Experience of agency and sense of responsibility

The experience of agency refers to the feeling that we control our own actions, and through them the outside world. In many contexts, sense of agency has strong implications for moral responsibility. For example, a sense of agency may allow people to choose between right and wrong actions, either immediately, or on subsequent occasions through learning about the moral consequences of their actions. In this study we investigate the relation between the experience of operant action, and responsibility for action outcomes using the intentional binding effect (Haggard, Clark, & Kalogeras, 2002) as an implicit, quantitative measure related to sense of agency. We studied the time at which people perceived simple manual actions and their effects, when these actions were embedded in scenarios where their actions had unpredictable consequences that could be either moral or merely economic. We found an enhanced binding of effects back towards the actions that caused them, implying an enhanced sense of agency, in moral compared to non-moral contexts. We also found stronger binding for effects with severely negative, compared to moderately negative, values. A tight temporal association between action and effect may be a low-level phenomenal marker of the sense of responsibility.     

Tactile sensitivity in Asperger syndrome

People with autism and Asperger syndrome are anecdotally said to be hypersensitive to touch. In two experiments, we measured tactile thresholds and suprathreshold tactile sensitivity in a group of adults with Asperger syndrome. In the first experiment, tactile perceptual thresholds were measured. Two frequencies of vibrotactile stimulation were used: 30 and 200 Hz. The results demonstrated significantly lower tactile perceptual thresholds in the Asperger group at 200 Hz but not at 30 Hz, thus confirming tactile hypersensitivity but only for one class of stimulus. A second experiment investigated whether self-produced movement affected the perception of touch in a group of adults with Asperger syndrome. A suprathreshold tactile stimulus was produced either by the participant (self-produced condition) or by the experimenter (externally produced condition) and participants were asked to rate the perception of the tactile stimulation. The results demonstrated that, while both Asperger and control groups rated self-produced touch as less tickly than external touch, the Asperger group rated both types of tactile stimulus as significantly more tickly and intense than did the control group. This experiment confirms the finding of tactile hypersensitivity, but shows that the perceptual consequences of self-produced touch are attenuated in the normal way in people with Asperger syndrome. An abnormality in this process cannot therefore account for their tactile hypersensitivity.     

Facilitated processing of visual stimuli associated with the body

Recent work on tactile perception has revealed enhanced tactile acuity and speeded spatial-choice reaction times (RTs) when viewing the stimulated body site as opposed to viewing a neutral object. Here we examine whether this body-view enhancement effect extends to visual targets. Participants performed a speeded spatial discrimination between two lights attached either to their own left index finger or to a wooden finger-shaped object, making a simple distal--proximal decision. We filmed either the finger-mounted or the object-mounted lights in separate experimental blocks and the live scene was projected onto a screen in front of the participants. Thus, participants responded to identical visual targets varying only in their context: on the body or not. Results revealed a large performance advantage for the finger-mounted stimuli: reaction times were substantially reduced, while discrimination accuracy was unaffected. With this finding we address concerns associated with previous work on the processing of stimuli attributed to the self and extend the finding of a performance advantage for such stimuli to vision.     

Effects of response type on coordinated responses during arm movement.

This paper reports some experimental results on the coordination of finger and vocal responses with passing through a target position in multijoint arm movement. In Experiment 1, we found that the difference in the timing of finger and vocal responses cannot be attributed entirely to efferent or representational effects. Instead, it appears to reflect the extent to which information about the internal stimuli generated by the arm movement are available to the centers controlling these different responses. That is, it is a compatibility effect. In Experiment 2, the case in which a finger response is made on the same side of the body as the moving arm was compared with the case in which it is made with the contralateral hand, which remains static. The interaction effect observed suggests that the pathways subserving coordinated responses are informationally encapsulated, so that information about arm movement is not shared between the neural centers controlling different coordinated responses.     

Backward masking and asymmetry of processing for vowels differing in acoustical similarity

Several investigations have reported problems in demonstrating for vowels the phenomena of backward masking and right ear advantage so easily demonstrated for consonants. An experiment is reported on the dichotic backward masking (BM) of acoustically similar and dissimilar sets of vowels in consonant-vowel syllables. The results suggest that increasing perceptual difficulty by varying the acoustic similarity of the stimulus set augments BM. A second experiment showed that the right ear advantage (REA) was augmented by manipulating the acoustic similarity of the stimulus set and by decreasing intelligibility through the addition of noise. This and other evidence was employed to ascribe variations in both REA and BM to the interaction of perceptual processing time with information decay in precategorical acoustical storage. It is argued that this process interaction underlies statistical interactions in dichotic data which show that variations in difficulty (discriminability, noise addition, brain deterioration) affect most adversely the least favoured items (those presented earlier, those on the unattended ear, those on the left ear).     

Intention, attention and the temporal experience of action

Subjects estimated the time of intentions to perform an action, of the action itself, or of an auditory effect of the action. A perceptual attraction or binding effect occurred between actions and the effects that followed them. Judgements of intentions did not show this binding, suggesting they are represented independently of actions and their effects. In additional unpredictable judgement conditions, subjects were instructed only after each trial which of these events to judge, thus discouraging focussed attention to a specific event. Stronger binding effects were found, with intention, action and effect fusing to a single central point in time. In a control task, subjects reported the time of the first or second tone in sequence. Tone sequences showed no binding at all when subjects knew in advance which tone to judge, but showed the same fusion as actions when the event to be judged was not predictable. Binding of actions and effects, but not of tone sequences, occurs pre-attentively, and automatically. The data are consistent with a reconstructive process, implemented after actions, which generates a coherent sense of agency. However, this process should only be triggered only when our actions make it appropriate. We suggest that this mechanism is triggered in advance by efferent processing. This conclusion was supported by a further study in deafferented subject IW. This subject showed the normal binding of a tone towards an action, although his experience of the action was of pre-motor, rather than peripheral origin. The experience of intentional action involves an interplay between pre-motor and reconstructive processes.     

Intentionality as a constituting condition for the own self--and other selves

Introspectively, the awareness of actions includes the awareness of the intentions accompanying them. Therefore, the awareness of self-generated actions might be expected to differ from the awareness of other-generated actions to the extent that access to one's own and to other's intentions differs. However, we recently showed that the perceived onset times of self- vs. other-generated actions are similar, yet both are different from comparable events that are conceived as being generated by a machine. This similarity raises two interesting possibilities. First we could infer the intentions of others from their actions. Second and more radically, we could equally infer our own intentions from the actions we perform rather than sense them. We present two new experiments which investigate the role of action effects in the awareness of self- and other-generated actions by means of measuring the estimated onset time. The results show that the presence of action effects is necessary for the similarity of awareness of self- and other-generated actions.     

Priming of actions increases sense of control over unexpected outcomes

Sense of agency (SoA) refers to the feeling that we are in control of our own actions and, through them, events in the outside world. SoA depends partly on retrospectively matching outcomes to expectations, and partly on prospective processes occurring prior to action, notably action selection.To assess the relative contribution of these processes, we factorially varied subliminal priming of action selection and expectation of action outcomes. Both factors affected SoA, and there was also a significant interaction. Compatible action primes increased SoA more strongly for unexpected than expected outcomes. Outcome expectation had strong effects on SoA following incompatible action priming, but only weak effects following compatible action priming. Prospective and retrospective SoA may have distinct and complementary functions.     

Spatial patterns in tactile perception: is there a tactile field?

Previous studies of tactile spatial perception focussed either on a single point of stimulation, on local patterns within a single skin region such as the fingertip, on tactile motion, or on active touch. It remains unclear whether we should speak of a tactile field, analogous to the visual field, and supporting spatial relations between stimulus locations. Here we investigate this question by studying perception of large-scale tactile spatial patterns on the hand, arm and back. Experiment 1 investigated the relation between perception of tactile patterns and the identification of subsets of those patterns. The results suggest that perception of tactile spatial patterns is based on representing the spatial relations between locations of individual stimuli. Experiment 2 investigated the spatial and temporal organising principles underlying these relations. Experiment 3 showed that tactile pattern perception makes reference to structural representations of the body, such as body parts separated by joints. Experiment 4 found that precision of pattern perception is poorer for tactile patterns that extend across the midline, compared to unilateral patterns. Overall, the results suggest that the human sense of touch involves a tactile field, analogous to the visual field. The tactile field supports computation of spatial relations between individual stimulus locations, and thus underlies tactile pattern perception.     

From body form to biological motion: the apparent velocity of human movement biases subjective time

In two experiments, we investigated time perception during apparent biological motion. Pictures of initial, intermediate, and final positions of a single movement were presented, with interstimulus intervals that were constant within trials but varied across trials. Movement paths were manipulated by changing the sequential order of body postures. Increasing the path length produced an increase in perceived movement velocity. To produce an implicit measure of apparent movement dynamics, we also asked participants to judge the duration of a frame surrounding the stimuli. Longer paths with higher apparent movement velocity produced shorter perceived durations. This temporal bias was attenuated for nonbody (Experiment 1) and inverted-body (Experiment 2) control stimuli. As an explanation for these findings, we propose an automatic top-down mechanism of biological-motion perception that binds successive body postures into a continuous perception of movement. We show that this mechanism is associated with velocity-dependent temporal compression. Furthermore, this mechanism operates on-line, bridging the intervals between static stimuli, and is specific to configural processing of body form.