Other minds,other people,and human opacity

This paper explains the absence of the problem of other minds in ancient philosophy and links its rise in early modern philosophy with the distinction between primary and secondary qualities and the consequent veil of ideas. The futile struggles of early modern philosophers with the problems is delineated. So too are the incoherent theories of modern neuroscientists and psychologists. The sources of the manifold confusions are pinned down to use and misuse of the concept of mind, to misunderstandings about the nature of the human ability to say how things are subjectively with oneself, to misconstruals of the nature of introspection and self-knowledge, and to the misguided picture of the “inner” and the “outer”. Philosophical misunderstandings about knowledge of other minds has masked the genuine limitations on our knowledge and understanding of our fellow human beings. Some of these rest on ignorance, others on the constitutional indeterminacy of the mental.     

Wittgenstein, Carnap and the New American Wittgensteinians

James Conant, a proponent of the 'New American Wittgenstein', has argued that the standard interpretation of Wittgenstein is wholly mistaken in respect of Wittgenstein's critique of metaphysics and the attendant conception of nonsense. The standard interpretation, Conant holds, misascribes to Wittgenstein Carnapian views on the illegitimacy of metaphysical utterances, on logical syntax and grammar, and on the nature of nonsense. Against this account, I demonstrate that (i) Carnap is misrepresented; (ii) the so–called standard interpretation (in so far as I have contributed to it) is misrepresented; (iii) Wittgenstein's views, early and late, are misrepresented. I clarify Wittgenstein's conception of logical syntax and of the nonsense that results from transgressing it.     

Speed and accuracy of same and different responses in perceptual matching

Models of the visual perceptual matching process are evaluated in two experiments in which the relative speeds of “same” and “different” responses were manipulated. In the first experiment, subjects were tested under two bias conditions: they were instructed to respond “same” only when sure or to respond “different” only when sure. Such bias is found to have a very large effect on the speed and accuracy of “same” and “different” responses, changing “same” responses from being faster than “different” responses (the usual result) in the sure “different” condition to being slower in the sure “same” condition. In the second experiment, the relative speed of “same” responses was slowed significantly by the addition of difficult “different” judgments. These results are used to argue against models that contain an identity matcher and against models that have separate components to account for errors and reaction time. We also point out that, although it is well known that the relative speeds of positive and negative responses are subject to bias manipulations, this fact has been ignored by many researchers in developing models in which the reaction time difference between positive and negative responses is used as a measure of a stage of processing.