Fusion prevents the redundant signals effect: evidence from stereoscopically presented stimuli

In a simple reaction time (RT) experiment, visual stimuli were stereoscopically presented either to one eye (single stimulation) or to both eyes (redundant stimulation), with brightness matched for single and redundant stimulations. Redundant stimulation resulted in two separate percepts when noncorresponding retinal areas were stimulated, whereas it resulted in a single fused percept when corresponding areas were stimulated. With stimulation of noncorresponding areas, mean RT was shorter to redundant than to single stimulation, replicating the redundant signals effect (RSE) commonly found with visual stimuli. With stimulation of corresponding areas, however, no RSE was observed. This suggests that the RSE is driven by the number of percepts rather than by the number of stimulated receptors or sensory organs. These results are consistent with previous findings in the auditory modality and have implications for models of the RSE.     

God − Moore = Ramsey (A Reply to Chalmers and Hájek)

Famously, Frank P. Ramsey suggested a test for the acceptability of conditionals. Recently, David Chalmers and Alan Hájek (2007) have criticized a qualitative variant of the Ramsey test for indicative conditionals. In this paper we argue for the following three claims: (i) Chalmers and Hájek are right that the variant of the Ramsey test that they attack is not the correct way of spelling out an acceptability test for indicative conditionals. But there is a suppositional variant of the Ramsey test which is still stated in purely qualitative terms, which avoids the problems, and which looks correct. (ii) While the variant of the Ramsey test that Chalmers and Hájek criticize is not correct, it is still a good approximation of a correct formulation of the Ramsey test which may be usefully employed in various contexts. (iii) The variant of the Ramsey test that Chalmers and Hájek suggest as a substitute for the deficient version of the Ramsey test is itself subject to worries similar to those raised by Chalmers and Hájek, if it is given a non-suppositional interpretation.     

Establishing the next generation at work: leader generativity as a moderator of the relationships between leader age, leader-member exchange, and leadership success

In this study, the authors investigated leader generativity as a moderator of the relationships between leader age, leader-member exchange, and three criteria of leadership success (follower perceptions of leader effectiveness, follower satisfaction with leader, and follower extra effort). Data came from 128 university professors paired with one research assistant each. Results showed positive relationships between leader age and leader generativity, and negative relationships between leader age and follower perceptions of leader effectiveness and follower extra effort. Consistent with expectations based on leadership categorization theory, leader generativity moderated the relationships between leader age and all three criteria of leadership success, such that leaders high in generativity were better able to maintain high levels of leadership success at higher ages than leaders low in generativity. Finally, results of mediated moderation analyses showed that leader-member exchange quality mediated these moderating effects. The findings suggest that, in combination, leader age and the age-related construct of generativity importantly influence leadership processes and outcomes.     

Probability for the Revision Theory of Truth

Journal of Philosophical Logic - We investigate how to assign probabilities to sentences that contain a type-free truth predicate. These probability values track how often a sentence is satisfied...     

Normativity and context in young children's pretend play

In two studies 3-year-olds’ understanding of the context-specificity of normative rules was investigated through games of pretend play. In the first study, children protested against a character who joined a pretend game but treated the target object according to its real function. However, they did not protest when she performed the same action without having first joined the game. In the second study, children protested when the character mixed up an object's pretend identities between two different pretend games. However, they did not protest when she performed the same pretend action in its correct game context. Thus, the studies show that young children see the pretence–reality distinction, and the distinction between different pretence identities, as normative. More generally, the results of these studies demonstrate young children's ability to enforce normative rules in their pretence and to do so context-specifically.     

Young children's selective learning of rule games from reliable and unreliable models

We investigated preschoolers’ selective learning from models that had previously appeared to be reliable or unreliable. Replicating previous research, children from 4 years selectively learned novel words from reliable over unreliable speakers. Extending previous research, children also selectively learned other kinds of acts – novel games – from reliable actors. More important, – and novel to this study, this selective learning was not just based on a preference for one model or one kind of act, but had a normative dimension to it. Children understood the way a reliable actor demonstrated an act not only as the better one, but as the normatively appropriate or correct one, as indicated in both their explicit verbal comments and their spontaneous normative interventions (e.g., protest, critique) in response to third-party acts deviating from the one demonstrated. These findings are discussed in the broader context of the development of children's social cognition and cultural learning.     

Multidimensional similarity: an experimental and theoretical comparison of vector,distance, and set theoretical models : I. Models and internal consistency of data

In an experiment (conducted by the senior author) subjects were instructed to give three kinds of quantitative judgment on pairs of simple geometrical stimuli: similarity, commonality ratio and magnitude ratio. It was assumed that the different kinds of judgments could be interpreted in terms of one cognitive structure, and that formal models for each of these judgments should be validated by predicting one kind of judgment from knowledge of another kind of judgment. The present report proposes two different, though related, systems of formal models for similarity, commonality and magnitude ratio judgments. One, called E-model, interprets the judgments in terms of set- and vector-representations, and connections between them; the other, called R-model, interprets the judgments in terms of set- and distance-representations and their connections. The results are slightly in favor of the E-model. In a subsequent paper, the authors will report the results of multidimensional analyses for the same data, which slightly favor the R-model.     

Two-year-olds grasp the intentional structure of pretense acts

Twenty-two- and 27-month-old children were tested for their understanding of pretending as a specific intentional action form. Pairs of superficially similar behaviors - pretending to perform an action and trying to perform that action - were demonstrated to children. The 27-month-olds, and to some degree the 22-month-olds, showed in their responses that they understood the intentional structure of both kinds of behaviors: after pretense models, they themselves performed appropriate inferential pretense acts, whereas after the trying models they properly performed the action or tried to perform it with novel means. These findings are discussed in the light of recent debates about children's developing understanding of pretense and theory of mind.