Producing biased diagnoses with unambiguous stimuli: The importance of feature instantiations

In this article, the authors demonstrate a laboratory analogue of medical diagnostic biasing (V. R. LeBlanc, G. R. Norman, & L. R. Brooks, 2001) in 2 experiments and explore the basis of this effect. Before categorizing novel exemplars, participants first evaluated the likelihood that the item was a member of the category suggested on that trial: either the correct category or a plausible alternative category. This was sufficient to produce a substantial bias toward the suggested category despite the use of unambiguous stimuli, explicit rules, and unhurried conditions--each of which would be likely to limit diagnostic bias. The authors argue that the production of this effect requires distinguishing between particular feature instantiations and more abstract representations of those features as well as allowing people to adopt a particular decision strategy mediating the use of instantiated features: a feature-recognition heuristic.     

Grouping does not require attention

Many theories of visual perception stipulate that Gestalt grouping occurs preattentively. Subjects' failure to report perceiving even salient grouping patterns under conditions of inattention challenges this assumption (see, e.g., Mack, Tang, Tuma, Kahn, & Rock, 1992), but Moore and Egeth (1997) showed that although subjects are indeed unable to identify grouping patterns outside the focus of attention, effects of these patterns on visual perception can be observed when they are assessed using implicit, rather than explicit, measures. However, this finding, which is the only one to date demonstrating grouping effects without attention, is open to an alternative account. In the present study, we eliminated this confound and replicated Moore and Egeth's findings, using the Müller-Lyer illusion (Experiments 1 and 2). Moreover, we found converging evidence for these findings with a variant of the flanker task (Experiment 3), when the amount of available attentional resources was varied (Experiments 4 and 5). The results reinforce the idea that, although grouping outside the focus of attention cannot be the object of overt report, grouping processes can occur without attention.     

Parenting cognitions and treatment beliefs as predictors of experience using behavioral parenting strategies in families of children with attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder

We tested a model of mothers' parenting efficacy and attributions for child ADHD behaviors as predictors of experiences with behavioral treatment. The model proposed that mothers' beliefs regarding the acceptability and effectiveness of behavioral strategies would intervene between mothers' cognitions about parenting and child behavior and their treatment experiences. Participants were 101 mothers of 5- to 10-year-old children (82% male) with ADHD. Mothers reported their parenting efficacy and attributions for child behavior, and then received a single session of treatment teaching 2 behavior management strategies. Then, mothers reported their beliefs regarding the acceptability and effectiveness of these strategies. A follow-up phone interview 1 week later assessed mothers' experiences in using the behavioral strategies. The overall model fit the data. Attributions of child ADHD behavior as more pervasive, enduring, and within the child's control were related to seeing behavioral treatment as more acceptable, but neither attributions nor treatment acceptability predicted treatment experience. However, mothers with higher parenting efficacy viewed the behavioral strategies as more likely to be effective, and this pathway significantly predicted positive treatment experience. Implications for understanding the variables that contribute to parental decision-making and treatment participation for childhood ADHD are considered.     

Facial asymmetry detection in patients with body dysmorphic disorder

Cognitive-behavioral models of body dysmorphic disorder (BDD) propose that individuals with BDD may possess a better or more developed sense of aestheticality than do individuals without BDD. Evidence for this proposition, however, is limited. One perceptual process that could contribute to heightened aestheticality is the ability to detect differences in symmetry. In this experiment we tested whether individuals with BDD (n = 20), relative to individuals with obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD; n = 20) and healthy controls (n = 20), show an enhanced ability to detect differences in the symmetry of others’ faces, symmetry of dot arrays, and/or show a greater preference for symmetrical faces. Individuals with BDD were not significantly more accurate in detecting differences in facial symmetry or dot arrays relative to individuals with OCD and healthy controls. Individuals with OCD took longer to make facial symmetry judgments than did individuals in the other two groups. All participants, regardless of diagnostic group, preferred more symmetrical faces than nonsymmetrical ones. Taken together, our results do not support a heightened perceptual ability or evaluative preference for symmetry among individuals with BDD.     

Maximum-corrected and chance-corrected measures of effect size for the Mantel-Haenszel test

Two measures of effect size are described for the Mantel-Haenszel test. Both measures belong to the r-family of effect size measures. One measure is based on a maximum-corrected model, and the second measure is based on a chance-corrected model.     

Aristotle's De Anima: On Why the Soul is Not a Set of Capacities

Although it is common for interpreters of Aristotle's De Anima to treat the soul as a specially related set of powers of capacities, I argue against this view on the grounds that the plausible options for reconciling the claim that the soul is a set of powers with Aristotle's repeated claim that the soul is an actuality cannot be unsuccessful. Moreover, I argue that there are good reasons to be wary of attributing to Aristotle the view that the soul is a set of powers because this claim conflicts with several of his metaphysical commitments, most importantly his claims about form and substance. I argue that although there are passages in the De Anima in which Aristotle discusses the soul in terms of its powers or capacities, these discussions do not establish that the soul is a set of capacities.     

Familiar and unfamiliar face recognition: A review

Since the 1970s there has been a continuing interest in how people recognise familiar faces (Bruce, 1979 Bruce, V. 1979. Searching for politicians: An information processing approach to face recognition. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 31: 373–395. [Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]; Ellis, 1975 Ellis, H.D. 1975. Recognising faces. British Journal of Psychology, 66: 409–426. [Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]). This work has complemented investigations of how unfamiliar faces are processed and the findings from these two strands of research have given rise to accounts that propose qualitatively different forms of representation for familiar and unfamiliar faces. Evidence to suggest that we process familiar and unfamiliar faces in different ways is available from cognitive neuropsychology, brain scanning, and psychophysics. However, in this review we focus on the evidence, available from experimental investigations of how people recognise faces, for different types of representation existing for each type of face. Factors affecting recognition are evaluated in terms of how they apply to familiar and unfamiliar faces and categorised according to the nature of their impact. In the final section this evidence, along with recent advances in the field, is used to explore the way in which unfamiliar faces may become familiar and the factors that may be important for the development of familiar face representations.     

Aesthetic Judgment and Perceptual Normativity

I draw a connection between the question, raised by Hume and Kant, of how aesthetic judgments can claim universal agreement, and the question, raised in recent discussions of nonconceptual content, of how concepts can be acquired on the basis of experience. Developing an idea suggested by Kant's linkage of aesthetic judgment with the capacity for empirical conceptualization, I propose that both questions can be resolved by appealing to the idea of “perceptual normativity”. Perceptual experience, on this proposal, involves the awareness of its own appropriateness with respect to the object perceived, where this appropriateness is more primitive than truth or veridicality. This means that a subject can take herself to be perceiving an object as she (and anyone else) ought to perceive it, without first recognizing the object as falling under a corresponding concept. I motivate the proposal through a criticism of Peacocke's account of concept‐acquisition, which, I argue, rests on a confusion between the notion of a way something is perceived, and that of a way it is perceived as being. Whereas Peacocke's account of concept‐acquisition depends on an illicit slide between these two notions, the notion of perceptual normativity allows a legitimate transition between them: if someone's perceiving something a certain way involves her taking it that she ought to perceive it that way, then she perceives the thing as being a certain way, so that the corresponding concept is available to her in perceptual experience.