Individual differences in afterimage persistence: relationships to hypnotic susceptibility and visuospatial skills.

To investigate the moderating role of individual differences in hypnotic susceptibility and visuospatial skills on afterimage persistence, we presented a codable (cross) flash of light to 40 men and 46 women who had been dark adapted for 20 min. In an unrelated classroom setting, subjects had previously been given two standardized scales of hypnotic susceptibility (Harvard Group Scale of Hypnotic Susceptibility, Shor & Orne, 1962; Group Stanford Hypnotic Susceptibility Scale, Form C, Crawford & Allen, 1982) and the Mental Rotations Test (Vandenberg & Kuse, 1978). The first afterimage interval and the afterimage duration correlated significantly with hypnotic responsiveness, supporting Wallace (1979), but did not show the anticipated relationships with mental rotation visuospatial skills. Individuals in the high hypnotizable group had (a) significantly longer afterimage intervals between its first appearance and first disappearance than did those in medium or low groups, as well as (b) significantly longer afterimages between the first appearance and the final disappearance than did those in low groups, but those in medium groups did not differ significantly from the other groups. Discriminant analysis using the afterimage persistence measures classified correctly 65.2% of high hypnotizables, 37.5% of medium hypnotizables, and 54.8% of low hypnotizables. Hypothesized cognitive skills that assist in the maintenance of afterimages and underlie hypnotic susceptibility include abilities to maintain focused attention and resist distractions over time and to maintain vivid visual images.     

Psychoanalytic ecumenism and varieties of psychoanalytic experience.

Using the metaphor of ecumenism, the current status of psychoanalysis and the American Psychoanalytic Association is examined. The dialectical tendencies to oppose and to unify are noted in psychoanalytic theory, technique, and practice, as well as in the administrative and political life of our organization. Fostering tolerance for new hypotheses without sacrificing empirical discrimination, and promoting broad participation without lowering standards confront us as major tasks demanding continuing vigilance and effort.     

Hypnotically created pseudomemories: further investigation into the "memory distortion or response bias" question.

In order to study whether pseudomemories represent actual memory distortions or are a result of response bias, 60 highly hypnotizable subjects and subjects from the general population were divided into 4 experimental groups and were tested for pseudomemory manifestation after receiving a false suggestion. Of the 4 groups of subjects, 3 were offered a monetary reward as a motivation to distinguish false suggestion from actual occurrence. Pseudomemory manifestation was found to be significantly higher among subjects not offered a reward than among subjects who were offered such an reward. The implications of these findings are discussed.     

"Existential" therapists and their group therapy practices.

Existential philosophical thought insists that human behavior is indeterminate and subject only to the individual's will. It is, therefore, skeptical of all dynamic psychologies based as they are on Freudian determinism. Group therapists imbued with this philosophy stop short of its extreme. Their existential position, however, does greatly modify treatment, and yet they preserve both the form and goals of therapy. They place properly selected and prepared patients in a group where their individuality and authenticity are highly valued. Finding most technical procedures irrelevant, the therapists themselves, that is, their evolving personalities are central. The key to patient change is the spontaneous meeting of members and the therapist which the therapist orchestrates. Instead of the usual interpretation, members are encouraged to confront the paradoxes in their lives, their humanness, and especially their finitude. Patients are to be brought up to the threshold of their self-knowledge so they can choose. Choice, therefore, along with action coupled with responsibility are frequent themes. Unless the individual is incompetent, decisions made for him or her by the therapist or by group consensus are thought to be nontherapeutic.     

Comparison of bulimics, obese binge eaters, social phobics, and individuals with panic disorder on comorbidity across DSM-III-R anxiety disorders.

Eighty-two women, presenting as normal-weight bulimics, obese binge eaters, social phobics, and individuals with panic disorder, were compared on anxiety, depression, and substance abuse. All were administered the Anxiety Disorder Interview Schedule-Revised and completed the Michigan Alcohol Screening Test, Drug Abuse Screening Test, and Self-Consciousness Scale. A striking proportion of eating disorder subjects were comorbid for one or more anxiety disorders, the most frequent diagnoses being generalized anxiety disorder and social phobia. The results suggest that the place of anxiety in bulimia nervosa goes beyond that discussed within the context of the anxiety reduction model. Conflicting comorbidity findings among this and prior investigations are noted, however, and discussed in terms of the issue of differential diagnosis between eating and anxiety disorders.     

Covariation detection in treated and untreated spider phobics.

Twenty treated and 18 untreated spider phobics were exposed to a series of 72 slides. Three different categories of slides were used: phobia-relevant slides (spiders), alternative fear-relevant slides (weapons), and neutral slides (flowers). Slides were randomly paired with either a shock, a tone, or nothing at all. Despite the absence of a systematic correlation between slides and outcomes, untreated phobics strongly overestimated the covariation between spider slides and shock. Treated phobics did not show a covariation bias, suggesting that such bias can be modulated by behavioral treatment. In addition, untreated subjects were more confident about their contingency estimates than were treated subjects. The present results fit with earlier studies.     

Ratings of Orally Presented Verbal Expressions of Probability by a Heterogeneous Sample

Verbal expressions of probability are used in daily conversations, physician-physician and physician-patient communications, and questionnaire and interview responses. To assess the degree of agreement among English-speaking Australian adults in allocating numerical probabilities to these verbal expressions of probability, 966 interviewees provided estimates for 60 isolated expressions of probability and a sequence of seven items placed in a sequence. Means and median scores appeared to be consistent with common sense and with findings from other countries. Mirror-imaged terms were neither symmetrical nor equidistant, with the means and medians for the positive terms being closer to the mid-points of the scale than the means and medians of the negative terms. Items in a sequence of probability terms showed greater symmetry and less variability than isolated expressions. For most items, there was an unacceptably high level of within-subject and between-subject variability. Although subjects with higher levels of education and/ or mathematics education showed less variability, these factors accounted for very little of the variance. The greater variability in Australian results relative to those reported elsewhere was partly attributed to the use of interviews rather than questionnaires. There were no particular stems that yielded greater consistency. It was concluded that the use of these expressions leads to very imprecise communication.     

Stability/Instability of Cognitive Strategies Across Tasks Determine Whether Stress Will Affect Judgmental Processes'

Previous research indicates that individuals employ various cognitive heuristics and decision modes in making decisions and judgmental tasks that do not follow an expected value model. It further indicates that several cognitive faculties are affected by stress. The purpose of this study was twofold: first, to examine whether individual differences exist in the use of cognitive heuristics and risk-assessment decision modes; second, to examine whether stress would affect the use of these cognitive strategies. Three versions of a questionnaire measuring the representativeness and availability heuristics, and risk-seeking and risk-aversion decision modes were administered to three different groups of subjects. Consistent individual differences were only observed in the subscales measuring risk-seeking and risk-aversion modes, but not in the use of the heuristics. In a different group of subjects, exposure to noise and task overload stress increased the use of the representativeness heuristic, but did not alter the use of risk-seeking and risk-aversion decision modes. These results indicate that the existence of individual differences in cognitive strategies may determine, in part, whether stress will modify judgmental processes.