Examining legalism,scrupulosity, family perfectionism,and psychological adjustment among LDS individuals

This study examined the relationships and interactions between legalism, scrupulosity, family perfectionism, guilt, and shame among 421 Latter-Day Saints (LDS or Mormons). The results showed that scrupulosity fully mediated the links between legalism and guilt, as well as legalism and shame. A moderated-mediation effect was found, in which family discrepancy (maladaptive perfectionism) intensified the scrupulosity–shame association in the mediation model of legalism and shame by scrupulosity. Family discrepancy was not a significant moderator for the mediation model of legalism and guilt by scrupulosity. Additional results are provided and implications of these findings are outlined.     

Producing biased diagnoses with unambiguous stimuli: The importance of feature instantiations

In this article, the authors demonstrate a laboratory analogue of medical diagnostic biasing (V. R. LeBlanc, G. R. Norman, & L. R. Brooks, 2001) in 2 experiments and explore the basis of this effect. Before categorizing novel exemplars, participants first evaluated the likelihood that the item was a member of the category suggested on that trial: either the correct category or a plausible alternative category. This was sufficient to produce a substantial bias toward the suggested category despite the use of unambiguous stimuli, explicit rules, and unhurried conditions--each of which would be likely to limit diagnostic bias. The authors argue that the production of this effect requires distinguishing between particular feature instantiations and more abstract representations of those features as well as allowing people to adopt a particular decision strategy mediating the use of instantiated features: a feature-recognition heuristic.     

Grouping does not require attention

Many theories of visual perception stipulate that Gestalt grouping occurs preattentively. Subjects' failure to report perceiving even salient grouping patterns under conditions of inattention challenges this assumption (see, e.g., Mack, Tang, Tuma, Kahn, & Rock, 1992), but Moore and Egeth (1997) showed that although subjects are indeed unable to identify grouping patterns outside the focus of attention, effects of these patterns on visual perception can be observed when they are assessed using implicit, rather than explicit, measures. However, this finding, which is the only one to date demonstrating grouping effects without attention, is open to an alternative account. In the present study, we eliminated this confound and replicated Moore and Egeth's findings, using the Müller-Lyer illusion (Experiments 1 and 2). Moreover, we found converging evidence for these findings with a variant of the flanker task (Experiment 3), when the amount of available attentional resources was varied (Experiments 4 and 5). The results reinforce the idea that, although grouping outside the focus of attention cannot be the object of overt report, grouping processes can occur without attention.     

Facial asymmetry detection in patients with body dysmorphic disorder

Cognitive-behavioral models of body dysmorphic disorder (BDD) propose that individuals with BDD may possess a better or more developed sense of aestheticality than do individuals without BDD. Evidence for this proposition, however, is limited. One perceptual process that could contribute to heightened aestheticality is the ability to detect differences in symmetry. In this experiment we tested whether individuals with BDD (n = 20), relative to individuals with obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD; n = 20) and healthy controls (n = 20), show an enhanced ability to detect differences in the symmetry of others’ faces, symmetry of dot arrays, and/or show a greater preference for symmetrical faces. Individuals with BDD were not significantly more accurate in detecting differences in facial symmetry or dot arrays relative to individuals with OCD and healthy controls. Individuals with OCD took longer to make facial symmetry judgments than did individuals in the other two groups. All participants, regardless of diagnostic group, preferred more symmetrical faces than nonsymmetrical ones. Taken together, our results do not support a heightened perceptual ability or evaluative preference for symmetry among individuals with BDD.     

A Developmental Trajectory in Implicit Memory is Revealed by Picture Fragment Completion

Dissociations between performance on implicit and explicit tasks have often been taken as evidence that different neural structures subserve the two types of memory. One such dissociation involves developmental differences that emerge in explicit tasks, but which appear to be absent in implicit tasks. Such findings are consistent with the idea that implicit memory is subserved by a more primitive system that evolves earlier at both phylogenetic and ontogenetic levels. The present paper reviews previous studies that claimed to find evidence that implicit memory is fully developed in very young children. Issues of measurement error, ceiling effects, and insufficient power brought up questions about those studies with respect to the developmental issue. The present study compares performance on implicit (picture fragment completion) and explicit (free recall and recognition) memory tasks with groups ranging in age from 5–28 years. We find a reliable developmental trend in both implicit and explicit performance in which the former cannot be attributed to the operation ofexplicit memory processes. Thus, we conclude that implicit memory, like explicit memory, develops with age.     

Aesthetic Judgment and Perceptual Normativity

I draw a connection between the question, raised by Hume and Kant, of how aesthetic judgments can claim universal agreement, and the question, raised in recent discussions of nonconceptual content, of how concepts can be acquired on the basis of experience. Developing an idea suggested by Kant's linkage of aesthetic judgment with the capacity for empirical conceptualization, I propose that both questions can be resolved by appealing to the idea of “perceptual normativity”. Perceptual experience, on this proposal, involves the awareness of its own appropriateness with respect to the object perceived, where this appropriateness is more primitive than truth or veridicality. This means that a subject can take herself to be perceiving an object as she (and anyone else) ought to perceive it, without first recognizing the object as falling under a corresponding concept. I motivate the proposal through a criticism of Peacocke's account of concept‐acquisition, which, I argue, rests on a confusion between the notion of a way something is perceived, and that of a way it is perceived as being. Whereas Peacocke's account of concept‐acquisition depends on an illicit slide between these two notions, the notion of perceptual normativity allows a legitimate transition between them: if someone's perceiving something a certain way involves her taking it that she ought to perceive it that way, then she perceives the thing as being a certain way, so that the corresponding concept is available to her in perceptual experience.