Audience Design in Multiparty Conversation

How do speakers design what they say in order to communicate effectively with groups of addressees who vary in their background knowledge of the topic at hand? Prior findings indicate that when a speaker addresses a pair of listeners with discrepant knowledge, that speakers Aim Low, designing their utterances for the least knowledgeable of the two addressees. Here, we test the hypothesis that speakers will depart from an Aim Low approach in order to efficiently communicate with larger groups of interacting partners. Further, we ask whether the cognitive demands of tracking multiple conversational partners' perspectives places limitations on successful audience design. We find that speakers can successfully track information about what up to four of their partners do and do not know in conversation. When addressing groups of 3–4 addressees at once, speakers design language based on the combined knowledge of the group. These findings point to an audience design process that simultaneously represents the perspectives of multiple other individuals and combines these representations in order to design utterances that strike a balance between the different needs of the individuals within the group.     

Libertarianism,the Rollback Argument,and the Objective Probability of Free Choices

It is widely assumed that candidates for free, undetermined choices must have objective probabilities prior to their performance. Indeed although this premise figures prominently in a widely discussed argument against libertarianism, few libertarians have called it into question. In this article, I will investigate whether libertarians ought to reject it. I will conclude that doing so should not be tempting to event‐causal libertarians or most agent‐causal ones, because the added costs outweigh the benefits.     

SUBJECTIVISM,UTILITY, AND AUTONOMY

Taking as a starting point a thesis of David Gauthier's about the status of Rational Choice Theory. I discuss the relation between a subjectivist theory of value and an account of rational agency that leaves room for autonomy. I argue that if autonomy presupposes an activity of practical reason, the maximization of subjective expected utility (as prescribed by Rational Choice Theory) cannot serve as the principle of practical reason.