When do false memories cross language boundaries in English—Spanish bilinguals?

To determine whether false memories cross language boundaries, we presented English-Spanish bilinguals with conceptually related word lists for five study-test trials. Some lists were heard in English, some in Spanish, and they were then followed by a recognition memory test composed of studied words, conceptually related nonstudied critical words, and unrelated words presented in the same language used at study or in a different language. Even though participants were instructed to recognize only previously heard words, they falsely recognized both same-language and different-language critical words. With practice, participants increased their accurate recognition of list words and decreased their false recognition of critical words when the study-test language was the same, and they decreased their false recognition of list words and critical words when the language differed. False memories can cross language boundaries when participants rely on conceptual representations from the word lists, but these errors decrease over trials as participants increasingly rely on language-specific lexical representations.     

Comparisons and perceived deprivation in ethnic minority settings

Two studies investigated comparison choices among ethnic minorities and majorities. The perceived status of the self vis-á-vis different comparison targets also was assessed. Antecedents and consequences of comparisons and relative deprivation were examined. Predictions were derived from social comparison, stigma, social identity, and relative deprivation research. Two surveys were conducted, one in London with mainly Asian participants (N = 235) and one in Germany with Turkish and Aussiedler participants (N = 166) and German majority members (N = 351). Participants preferred intragroup and temporal comparisons (with other ingroup members and with the self in the past) to various types of cross-group comparisons (with outgroup members). Perceived similarity and contact with a target positively predicted interest in comparing with this target, and perceived higher status of the target was a negative predictor. Some evidence was found that feelings of deprivation depend on comparison choices. Deprivation negatively predicted self-esteem and life satisfaction. Deprivation and group identification were negatively correlated.     

Investment behavior and the negative side of emotion

Can dysfunction in neural systems subserving emotion lead, under certain circumstances, to more advantageous decisions? To answer this question, we investigated how normal participants, patients with stable focal lesions in brain regions related to emotion (target patients), and patients with stable focal lesions in brain regions unrelated to emotion (control patients) made 20 rounds of investment decisions. Target patients made more advantageous decisions and ultimately earned more money from their investments than the normal participants and control patients. When normal participants and control patients either won or lost money on an investment round, they adopted a conservative strategy and became more reluctant to invest on the subsequent round; these results suggest that they were more affected than target patients by the outcomes of decisions made in the previous rounds.     

A new approach to the formulation and testing of learning models

It is argued that current attempts to model human learning behavior commonly fail on one of two counts: either the model assumptions are artificially restricted so as to permit the application of mathematical techniques in deriving their consequences, or else the required complex assumptions are imbedded in computer programs whose technical details obscure the theoretical content of the model. The first failing is characteristic of so-called mathematical models of learning, while the second is characteristic of computer simulation models. An approach to model building which avoids both these failings is presented under the title of a black-box theory of learning. This method permits the statement of assumptions of any desired complexity in a language which clearly exhibits their theoretical content.Section II of the paper is devoted to the problem of testing and comparing alternative learning theories. The policy advocated is to abandon attempts at hypothesis testing. It is argued that, in general, we not only lack sufficient data and sufficiently powerful techniques to test hypotheses, but that the truth of a model is not really the issue of basic interest. A given model may be true in the sense that on the basis of available evidence we cannot statistically reject it, but not interesting in the sense that it provides little information about the processes underlying behavior. Rather, we should accept or reject models on the basis of how much information they provide about the way in which subjects respond to environmental structure. This attitude toward model testing is made precise by introducing a formal measure of the information content of a model. Finally, it is argued that the statistical concept of degrees-of-freedom is misleading when used in the context of model testing and should be replaced by a measure of the information absorbed from the data in estimating parameters.I would like to express my indebtedness to Ernest W. Adams and Julian Feldman for their guidance and encouragement of the research reported here.Much of the research reported here was conducted at the University of California, Berkeley, and incorporated in a Ph.D. dissertation in Logic and the Methodology of Science [15]. The research was supported in part by the Computer Institute for Social Science Research, Michigan State University.     

The representation of color and form in long-term memory

Color and form are elementary stimulus encoding dimensions that have effects on the representation of visual stimuli at early processing stages. Little is known, however, about their effects on visual long-term memory. In three experiments we investigated whether color is part of the memory representation, whether color and form are bound in the memory representation, and the effect of color context on memory performance. Experimental results suggest that color is part of the memory representation and that color and form can be represented separately in memory and accessed independently. We suggest that the binding of color and form is a deliberate strategic act that requires focal attention, not a natural consequence of processing visual stimuli. We compare our results with the predictions of two computational memory models regarding feature binding. The effect of color context was not straightforward; however, results are consistent with the encoding specificity principle.     

Effects of transient coronary artery occlusion on canine intrinsic cardiac neuronal activity

In order to further elucidate the regulatory function of canine epicardial neurons, the effects of transient coronary artery occlusion on their spontaneous activity was studied. Fifty-eight individual, spontaneously active units were identified by means of their action potential configurations in specific loci of atrial and ventricular epicardial fat of 10 anesthetized dogs. The activity of 49 of the units was modified by one minute of coronary artery occlusion. Twenty-four of the 49 responding units exhibited increased activity and 37 decreased activity during coronary artery occlusions. Activity changes were sometimes, but not always, associated with decreased left ventricular intramyocardial systolic pressure. During reperfusion, the activity of 6 units was increased compared to control levels, even though ventricular pressures remained the same. Following acute decentralization, 48% of previously active units generated spontaneous activity; the activity of 89% of these was altered during coronary artery occlusion despite the fact that overall cardiodynamics were unchanged. Following hexamethonium administration, the activity generated by 9 of 10 spontaneously active units was modified by coronary artery occlusion. It is concluded that transient coronary artery occlusion can modify the activity generated by intrinsic cardiac neurons, such modification involving central and peripheral neuronal interactions.     

The phenomenology of spatial integration: data and models

A briefly presented visual stimulus followed by darkness seems to persist beyond its physical offset. We are concerned here with the relation between two characteristics of this visible persistence: first, its phenomenological resemblance to the stimulus that spawned it and second, its usefulness as a basis for integrating visual stimuli that are separated in time. We describe two experiments using a task in which two halves of a visual stimulus were presented successively and observers reported how complete the stimulus appeared to be. Stimuli appeared less complete with increases in both the duration of the interval intervening between presentation of the two halves and the duration of the initially presented stimulus half. This data pattern is similar to that obtained in tasks in which spatial integration of two temporally disparate stimuli is necessary for correct responding. On the basis of this similarity, we argue that phenomenological appearance and ability to integrate stimuli over time are two facets of the same perceptual events. We describe a formal model to account for these and other data.     

Paternalism and the Ill-Informed Agent

Most anti-paternalists claim that informed and competent self-regarding choices are protected by autonomy, while ill-informed or impaired self-regarding choices are not. Joel Feinberg, among many others, argues that we can in this way distinguish impermissible ??hard?? paternalism from permissible ??soft?? paternalism. I argue that this view confronts two related problems in its treatment of ill-informed decision-makers. First, it faces a dilemma when applied to decision-makers who are responsible for their ignorance: it either permits too much, or else too little, intervention to satisfy its proponents. Second, the most promising rationales in favor of the view ignore the distinction between an agent??s voluntarily bringing about some state of affairs, on the one hand, and an agent??s voluntarily assuming a risk, on the other. I conclude that a decision-maker??s ignorance is irrelevant to the permissibility of intervention on her behalf. If it is permissible to intervene in a given ill-informed choice, it would be permissible to intervene in an otherwise similar but informed choice, at least provided that intervention would produce similar benefits in both cases. This shows that we should sometimes accept straightforwardly paternalistic rationales.