An Exploration of Johnson's Sense of ‘Argument’

This essay attempts to give definitions and identity conditions for the two predominant senses of Argument currently in use, the one involving reasons for a conclusion and the other denoting an expressed disagreement with ensuing verbal behaviour by two parties. I see Johnson's new concept of Argument, as developed in his book Manifest Rationality, as a hybrid of the two common senses of Argument, and, accordingly, I try to define and give the identity conditions of Johnson-arguments. Finally, I disagree with Johnson on the nature of the definition he thinks he has proposed, and I conclude with observations suggesting that his logical perspective has dialectical and rhetorical components.     

Physical,neural, and mental timing

The conclusions drawn by Benjamin Libet from his work with colleagues on the timing of somatosensorial conscious experiences has met with a lot of praise and criticism. In this issue we find three examples of the latter. Here I attempt to place the divide between the two opponent camps in a broader perspective by analyzing the question of the relation between physical timing, neural timing, and experiential (mental) timing. The nervous system does a sophisticated job of recombining and recoding messages from the sensorial surfaces and if these processes are slighted in a theory, it might become necessary to postulate weird operations, including subjective back-referral. Neuroscientifically inspired theories are of necessity still based on guesses, extrapolations, and philosophically dubious manners of speech. They often assume some neural correlate of consciousness (NCC) as a part of the nervous system that transforms neural activity in reportable experiences. The majority of neuroscientists appear to assume that the NCC can compare and bind activity patterns only if they arrive simultaneously at the NCC. This leads to a search for synchrony or to theories in terms of the compensation of differences in neural delays (latencies). This is the main dimension of the Libet discussion. Examples from vision research, such as "temporal-binding-by-synchrony" and the "flash-lag" effect, are then used to illustrate these reasoning patterns in more detail. Alternatively one could assume symbolic representations of time and space (symbolic "tags") that are not coded in their own dimension (not time in time and space in space). Unless such tags are multiplexed with the quality message (tickle, color, or motion), one gets a binding problem for tags. One of the hidden aspects of the discussion between Libet and opponents appears to be the following. Is the NCC smarter than the rest of the nervous system, so that it can solve the problems of local sign (e.g., "where is the event"?) and timing (e.g., "when did it occur?" and "how long did it last?") on its own, or are these pieces of information coded symbolically early on in the system? A supersmart NCC appears to be the assumption of Libet's camp (which includes Descartes, but also mystics). The wish to distribute the smartness evenly across all stages of processing in the nervous system (smart recodings) appears to motivate the opponents. I argue that there are reasons to side with the latter group.     

Plasticity of the human auditory cortex induced by discrimination learning of non-native,mora-timed contrasts of the Japanese language

In this magnetoencephalographic (MEG) study, we examined with high temporal resolution the traces of learning in the speech-dominant left-hemispheric auditory cortex as a function of newly trained mora-timing. In Japanese, the “mora” is a temporal unit that divides words into almost isochronous segments (e.g., na-ka-mu-ra and to-o-kyo-o each comprises four mora). Changes in the brain responses of a group of German and Japanese subjects to differences in the mora structure of Japanese words were compared. German subjects performed a discrimination training in 10 sessions of 1.5 h each day. They learned to discriminate Japanese pairs of words (in a consonant, anni–ani; and a vowel, kiyo–kyo, condition), where the second word was shortened by one mora in eight steps of 15 msec each. A significant increase in learning performance, as reflected by behavioral measures, was observed, accompanied by a significant increase of the amplitude of the Mismatch Negativity Field (MMF). The German subjects' hit rate for detecting durational deviants increased by up to 35%. Reaction times and MMF latencies decreased significantly across training sessions. Japanese subjects showed a more sensitive MMF to smaller differences. Thus, even in young adults, perceptual learning of non-native mora-timing occurs rapidly and deeply. The enhanced behavioral and neurophysiological sensitivity found after training indicates a strong relationship between learning and (plastic) changes in the cortical substrate.     

Phonological sensitivity and the acquisition of new words in children

Two studies are reported which aimed to examine the relationship between phonological sensitivity and the acquisition of new words that systematically differed in the familiarity of their sound structures. In the first study measures of phonological sensitivity, phonological short-term memory, vocabulary, and nonverbal ability were administered to forty-one 5-year-old children. Phonological sensitivity was related to the paired-associate learning of phonologically unfamiliar words, but not to the learning of familiar words. In the second study a group of 14 nonreading 5-year-old children received phonological sensitivity training. A control group was trained in semantic categorization. After the training, the phonological sensitivity group did perform better on measures of letter knowledge and phonological sensitivity (rhyme and first-sound categorization) and appeared to learn phonologically unfamiliar words more easily. The findings of both studies suggest that phonological sensitivity can support the acquisition of novel words.     

Substantive unconscious and adjective unconscious: the contribution of Wilfred Bion

The author first provides her readers with a brief summary of some of Freud's ideas, as found throughout his work, on the notion of 'unconscious'. The notion of unconscious as noun is contrasted to the idea of unconscious as adjective, this latter being proposed as a quality, or a state, ever temporary, dynamic, and subject to the constant changes going on in the individual's internal psychic world, as well as to external conditions. After presenting some considerations, the author then contrasts the Kleinian model of the mind to the Freudian, and Wilfred Bion's contribution is discussed at some length. Within Bion's conception of psychic functioning, the model of 'dream' is highlighted and, in this regard, clarifications are sought regarding Bion's view of the unconscious. To conclude, a brief and superficial approximation to the work of Carl Jung is touched upon, although the author admits to knowing little of Jung's positions.     

Flexibility, inhibition, and planning: frontal dysfunctioning in schizophrenia

Neuropsychological tests known to reveal abnormalities in patients with frontal lobe damage were used to explore cognitive function in 20 chronic schizophrenic patients. Eleven control subjects, matched on age and NLV-IQ (NLV is the Dutch version of the NART) were also tested. No impairments of planning ability were found on either the Action Program test or the Zoomap test, both subtests from the BADS (Behavioural Assessment of the Dysexecutive Syndrome). No abnormalities were apparent on tests of reactive flexibility, measured by task-switching and by the Rule Shift Cards test, also a subtest of the BADS. Patients with schizophrenia, however, had significantly greater difficulty in inhibiting irrelevant information and in generating words in a verbal fluency task, a measure of spontaneous flexibility.     

Frontal-Lobe Involvement in Spatial Memory: Evidence from PET,fMRI, and Lesion Studies

Many studies have identified the prefrontal cortex as the brain area that is critical for spatial memory, both in humans and in other primates. Other studies, however, have failed to establish this relation. Therefore, the aim of this paper was to review the literature regarding the role of the human prefrontal lobe in spatial memory. This was done by examining the evidence obtained from neuropsychological patients and from studies using brain-imaging techniques (PET and fMRI). Evidence supporting the notion that the prefrontal cortex is extensively involved in spatial working memory was found. The majority of these studies, however, suggests that frontal-lobe involvement is not related to the type of material that is being processed (e.g., spatial vs. nonspatial), but to process-specific functions, such as encoding and retrieval. Theoretically, these functions could be linked to the central executive within Baddeley's working-memory model, or to recent theories that emphasize the various processes that play a role in working memory. Also, methodological issues were discussed. Further research is needed to enhance our understanding of the precise interaction of domain-specific and general processes.