Theory of mind and wisdom: The development of different forms of perspective-taking in late adulthood

How does perspective-taking develop over the lifespan? This question has been investigated in two separate research traditions, dealing with theory of mind (ToM) and wisdom, respectively. Operating in almost complete isolation from each other, and using rather different conceptual approaches, these two traditions have produced seemingly contradictory results: While perspective-taking has been consistently found to decline in old age in ToM research, studies on wisdom have mostly found that perspective-taking remains constant or sometimes even increases in later adulthood. This study sought to integrate these two lines of research and clarify the seemingly contradictory patterns of findings by systematically testing for both forms of perspective-taking and their potential cognitive foundations. The results revealed (1) the dissociation in developmental patterns between ToM perspective-taking (declining with age) and wisdom-related perspective-taking (no decline with age) also held – documented here for the first time – in one and the same sample of younger versus older adults; (2) this dissociation was of limited generality: It did not (or only partly) hold once the material of the two types of tasks was more closely matched; and (3) the divergent developmental patterns of ToM perspective-taking versus wisdom-related perspective-taking could be accounted for to some degree by the fact that only TOM perspective-taking was related to developmental changes in fluid intelligence.     

HYPE: A System of Hyperintensional Logic (with an Application to Semantic Paradoxes)

Journal of Philosophical Logic - This article introduces, studies, and applies a new system of logic which is called ‘HYPE’. In HYPE, formulas are evaluated at states that may exhibit...     

A Lottery Paradox for Counterfactuals Without Agglomeration

We will present a new lottery‐style paradox on counterfactuals and chance. The upshot will be: combining natural assumptions on (i) the truth values of ordinary counterfactuals, (ii) the conditional chances of possible but non‐actual events, (iii) the manner in which (i) and (ii) relate to each other, and (iv) a fragment of the logic of counterfactuals leads to disaster. In contrast with the usual lottery‐style paradoxes, logical closure under conjunction—that is, in this case, the rule of Agglomeration of (consequents of) counterfactuals—will not play a role in the derivation and will not be entailed by our premises either. We will sketch four obvious but problematic ways out of the dilemma, and we will end up with a new resolution strategy that is non‐obvious but (as we hope) less problematic: contextualism about what counts as a proposition. This proposal will not just save us from the paradox, it will also save each premise in at least some context, and it will be motivated by independent considerations from measure theory and probability theory.     

The Role of Memory Distrust in Cases of Internalised False Confession

This paper reviews the literature on the role of ‘memory distrust’ in cases of internalised false confessions and provides a heuristic model for understanding the antecedents and mechanism involved. It also provides an in‐depth analysis of two real life cases of ‘suspected’ murders involving six convicted persons, five of whom showed evidence of profound memory distrust regarding the alleged offences. The key factors were coercive interviewing, lengthy solitary confinement, contamination, psychological vulnerabilities (both state and trait) and lack of independent support during questioning. The vulnerabilities in such cases typically involve a combination of cognitive (memory flaws, lack of confidence in memory and failure to invoke distinctiveness heuristic), personality (suggestibility and compliance), health problems and motivational (desire and willingness to assist the police) factors. The two cases suggest that the process of internalised false confessions may be conceptualised in terms of five sequential steps: a trigger, plausibility, acceptance, reconstruction and resolution. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

No anticipation without intention: Response–effect compatibility in effect-based and stimulus-based actions

Goal-directed behavior is characterized by the anticipation of the resulting effect during response selection. Such anticipations can be contextualized in the sense that response–effect relationships in one stimulus context are inverted in another stimulus context. The primary study aim was to test the hypothesis that contextualized effect anticipation might depend on whether subjects adopt either an effect-based action control style or a stimulus-based control style. Importantly, we hypothesized that the choice of control styles depends on explicit instruction. Effect anticipation during response selection was determined by assessing the behavioral impact of spatial compatibility between the required response and an additional task-irrelevant spatial feature attached to the anticipated effect that would be produced by that response in a given context. In two experiments we found a compatibility effect exclusively in blocks with effect-based instruction but not in stimulus-based blocks. Furthermore, subjects could quickly switch between styles without one strategy dominating the others. Together, this shows that contextualized anticipation of distal visual effects is not an automatic process but depends on the intention to produce an effect.     

Focus on opportunities as a mediator of the relationships between age, job complexity, and work performance

Focus on opportunities is a cognitive-motivational facet of occupational future time perspective that describes how many new goals, options, and possibilities individuals expect to have in their personal work-related futures. This study examined focus on opportunities as a mediator of the relationships between age and work performance and between job complexity and work performance. In addition, it was expected that job complexity buffers the negative relationship between age and focus on opportunities and weakens the negative indirect effect of age on work performance. Results of mediation, moderation, and moderated mediation analyses with data collected from 168 employees in 41 organizations (mean age = 40.22 years, SD = 10.43, range = 19–64 years) as well as 168 peers providing work performance ratings supported the assumptions. The findings suggest that future studies on the role of age for work design and performance should take employees’ focus on opportunities into account.     

Two-year-olds grasp the intentional structure of pretense acts

Twenty-two- and 27-month-old children were tested for their understanding of pretending as a specific intentional action form. Pairs of superficially similar behaviors - pretending to perform an action and trying to perform that action - were demonstrated to children. The 27-month-olds, and to some degree the 22-month-olds, showed in their responses that they understood the intentional structure of both kinds of behaviors: after pretense models, they themselves performed appropriate inferential pretense acts, whereas after the trying models they properly performed the action or tried to perform it with novel means. These findings are discussed in the light of recent debates about children's developing understanding of pretense and theory of mind.     

Control over location-based response activation in the Simon task: behavioral and electrophysiological evidence

In 4 Simon experiments the authors examined control over 2 routes of sensorimotor processing: response priming in the unconditional route and response selection via the conditional route. The Simon effect diminished as the frequency of noncorresponding trials increased. Location-based response priming was observed only when the stimulus followed a corresponding event but not after a noncorresponding trial. Therefore, the unconditional route appears to be suppressed whenever the task context indicates priming as potentially disadvantageous. Moreover, the task-irrelevant stimulus location was used for response selection as a function of correspondence probability. Although exact repetitions of stimulus-response sequences caused a marked speed-up of responses, this 3rd mechanism is independent of unconditional route suppression and frequency-based adjustments in the conditional route.     

Bigger knows better: Young children selectively learn rule games from adults rather than from peers

Preschoolers' selective learning from adult versus peer models was investigated. Extending previous research, children from age 3 were shown to selectively learn simple rule games from adult rather than peer models. Furthermore, this selective learning was not confined to preferentially performing certain acts oneself, but more specifically had a normative dimension to it: children understood the way the adult demonstrated an act not only as the better one, but as the normatively appropriate/correct one. This was indicated in their spontaneous normative interventions (protest, critique, etc.) in response to third party acts deviating from the one demonstrated by the adult model. Various interpretations of these findings are discussed in the broader context of the development of children's social cognition and cultural learning.