Predicting the size of individual and

An a priori test of the difference engine model (Myerson, Hale, Zheng, Jenkins, & Widaman, 2003) was conducted using a large, diverse sample of individuals who performed three speeded verbal tasks and three speeded visuospatial tasks. Results demonstrated that, as predicted by the model, the group standard deviation (SD) on any task was proportional to the amount of processing required by that task. Both individual performances as well as those of fast and slow subgroups could be accurately predicted by the model using no free parameters, just an individual or subgroup’s mean z-score and the values of theoretical constructs estimated from fits to the group SDs. Taken together, these results are consistent with post hoc analyses reported by Myerson et al. and provide even stronger supporting evidence. In particular, the ability to make quantitative predictions without using any free parameters provides the clearest demonstration to date of the power of an analytic approach on the basis of the difference engine.     

Predictors of fatigue over 1 year among people with rheumatoid arthritis

Fatigue is a systemic feeling of exhaustion that is a common symptom of many chronic illnesses, including the autoimmune inflammatory disease rheumatoid arthritis (RA). We examined predictors of levels of fatigue among people with RA using Leventhal's Common-Sense Model (CSM), which states that cognitive representations of an illness spur (or halt) people's efforts to cope and thereby influence outcomes of the illness. Our use of the CSM was designed in the light of evidence in the literature specific to fatigue in RA. Current fatigue was reported on a 100 mm visual analogue scale (with anchors "No fatigue" and "Unbearable fatigue") by 114 people (73.7% women) with RA at baseline and 1 year later. Baseline employment status, pain, impact of disability, sleep disruption frequency, depressed mood, perceptions of consequences, arthritis self-efficacy and attempts to cope by praying/hoping were also self-reported. Duration of RA and a haematological measure of systemic inflammation (erythrocyte sedimentation rate; ESR) were obtained from hospital records. Unexpectedly, RA duration did not predict fatigue after 1 year, although lower baseline inflammation did (controlling for baseline fatigue and other disease impact variables). This may be due to sampling flares of RA at baseline. Baseline perceptions that RA has severe consequences and is uncontrollable also predicted greater fatigue after 1 year but this relationship was not mediated by praying/hoping. Targeted psychological care to modify perceptions of severe consequences may therefore improve later fatigue for people with RA even when the condition is longstanding, but the mechanisms of any benefit require further investigation.     

Individual and developmental differences in working memory across the life span

The effects of secondary tasks on verbal and spatial working memory were examined in multiple child, young adult, and older adult samples. Although memory span increased with age in the child samples and decreased with age in the adult samples, there was little evidence of systematic change in the magnitude of interference effects. Surprisingly, individuals who had larger memory spans when there was no secondary task showed greater interference effects than their age-mates. These findings are inconsistent with the hypothesis that age and individual differences in working memory are due to differences in the ability to inhibit irrelevant information, at least as this hypothesis is currently formulated. Moreover, our results suggest that different mechanisms underlie developmental and individual differences in susceptibility to interference across the life span. A model is proposed in which memory span and processing speed both increase with development but are relatively independent abilities within age groups.     

OBJECT-ORIENTED ONTOLOGY AND THE OTHER OF WE IN ANTHROPOCENTRIC POSTHUMANISM

The object-oriented ontology group of philosophies, and certain strands of posthumanism, overlook important ethical and biological differences, which make a difference. These allied intellectual movements, which have at times found broad popular appeal, attempt to weird life as a rebellion to the forced melting of lifeforms through the artefacts of capitalist realism. They truck, however, in a recursive solipsism resulting in ontological flattening, overlooking that things only show up to us according to our attunement to them. Ecology and biology tend to get lost in the celebration of “thingness,” which puts on par artifacts, trash, and living beings. Such abstractions fail to understand the political, ethical, and ontological implications of eliding the animate/nonanimate distinction, which from the opposite direction (of flattening) reproduce the same violences of historical colonialism (hierarchical humanism). I argue that ontological flattening entails epistemological narcissism, fails to take into account plural (interspecies) perspectives, and propose biosemiotics can address these shortcomings through becoming-with nonhuman knowledge.