Ideal Worlds — Wishful Thinking in Deontic Logic

The ideal world semantics of standard deontic logic identifies our obligations with how we would act in an ideal world. However, to act as if one lived in an ideal world is bad moral advice, associated with wishful thinking rather than well-considered moral deliberation. Ideal world semantics gives rise to implausible logical principles, and the metaphysical arguments that have been put forward in its favour turn out to be based on a too limited view of truth-functional representation. It is argued that ideal world semantics should be given up in favour of other, more plausible uses of possible worlds for modelling normative subject-matter.     

Category-specified Value Statements

A value statement such as “she is a good teacher” is categoryspecified, i.e., the criteria of evaluation are specified as those that are applicable to a given category, in this case the category of teachers. In this study of categoryspecified value statements, certain categories are identified that cannot be used to specify value aspects. Special attention is paid to categories that are constituted by functional characteristics. The logical properties of value statements that refer to such categories are shown to differ significantly from the corresponding properties in social choice theory.     

Why the social sciences are irreducible

Synthese - It is often claimed that the social sciences cannot be reduced to a lower-level individualistic science. The standard argument for this position (usually labelled explanatoryholism) is...     

Active Powers and Passive Powers – Do Causal Interactions Require Both?

Philosophia - Many powers metaphysicians postulate both active and passive powers, understood as distinct kinds of intrinsic causal properties of objects. I argue that the category of passive power...     

The role of short-term memory capacity and task experience for overconfidence in judgment under uncertainty

Research with general knowledge items demonstrates extreme overconfidence when people estimate confidence intervals for unknown quantities, but close to zero overconfidence when the same intervals are assessed by probability judgment. In 3 experiments, the authors investigated if the overconfidence specific to confidence intervals derives from limited task experience or from short-term memory limitations. As predicted by the naive sampling model (P. Juslin, A. Winman, & P. Hansson, 2007), overconfidence with probability judgment is rapidly reduced by additional task experience, whereas overconfidence with intuitive confidence intervals is minimally affected even by extensive task experience. In contrast to the minor bias with probability judgment, the extreme overconfidence bias with intuitive confidence intervals is correlated with short-term memory capacity. The proposed interpretation is that increased task experience is not sufficient to cure the overconfidence with confidence intervals because it stems from short-term memory limitations.     

Local Change

An agent can usually hold a very large number of beliefs. However, only a small part of these beliefs is used at a time. Efficient operations for belief change should affect the beliefs of the agent locally, that is, the changes should be performed only in the relevant part of the belief state. In this paper we define a local consequence operator that only considers the relevant part of a belief base. This operator is used to define local versions of the operations for belief change. Representation theorems are given for the local operators.     

Intensive family therapy: a way to change family functioning in multi-problem families

TA single group treatment outcome study of intensive family therapy (IFT) is presented. One hundred and nine families from five Swedish units participated and results on family measures for eighty-six of these families are reported. This multi-centre study is the largest so far of this treatment model. The units offered a full-day multi-impact treatment programme for families during an intensive period of approximately one month preceded by a period of extensive planning. Measures used were the self-rating 'Family Climate' and Family Relation Scale and observer-rated CRS-Turbo and the Beavers' System Scales. Significant changes in the direction towards a better family climate and a higher family functioning occurred. Given the very difficult circumstances of these multi-problem families the results are considered promising.     

Relation of mobility-fixity to the interpretation of pictorial stimuli

A group of 61 students who had previously (in 1986) been classified by Hansson, Rydén, and Johnsson in terms of perceptual fixity-mobility using a "free" Rod-and-Frame Test, were investigated regarding their interpretations of a nonfigurative stimulus shown repetitively at short exposure-times, and their characterization of two pictures each portraying two soldiers in intensive interaction--one man apparently attacking the other in the first picture and apparently rescuing or taking care of the other man in the second. Mobile subjects on the free Rod-and-Frame Test reported a larger number of different interpretations of the nonfigurative stimulus and construed it more frequently in terms of human themes than did the fixed subjects; in rating the pictures of soldiers, they used more extreme and complex characteristics. It appeared that, when confronted with ambiguous stimuli, the mobile individual moves both "horizontally", as it were, along the surface of objective reality, and "vertically", from present to past realities, thus conjoining subjective-emotional and objective-analytic aspects of perception. This interpretation agrees with Werner's model of mobility-fixity which implies that the mobile individual operates on different developmental levels of perceptual functioning.     

Uncertainty and the Ethics of Clinical Trials

A probabilistic explication is offered of equipoise and uncertainty in clinical trials. In order to be useful in the justification of clinical trials, equipoise has to be interpreted in terms of overlapping probability distributions of possible treatment outcomes, rather than point estimates representing expectation values. Uncertainty about treatment outcomes is shown to be a necessary but insufficient condition for the ethical defensibility of clinical trials. Additional requirements are proposed for the nature of that uncertainty. The indecisiveness of our criteria for cautious decision-making under uncertainty creates the leeway that makes clinical trials defensible.     

What is ceteris paribus preference?

A general format is introduced for deriving preferences over states of affairs from preferences over a set of contextually complete alternatives. Formal results are given both for this general format and for a specific instance of it that is a plausible explication of ceteris paribus prefence.