Changing plans: Dynamic inconsistency and the effect of experience on the reference point

This article presents a new test of a principle of decision making calleddynamic consistency. This principle was tested in an experiment in which participants were asked to make decisions about a second gamble within a sequence of two gambles. Participants were first asked to make a planned choice about the second gamble. The planned choice was madebefore the first gamble was played and was conditioned on the anticipated outcomes of the first gamble.After the first gamble was played, the same participants were asked to make a final choice about the second gamble, conditioned on the experienced outcome of the first gamble. The results showed that participants’ final choices were frequently inconsistent with their plans, even when the anticipated and experienced outcomes were identical. These inconsistencies occurred in a systematic direction. Experiencing an anticipated gain resulted with a change toward risk aversion, and experiencing an anticipated loss resulted in a change toward risk seeking. These results are explained in terms of the effect of actual experience on the reference point used for the evaluation of the decision problem.     

Idealistic advice and pragmatic choice: a psychological distance account

In 6 studies, we found that advice is more idealistic than choice in decisions that trade off idealistic and pragmatic considerations. We propose that because advisers are more psychologically distant from the choosers' decision problem, they construe the dilemma at a higher construal level than do choosers (Trope & Liberman, 2003, 2010). Consequently, advisers are more influenced by idealistic considerations that are salient at a high-level construal, whereas choosers are more influenced by pragmatic considerations that are salient at a low-level construal. Consistent with this view, Studies 1 and 2 demonstrate that compared with choosers, advisers weigh idealistic considerations more heavily and pragmatic considerations less heavily, place greater emphasis on ends (why) than on means to achieve the end (how), and generate more reasons (pros) in favor of acting idealistically. Studies 3 and 4 provide converging support for our account by demonstrating that making advisers focus on a lower construal level results in more pragmatic recommendations. In Study 3, we manufactured more pragmatic recommendations by priming a low-level implementation mind-set in a purportedly unrelated task, whereas in Study 4 we did so by reducing advisers' psychological distance from the dilemma by asking them to consider what they would choose in the situation. The results of Study 4 suggest advisers do not spontaneously consider self-choice. Finally, in Studies 5 and 6, we demonstrate the choice-advice difference in consequential real-life decisions.     

Concrete mindset impairs filtering in visual working memory

Psychonomic Bulletin & Review - Two studies tested whether a mindset manipulation would affect the filtering of distractors from entering visual working memory (VWM). In Study 1, participants...     

Modeling dynamic inconsistency with a changing reference point

A rational principle of decision making called dynamic consistency was tested by presenting decision makers with a sequence of two gambles. The first gamble was obligatory. Before playing the first gamble, participants were asked to make a planned choice as to whether they would take the second gamble. After experiencing the actual results of the first gamble, decision makers were asked to make a final choice regarding the second gamble. Dynamic consistency requires agreement between the planned and final choices. Violations of dynamic consistency were observed, e.g. anticipating a gain in the first gamble, decision makers planned to take the second gamble; after experiencing the gain, they changed their minds and rejected the second gamble. Two models of dynamic inconsistency were compared. One assumes that experience shifts the reference point and changes the utility associated with the gamble; another assumes that experience changes the subjective probability associated with the gamble. The reference point model provided the best account for the findings. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Using a signal detection safety model to simulate managerial expectations and supervisory feedback

The present work studied a basic discrimination task that underlies many safety problems (such as hazard identification and supervisory inspection). The experimental task required decision-makers to discriminate between two classes of stimuli representing hazardous and secure cues in the environment. Errors in which decision-makers failed to identify hazardous cues were defined as risky errors. The payoff for risky errors was probabilistic. Some risky errors went unnoticed (representing lucky outcome of near accidents). Other risky errors resulted in penalty (representing damage incurred by an accident). The discrimination task was modeled utilizing Signal Detection Theory. A Cutoff Reinforcement Learning model provided predictions for choice behavior. Two controlled experiments are reported here. Experiment 1 manipulated the payoff for unnoticed risky errors. This manipulation was suggested as an analogy to different levels of the conflict between safety and productivity. Experiment 2 tested the effect of outcome feedback and cognitive feedback for risky errors. This manipulation was suggested as an analogy to supervisory feedback. The results of the two experiments showed that the simplified experimental conditions were sufficient to induce risky behavior. The findings also suggested some ways to reduce risk taking. The Cutoff Reinforcement Learning model’s predictions captured most of the findings. The paper discusses the theoretical implications of the findings and their relevance for safety research.     

Speech-related body movement in aphasia: period analysis of upper arms and head movement.

The effects of aphasia on coverbal body movement have important implications for the understanding of both normal and pathological speech processes. The related findings were often inconsistent, partly due to inherent methodological difficulties which could be reduced by the use of advanced techniques of movement monitoring (Hadar, 1991). The present study employed a new computerized system, CODA-3, which locates small prismatic markers and computes by triangulation their three-dimensional position at 100 Hz. Movement of the head and the upper arms was monitored in 15 aphasic and normal subjects engaged in speech during a naturalistic interview. Movement analysis was based on automatized identification of successive movement extrema ("period analysis") and the computation of amplitude, duration, and velocity of each period. The results showed higher incidence and amplitude of all body movement in the aphasic population. Fluent aphasics showed this particularly with "symbolic," content-bearing movements, while nonfluent aphasics were higher than controls in both symbolic and "motor" (simple and small) movements. No deficit in the internal organization of movement was seen in the aphasic population. These results indicate that aphasics increase their coverbal movement in compensation for their speech impairment: fluent aphasics compensate primarily for a symbolic impairment, while nonfluent aphasics compensate more for a motor impairment.     

Narrative self and high risk for schizophrenia: remembering the past and imagining the future

ABSTRACT

We examined the narrative self of those at high psychometric risk for schizophrenia (HR). Eighty undergraduate students wrote personal narratives about a turning-point event in their life, and about a possible future. The turning-point narratives were coded for topic, specificity, event valence, valence of causal coherence link, overall level of causal coherence, and agency. The future narratives were coded for the number and valence of goals, topic of goals, and specificity of goals. Word count was applied to all narratives. The HR group expressed lower levels of agency and a trend of lower levels of causal coherence when narrating turning-point events. When imagining their futures, HR participants produced shorter narratives and showed a trend of having fewer goals. Including the dimensions of both the turning point and the future narratives revealed that the HR group membership was best predicted by lower levels of agency and of causal coherence in the turning-point narrative, and fewer words in the future narrative. Narratives differed specifically in those few elements that are critical for the achievement of narrative continuity. Consistent with the theory, people at high risk for schizophrenia already present, to some extent, an impoverishment in their narrative sense of self.     

Bold analysis and associative dialogue

Free association allows the emergence of novel formulations about self and, along with them, new insights, but it needs to modulate the risks of chaos and the compromising of mental integrity on the one hand and the arrest of growth on the other. Interpretation acts to contain and hold associative pressures and so helps maintain the patient's mental integrity, but it limits associative freedom by being necessarily inferential. In addition, in current interpretative strategies, analytic progress depends on the patient's ability to associate. This ability may be poor for longer or shorter periods during analysis. To help resolve these difficulties, a strategy of associative dialogue is proposed and clinically illustrated. The proposed strategy draws on the associative abilities of the analyst. This paper elaborates the way in which two basic forms of associative dialogue—bold and focused analysis—may facilitate the negotiation between freedom and continuity in analytic discourse.