consider responses from three recent event-causal libertarian models, and conclude that they fail to overcome the problem, though one promising avenue is opened up.

This paper is divided into six parts. In Section One, I minimally define libertarian free will as accepting agential indeterminism, which is the conjunction of indeterminism and agential causation, where agential indeterminism occurs when an agent’s reasons, efforts or character indeterministically cause actions. In Sections Two and Three I outline the physical indeterminism luck objection to libertarian free will, which states that sub-agential physical processes in the brain indeterministically cause actions to occur, and agents lack control over these indeterministic physical causes, so agent’s lack control over whether their actions occur. If agent’s lack control over whether actions occur, the occurrence of these actions is lucky, where this luck jeopardizes free will and moral responsibility. In Sections Four through Six I consider three recent libertarian responses to this objection—Mark Balaguer in Section Four, Chris Franklin in Section Five, and Robert Kane in Section Six. I conclude that none of these models satisfactorily overcomes the physical indeterminism luck objection, though one interpretation of Kane yields a promising avenue of reply.

     

The Oneness Beliefs Scale: Connecting Spirituality with Pro‐Environmental Behavior

The inherent unity of all phenomena, or oneness, is a central concept of mysticism, but there have heretofore been no measures of oneness beliefs. We developed the Oneness Beliefs Scale, with spiritual and physical oneness subscales. The spiritual oneness subscale fills a need in the field for a short, reliable measure of spirituality not characterized by the language of traditional Western religiousness. The physical oneness subscale allows researchers to juxtapose spiritual beliefs with a nonspiritual, materialist counterpart. We found that spiritual oneness beliefs were more strongly related to mystic experiences and spirituality than to traditional religiousness. Physical oneness was not strongly associated with either religiousness or spirituality. Both spiritual and physical oneness were positively associated with pro‐environmental attitudes but not with depression, anxiety, or negative affect. Spiritual oneness was a better predictor of pro‐environmental attitudes than was religiousness. Spiritual oneness also predicted donating to a pro‐environmental group, making this to our knowledge the first empirical study to show a positive association between a religion or spirituality measure and observed, rather than self‐reported, pro‐environmental behavior.     

The specificity of learned parallelism in dual-memory retrieval

Retrieval of two responses from one visually presented cue occurs sequentially at the outset of dual-retrieval practice. Exclusively for subjects who adopt a mode of grouping (i.e., synchronizing) their response execution, however, reaction times after dual-retrieval practice indicate a shift to learned retrieval parallelism (e.g., Nino & Rickard, in Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 29, 373–388, 2003). In the present study, we investigated how this learned parallelism is achieved and why it appears to occur only for subjects who group their responses. Two main accounts were considered: a task-level versus a cue-level account. The task-level account assumes that learned retrieval parallelism occurs at the level of the task as a whole and is not limited to practiced cues. Grouping response execution may thus promote a general shift to parallel retrieval following practice. The cue-level account states that learned retrieval parallelism is specific to practiced cues. This type of parallelism may result from cue-specific response chunking that occurs uniquely as a consequence of grouped response execution. The results of two experiments favored the second account and were best interpreted in terms of a structural bottleneck model.     

Bidirectional Associations Between Parenting Behavior and Child Callous-Unemotional Traits: Does Parental Depression Moderate this Link?

The current study longitudinally examined bidirectional associations between callous-unemotional (CU) traits and parenting dimensions. This study extended the literature by examining whether parental depression moderated these relations in a pre-adolescent sample. Proposed relations were examined using a longitudinal sample of 120 aggressive children (59.6 % male) who were in the 4th grade (M?=?10.56 years, SD?=?0.56) at baseline and were followed annually over 4 years. A series of generalized estimating equation (GEE) models were used to examine proposed relations. At the first order level, corporal punishment (p?p?=?0.03) however, the inverse relations were not found. Importantly, parental depression moderated the link between corporal punishment and CU traits. Specifically, at high levels of depression, corporal punishment was predictive of increases in CU traits, but was unrelated to CU traits at low levels of depression. These findings aid in our understanding of the link between corporal punishment and CU traits by highlighting conditions under which certain parenting behaviors have an impact on CU traits, which in turn, may have important intervention implications. Further clinical implications, limitations and future directions are discussed.     

Timing of Stressful Life Events Affects Stability and Change of Neuroticism

Neuroticism is a predictor of many health problems. To study the determinants of within‐subject change in neuroticism, three hypotheses were tested: (i) subjects who experienced stressful life events (SLEs) show an increase in neuroticism; (ii) high baseline neuroticism moderated this effect; and (iii) recent SLEs had a greater impact on neuroticism than distant SLEs. Data came from the Finnish Twin Cohort. Neuroticism data were collected in 1975 and 1981 and SLEs data in 1981 (n = 21 085). By entering baseline neuroticism as a predictor for neuroticism at follow‐up, the outcome measure was change in neuroticism. Changes in neuroticism were predicted from SLE indices or their interaction with baseline neuroticism. Timing of SLEs was taken into account by distinguishing recent from distant SLEs. To control for confounding by shared genes and environments, both within‐twin pair and between‐twin pair effects were tested for monozygotic and dizygotic twin pairs separately. Neuroticism's six‐year stability was high (r = .58, p < .001). Exposure to SLEs modestly increased neuroticism (βs > .55, ps < .001), unconfounded by shared genes. This effect was not moderated by high baseline neuroticism. Recent SLEs (.09 < βs < .15) had more impact than distant SLEs (.03 < βs < .11; ps < .01). In conclusion, the findings strongly supported a model of environmentally driven SLEs causing dynamic fluctuations around a person's set point of neuroticism. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.