Self–other contingencies: Enacting social perception

Can we see the expressiveness of other people's gestures, hear the intentions in their voice, see the emotions in their posture? Traditional theories of social cognition still say we cannot because intentions and emotions for them are hidden away inside and we do not have direct access to them. Enactive theories still have no idea because they have so far mainly focused on perception of our physical world. We surmise, however, that the latter hold promise since, in trying to understand cognition, enactive theory focuses on the embodied engagements of a cognizer with his world. In this paper, we attempt an answer for the question What is social perception in an enactive account? In enaction, perception is conceived as a skill, crucially involving action (perception is action and action is perception), an ability to work successfully within the set of regularities, or contingencies that characterize a given domain. If this is the case, then social perception should be a social skill. Having thus transformed the question of what social perception is into that of what social skill is, we examine the concept of social contingencies and the manner in which social skills structure—both constrain and empower—social interaction. Some of the implications of our account for how social and physical perception differ, the role of embodiment in social interaction and the distinction between our approach and other social contingency theories are also addressed.     

Outpatient group psychotherapy following day treatment for patients with personality disorders

This prospective, naturalistic study evaluated the practice and effectiveness of an outpatient group therapy program following day treatment for patients with personality disorders (PDs). One hundred and eighty-seven patients (86% patients with PDs and 14% with no PDs), were treated in outpatient psychodynamic group therapy. Outcome was assessed by Global Assessment of Functioning, Symptom Check List 90-R, and Inventory of Interpersonal Problems-Circumplex, short version, at admission and discharge from day treatment, and at the end of outpatient group therapy. Average length of outpatient therapy was 24 months. Forty-three percent terminated in an irregular manner. Outcome of the continuation therapy was satisfactory for patients without PDs. For PD patients, the improvement from the day treatment was maintained during outpatient therapy, but further improvements were modest for symptoms and interpersonal distress, somewhat better for global functioning. Implications for further treatment development are discussed.     

Coming to terms: Client subjective experience of ending psychotherapy

How do clients consider their own contribution and that of their therapist in the last phase of therapy when they are moving toward the end? Thirty-seven clients who had received therapy from highly experienced clinicians were interviewed. Since the time for ending had not been decided at the onset, clients in both short- and long-term therapies were included. Thematic case-by-case analyses were carried out. Clients actively engaged in looking back and looking ahead, as means of reflecting on their capability to handle issues on their own. The majority of clients were satisfied with what they perceived as a reciprocal engagement that enabled them to come to terms with emotionally charged issues in life and in therapy. For some clients unresolved issues remained: wondering whether a therapist with another approach could have helped more; feeling pushed away by the therapist; having to take the lead in ending therapy; the fear of being an “unworthy” client; or wanting to end without the therapist’s approval. Coming to terms with the ending of therapy was highly personally meaningful and loaded with affective tensions, in ways that were not always shared with their therapist.     

The Second Essential Tension: on Tradition and Innovation in Interdisciplinary Research

In his analysis of “the essential tension between tradition and innovation” Thomas S. Kuhn focused on the apparent paradox that, on the one hand, normal research is a highly convergent activity based upon a settled consensus, but, on the other hand, the ultimate effect of this tradition-bound work has invariably been to change the tradition. Kuhn argued that, on the one hand, without the possibility of divergent thought, fundamental innovation would be precluded. On the other hand, without a strong emphasis on convergent thought, science would become a mess created by continuous theory changes and scientific progress would again be precluded. On Kuhn’s view, both convergent and divergent thought are therefore equally necessary for the progress of science. In this paper, I shall argue that a similar fundamental tension exists between the demands we see for novel insights of an interdisciplinary nature and the need for established intellectual doctrines founded in the classical disciplines. First, I shall revisit Kuhn’s analysis of the essential tension between tradition and innovation. Next, I shall argue that the tension inherent in interdisciplinary research between, on the one hand, intellectual independence and critical scrutiny and, on the other hand, epistemic dependence and trust is a complement to Kuhn’s essential tension within mono-disciplinary science between convergent and divergent thought.     

Beyond Single-Mindedness: A Figure-Ground Reversal for the Cognitive Sciences

A fundamental fact about human minds is that they are never truly alone: all minds are steeped in situated interaction. That social interaction matters is recognized by any experimentalist who seeks to exclude its influence by studying individuals in isolation. On this view, interaction complicates cognition. Here, we explore the more radical stance that interaction co-constitutes cognition: that we benefit from looking beyond single minds toward cognition as a process involving interacting minds. All around the cognitive sciences, there are approaches that put interaction center stage. Their diverse and pluralistic origins may obscure the fact that collectively, they harbor insights and methods that can respecify foundational assumptions and fuel novel interdisciplinary work. What might the cognitive sciences gain from stronger interactional foundations? This represents, we believe, one of the key questions for the future. Writing as a transdisciplinary collective assembled from across the classic cognitive science hexagon and beyond, we highlight the opportunity for a figure-ground reversal that puts interaction at the heart of cognition. The interactive stance is a way of seeing that deserves to be a key part of the conceptual toolkit of cognitive scientists.