Converging evidence that fear of success is multidimensional

Fear of Success (FOS) was originally conceived as a unidimensional motive. However, there is both theoretical and empirical support for the hypothesis that FOS is multidimensional. We factor analyzed the responses of 236 undergraduates to twenty-oneConcern Over the Negative Consequences of Success items and found four factors. Our four factors show considerable overlap with dimensions based on theoretical accounts of FOS etiology as well as with the factor structures obtained from two other factor analytic studies. Thus, there is converging evidence that FOS is multidimensional. The relationship between multidimensional FOS and a multidimensional approach to achievement motivation is discussed.     

Explaining Choices in Procedural and Distributive Justice Across Cultures

A previous study (Leung, Bond, & Schwartz, 1990) established that an expectancy-valence model could be used effectively to explain behaviours in three social domains both within and across cultures. In this study the model was applied to the domains of resource allocation and conflict resolution in order to pinpoint which expectancies and which valences were carrying the explanatory weight of the respondents' behavioural strategies. For both Israeli and Hong Kong students the expectancies and, less strongly, the valences tapping harmony and performance quality were important for resource allocation; those tapping animosity reduction and process control, for conflict resolution. Suggestions were offered for broadening the net of explanatory constructs for future work aimed at specifying subjective factors associated with justice-related behaviours.     

Noncompliance with Persuasive Appeals for a Prosocial,Altruistic Act: Blood Donating1

Effects of persuasive messages, responsibility denial (RD), and attitude-accessing on blood-giving attitudes, intentions, moral obligations, and behavior were examined. In Study 1, participants (n= 84) who heard a message emphasizing moral reasons for donating indicated a more favorable postmessage attitude and stronger moral obligation to donate than participants exposed to a message aimed at reducing fear, a combined moral and fear- reduction message, or no message. Combined message participants showed greatest intent to donate, yet only 14% of all participants attended a campus drive. In Study 2, low (n= 52) and high (n= 60) RD individuals heard the message arguments and were asked to access their attitudes. Low compared to high RD individuals stated a stronger sense of moral obligation, particularly when they accessed their thoughts relevant to blood donating, and behavioral intention, especially in the combined message condition. Few participants attended a blood drive (12.5%), yet most were low RD individuals from the nonaccessed attitude condition (83%). Results suggest that few individuals will engage in the altruistic act of blood donating, despite the experimental use of persuasive messages and accessing issue-relevant attitudes.     

Reaction time to threat stimuli in panic disorder and social phobia

Two studies assessed response time among clinically anxious subjects and normal controls when presented with threat, positive and neutral stimuli under perceptual (lexical decision) and semantic (category decision) task conditions. In Study 1, panic disorder subjects' (n = 14) performance was compared to that of matched normal controls (n = 14) while in Study 2 social phobic subjects (n = 24) were compared to matched normal controls (n = 24). Relative to matched normal controls, panic disorder subjects but not social phobics tended to show greater slowing in performance on the more cognitively complex (category) task. A second finding, consistent across both studies was that, compared to the normal control groups, both panic and social phobic groups showed significantly slowed responses to threat words in both the perceptual and semantic tasks. Such findings are directly counter to the predictions of a mood congruence hypothesis. This apparent contradiction is resolved by a review of the literature which indicates that mood-related facilitation effects are obtained only in tasks which tap awareness of threat information rather than speed of response. It is suggested that while anxiety may produce enhanced awareness of threat, it may inhibit responsiveness to it. The results of these studies are seen as consistent with ethological theories of inhibited motoric responses under certain threat conditions. Furthermore, the findings suggest that caution is indicated in interpreting slowed reaction time to threat stimuli in tasks such as the Stroop color naming task as purely the result of attentional processes.     

The concept of sin in pastoral counseling

The concept of sin seems to have virtually disappeared from the pastoral counseling literature, and this likely reflects the possibility that it has virtually disappeared from the practice of pastoral counseling. This article presents a case for returning the concept of sin to pastoral counseling and does so by discussing the psychospiritual importance of addressing sin, defining sin in a pastorally useful way, discussing four capital sins in light of a contemporary understanding of sin, and drawing some pastoral implications.     

The ω-rule

We prove that all proofs in -logic (a first order logic with -rule added) in which -rule is used finitely many times can be turned into proofs in which the -rule is used at most one time. Next, we prove that the word finitely above cannot be changed by the word infinitely.     

Backward induction and beliefs about oneself

According to decision theory, the rational initial action in a sequential decision-problem may be found by ‘backward induction’ or “folding back’. But the reasoning which underwrites this claim appeals to the agent's beliefs about what she will later believe, about what she will later believe she will still later believe, and so forth. There are limits to the ‘depth’ of people's beliefs. Do these limits pose a threat to the standard theory of rational sequential choice? It is argued, first, that the traditional solutions of certain games depend on knowledge which exceeds depth limits, and that these solutions therefore cannot be shown rational in the usual sense. Then, for that related reason even ‘folding back’ solutions of one-person problems cannot be! A revision of our notion of rational choice is proposed, analogous to the reliabilist account of knowledge of Goldman and others, by which this paradox is resolved.