Academic Performance of High School Students as a Function of Mental Capacity,Cognitive Style,Mobility‐Fixity Dimension,and Creativity

The purpose of this study is to explore how creativity and the cognitive variables (mental capacity, cognitive style & mobility‐fixity dimension) can explain academic performance of high school students. Students at a high school in Maturin (Venezuela) were tested to determine creativity (Torrance Tests), cognitive variables and academic performance. Results based on multiple regression analyses showed that the mobility‐fixity dimension was the most consistent predictor of academic performance, by explaining a significant amount of the variance in Spanish, English, Geography, Biology, Chemistry, Earth Science, Mathematics, Physics and the Mean score. Creativity scores explained a significant amount of the variance in Spanish, Geography, Earth Science and the Mean score. It appears that the mobility‐fixity dimension and creativity although related, perhaps represent different aspects of academic performance.     

Mental Imagery in Career Counseling and Life Planning: A Review of Research and Intervention Methods

The use of imagery in career counseling and life planning continues to increase just as the use of imagery in counseling and psychotherapy increases. The rationale for using imagery in career counseling and life planning is the same as in counseling and psychotherapy: It allows the client and counselor to bring into awareness unconscious material that is already influencing choices and makes this material usable in future planning. Imagey also allows the client to try on alternative roles. Several studies are cited that indicate that the imagery components of daydreams and fantasies are useful tools for career exploration and life planning when they are accessible to clients and properly processed. Relevant counseling applications and research studies are cited. Some recent tools for eliciting and processing these daydreams and fantasies are presented, and limits as well as benefits of techniques are discussed.     

How One Family Perceives Another: The Relationship Between Social Constructions and Problem-Solving Competence

This paper delineates a rarely studied but important family process: how a family perceives and understands the relationships in other families it knows. We hypothesize that these perceptions of other families are fundamental components of a family's shared construing of its social world. Families differ in how they perceive other families, specifically, and in their approach to construing or apprehending their social world, generally. We have hypothesized that these general differences also play a crucial role in shaping the style and competence of family problem-solving. A family's approach to any problem depends upon how it construes or interprets the social context of that problem. Using these general concepts of family life, we construct specific hypotheses linking family problem-solving and interfamily perception. We describe methods for measuring both family problem-solving and how a family perceives other families. Findings confirm our major hypothesis: A family that searches for underlying and subtle patterns in a problem-solving situation will develop a more differentiated and organized conception of other families.     

Changes in Family Structure After a Renal Transplant

Two girls (9 and 10 years old) and one male adolescent (19 years old) with chronic renal failure (CRF) were studied along with their families in order to evaluate their family structure before (4–5 weeks) and after (3–5 weeks) a renal transplant from a live donor. After the renal transplant there was a close association between the donor and the recipient that led to the creation of an alliance or the reinforcement of an alliance already present before the transplant. This may favor a family disruption or a better family equilibrium depending upon whether the donor ranked highest in the family hierarchy and was already in a rigid alliance with the patient before the transplant. It is suggested that the study and diagnosis of the family structure before the renal transplant may help to: (a) select the most suitable donor candidate from a biological as well as psychological point of view so as to allow a better possibility of success in the structural functioning of the family after the transplant; (b) predict changes that will appear within the family after the transplant, which in turn may alert the personnel to detect changes in the family structure as early as possible; and (c) offer more rapid therapeutic assistance to bring the family back to a functional level within its social framework.     

Early trauma and narcissism—autism bipolarity1

The analyst makes a series of considerations taken a posteriori from the analysis of a small number of patients. These patients have saved themselves from an early narcissistic catastrophe by developing precocious mental processes, while affective relationships rudimentarily repeat the impact with the original trauma. Primitive defences, essentially denial and vertical splitting, dissociate the tear in the psyche and structure a narcissism–autism bipolarity, revealed in aspects of the character which oblige the patient to automatically repeat a single matrix of experience. In therapy, it is necessary to construct a rst time of the trauma, by pending and linking threads of the primary relationship and strengthening them in the analytic relationship. This reconstruction of the background, a screen to project what had originally been rejected, is the prerequisite for coming out, in deferred action, from the hold of the pathological identifications. The author dedicates particular attention to the undifferentiated background, the nature‐environment torn by the trauma, and to the need to reconstruct this fabric of experience in the analytical relationship, as a fundamental element to the recomposition of the dissociated nuclei. In the clinical case, the analyst describes in particular how the analyst's words encounter an unbridgeable gap, a failure in the capacity for representation when opening the autistic nucleus. Through a regression lasting for about a year, a patient was able to live the experience of primitive agonies and that of an unbearable helplessness and, at the same time, was able to feel how the analyst supported her sense of existence. Subsequently, the patient was able to give shape, through visual images, to deep states of being and start the process of metabolising and symbolising the trauma.     

Obstacles to Personal Creativity between Brazilian and Mexican University Students: A Comparative Study

The study focused on personal obstacles to creativity between 385 Brazilian and 305 Mexican university students. The Obstacles to Personal Creativity Inventory, designed and validated by Alencar (1999b), was administered to these students. The results indicated that Lack of Time/Opportunity was the most frequent obstacle. Significant differences were observed between Brazilian and Mexican students in the cluster of obstacles named Lack of Motivation, and between male and female students in the cluster of obstacles named Inhibition/Shyness. The results point to several obstacles to personal creativity which are common among university students. These obstacles should be known by those involved in education in order for them to help students to be less susceptible to obstacles that hinder their creativity.     

Causation as a Philosophical Relation in Hume

By giving the proper emphasis to both radical skepticism and naturalism as two independent standpoints in Hume, I wish to propose a more satisfactory account of some of the more puzzling Humean claims on causation. I place these claims alternatively in either the philosophical standpoint of the radical skeptic or in the standpoint of everyday and scientific beliefs. I characterize Hume's radical skeptical standpoint in relation to Hume's perceptual model of the traditional theory of ideas, and I argue that Hume's radical skeptical argument concerning our causal inferences is inextricably linked to his skeptical argument concerning our idea of a necessary connection between cause and effect. I discuss Hume's naturalistic account of the origin of our idea of necessity and offer a new reading of Hume's two "definitions" of cause. I argue along the way against central aspects of two opposing styles of interpretation—Norman Kemp Smith's and Annette Baier's, on the one hand, and Robert Fogelin's, on the other—that in my view do not appreciate the mutual autonomy of radical skepticism and naturalism in Hume.