A Paradigm for Studying the Accuracy of Self-Reports of Risk Behavior Relevant to AIDS: Empirical Perspectives on Stability, Recall Bias, and Transitory Influences

Despite the importance of the issue for AIDS-related research, there is a paucity of studies that have addressed the issue of the validity of self-reports of patterns of risk behavior over time. This article frames issues of measurement in the context of cognitive psychology and presents a research paradigm that investigators can use to explore issues of accuracy, bias, and stability in self-reports. The paradigm also permits the analysis of transitory influences on risk behavior, influences which have been minimized in current AIDS research. Preliminary data are presented that support the feasibility of the method and which are suggestive of important considerations in the development of valid measures in national surveys.     

A cross-cultural examination of socio-psychological resources in mathematics achievement between Korea and the US

Social Psychology of Education - This cross-cultural study examines national variations in the association of youths’ attitudinal characteristics and socio-psychological resources at school...     

Propofol induction reduces the capacity for neural information integration: Implications for the mechanism of consciousness and general anesthesia

The cognitive unbinding paradigm suggests that the synthesis of neural information is attenuated by general anesthesia. Here, we analyzed the functional organization of brain activities in the conscious and anesthetized states, based on functional segregation and integration. Electroencephalography (EEG) recordings were obtained from 14 subjects undergoing induction of general anesthesia with propofol. We quantified changes in mean information integration capacity in each band of the EEG. After induction with propofol, mean information integration capacity was reduced most prominently in the γ band of the EEG (p = .0001). Furthermore, we demonstrate that loss of consciousness is reflected by the breakdown of the spatiotemporal organization of γ waves. We conclude that induction of general anesthesia with propofol reduces the capacity for information integration in the brain. These data directly support the information integration theory of consciousness and the cognitive unbinding paradigm of general anesthesia.     

The Answering System to Yes–No Truth-Functional Questions in Korean–English Bilingual Children

This study presents an experiment that explores the patterns of answers to yes–no truth-functional questions in English and Korean. The answering patterns are examined from 12 Korean–English bilingual children and 10 Korean-monolingual children. Four types of sentences in relation to given situations (Wason in Br J Psychol 52:133–142, 1961) were provided as questions such as true affirmative (TA), true negative (TN), false affirmative (FA), and false negative (FN). The bilingual children’s answers were observed in separate language settings, English and Korean. The results by the bilingual in the Korean setting were compared with those by the monolinguals. The results show that bilingual children can process two systems rather successfully by providing correct responses to the given questions. But difficulty patterns, measured from error rates in each setting, are found different in two languages. The bilinguals’ difficulty patterns in English and Korean, however, show deviation from monolinguals’ difficulty patterns suggested in previous studies (Wason in Br J Psychol 52:133–142, 1961, Akiyama in Dev Psychol 20:219–228, 1984, Kim in Dev Psychol 21(3):462–472, 1985, Choi in Dev Psychol 29(3):407–420, 1991). The present work also shows that negatives are not uniformly reported with more errors than affirmatives when the truth condition and the answering system are further involved. All in all, the current study suggests that bilingual children have two separate processing systems for yes–no truth-functional questions. However, the two systems cannot be understood as a simple coexistence of two monolingual systems. Interaction of the two competing linguistic systems is discussed further.     

Effects of grouping and attention on the perception of causality

Beyond perceiving patterns of motion in simple dynamic displays, we can also perceive higher level properties, such as causality, as when we see one object collide with another object. Although causality is a seemingly high-level property, its perception--like the perception of faces or speech--often appears to be automatic, irresistible, and driven by highly constrained and stimulus-driven rules. Here, in an exploration of such rules, we demonstrate that perceptual grouping and attention can influence the both perception of causality in ambiguous displays. We first report several types of grouping effects, based on connectedness, proximity, and common motion. We further suggest that such grouping effects are mediated by the allocation of attention, and we directly demonstrate that causal perception can be strengthened or attenuated on the basis of where observers are attending, independent of fixation. Like Michotte, we find that the perception of causality is mediated by strict visual rules. Beyond Michotte, we find that these rules operate not only over discrete objects, but also over perceptual groups, constrained by the allocation of attention.     

Understanding the Influence Theory of Causation: A Critique of Strevens

In this paper, I will first clarify Lewis’s influence theory of causation by relying on his theory of events. And then I will consider Michael Strevens’s charge against the sufficiency of Lewis’s theory. My claim is that it is legitimate but does not pose as serious a problem for Lewis’s theory as Strevens thinks because Lewis can surmount it by limiting the scope of his theory to causation between concrete events. Michael Strevens raises an alleged counterexample to the necessity of Lewis’s theory that, if successful, would have a very important advantage over other alleged counterexamples. But I will assert that it is simply mistaken. My defense of Lewis’s theory will shed interesting light on the relationship between Lewis’s theory and Salmon’s mark theory.