Suicide and Homicide Rates in Canada and the United States

Suicide and homicide rates by age were analyzed for Canada and the United States, indicating that suicide is higher in Canada and that homicide is higher in the United States. Results indicated a positive association between homicide and suicide rates in the United States but these two rates of death were not significantly associated in Canada. Holinger (1987) had associated the relative size of the cohort to the rates of suicide and homicide in young people in the United States. The more current data in both countries did not support Holinger's results. Using the measure devised by Easterlin (1980) and Ahlburg and Schapiro (1984) –that is, the proportion of youths aged 15–24 relative to adults aged 25–64–the correlation between the size of the youth cohort and the suicide rate of youths aged 15–24 was negative. It is concluded that the two patterns in these two countries may be explained from a historical perspective.     

Not all forms of misbehavior are created equal: Differential personality facet–counterproductive work behavior relations

We examined whether four personality traits—trait aggression, trait industriousness, trait deceptiveness, and trait self-control—were differentially related to 11 narrow-bandwidth CWB facets: (a) property destruction, (b) inappropriate verbal actions, (c) inappropriate physical actions, (d) poor attendance, (e) poor quality work, (f) unsafe behavior, (g) theft and related behavior, (h) misuse of information, (i) misuse of time and resources, (j) alcohol use, and (k) drug use. Based on responses from 404 employed participants recruited using Mechanical Turk, we found that each narrow-bandwidth personality trait often yielded stronger relationships with overall CWB than with narrow-bandwidth CWB facets.     

Epistemic constraints on practical normativity

What is the relation between what we ought to do, on the one hand, and our epistemic access to the ought-giving facts, on the other? In assessing this, it is common to distinguish ‘objective’ from ‘subjective’ oughts. Very roughly, on the objectivist conception what an agent ought to do is determined by ought-giving facts in such a way that does not depend on the agent’s beliefs about, or epistemic access to, those facts; whereas on the subjectivist conception, what an agent ought to do depends on his beliefs. This paper defends the need for, and explicates, a third category of ‘ought’: ‘warranted oughts’. Section 1 introduces the distinction between objective and subjective ‘oughts’. Sections 2–3 draw attention to some serious problems with each. Section 4 examines, though rejects, a recent attempt to replace subjective ‘oughts’ with objective ‘wide-scope oughts’ operating on belief-action combinations. Section 5 explicates the notion of a warranted ‘ought’ and defends the account against some possible objections. The resulting a picture is one in which an adequate analysis of practical normativity requires both objective and warranted ‘oughts’. Section 6 concludes by responding to a worry about countenancing both.