A Dynamic Neural Field Model of Visual Working Memory and Change Detection

ABSTRACT— Efficient visually guided behavior depends on the ability to form, retain, and compare visual representations for objects that may be separated in space and time. This ability relies on a short-term form of memory known as visual working memory. Although a considerable body of research has begun to shed light on the neurocognitive systems subserving this form of memory, few theories have addressed these processes in an integrated, neurally plausible framework. We describe a layered neural architecture that implements encoding and maintenance, and links these processes to a plausible comparison process. In addition, the model makes the novel prediction that change detection will be enhanced when metrically similar features are remembered. Results from experiments probing memory for color and for orientation were consistent with this novel prediction. These findings place strong constraints on models addressing the nature of visual working memory and its underlying mechanisms.     

Visuospatial attention in schizophrenia: deficits in broad monitoring

Although selective attention is thought to be impaired in people with schizophrenia (PSZ), prior research has found no deficit in the ability to select one location and withdraw attention from another. PSZ and healthy control subjects (HCS) performed a stimulus detection task in which one, two, or all four peripheral target locations were cued. When one or two locations were cued, both PSZ and HCS responded faster when the target appeared at a cued than uncued location. However, increases in the number of validly cued locations had much more deleterious effects on performance for PSZ than HCS, especially for targets of low contrast whose detection was more dependent on attention. PSZ also responded more slowly in trials with four cued locations relative to trials with one or two invalidly cued locations. Thus, visuospatial attention deficits in schizophrenia arise when broad monitoring is required rather than when attention must be focused narrowly.     

Active suppression after involuntary capture of attention

After attention has been involuntarily captured by a distractor, how is it reoriented toward a target? One possibility is that attention to the distractor passively fades over time, allowing the target to become attended. Another possibility is that the captured location is actively suppressed so that attention can be directed toward the target location. The present study investigated this issue with event-related potentials (ERPs), focusing on the N2pc component (a neural measure of attentional deployment) and the Pd component (a neural measure of attentional suppression). Observers identified a color-defined target in a search array, which was preceded by a task-irrelevant cue array. When the cue array contained an item that matched the target color, this item captured attention (as measured both behaviorally and with the N2pc component). This capture of attention was followed by active suppression (indexed by the Pd component), and this was then followed by a reorienting of attention toward the target in the search array (indexed by the N2pc component). These findings indicate that the involuntary capture of attention by a distractor is followed by an active suppression process that presumably facilitates the subsequent voluntary orienting of attention to the target.     

Why is information displaced from visual working memory during visual search?

Research has shown that performing visual search while maintaining representations in visual working memory displaces up to one object's worth of information from memory. This memory displacement has previously been attributed to a nonspecific disruption of the memory representation by the mere presentation of the visual search array, and the goal of the present study was to determine whether it instead reflects the use of visual working memory in the actual search process. The first hypothesis tested was that working memory displacement occurs because observers preemptively discard about an object's worth of information from visual working memory in anticipation of performing visual search. Second, we tested the hypothesis that on target absent trials no information is displaced from visual working memory because no target is entered into memory when search is completed. Finally, we tested whether visual working memory displacement is due to the need to select a response to the search array. The findings rule out these alternative explanations. The present study supports the hypothesis that change-detection performance is impaired when a search array appears during the retention interval due to nonspecific disruption or masking.     

Incommensurability,slight pains and God

I will consider how the notion of incommensurability, as championed by Parfit (Reasons and persons, 1984), Griffin (Well-being: its meaning, measurement and importance, 1986), Chang (Ethics 112:659–688, 2002), and Hare (Philos Perspect 23:165–176, 2009), might affect both the argument from slight pain (which suggests God’s non-existence can be inferred from the merest stubbing of one’s toe) and Leibniz’s reply to this argument. I conclude that the notion of incommensurability may ultimately strengthen Leibniz’s general position.     

Qualitative similarities in the visual short-term memory of pigeons and people

Visual short-term memory plays a key role in guiding behavior, and individual differences in visual short-term memory capacity are strongly predictive of higher cognitive abilities. To provide a broader evolutionary context for understanding this memory system, we directly compared the behavior of pigeons and humans on a change detection task. Although pigeons had a lower storage capacity and a higher lapse rate than humans, both species stored multiple items in short-term memory and conformed to the same basic performance model. Thus, despite their very different evolutionary histories and neural architectures, pigeons and humans have functionally similar visual short-term memory systems, suggesting that the functional properties of visual short-term memory are subject to similar selective pressures across these distant species.     

The number and quality of representations in working memory

Flexible-resource theories characterize working memory as a flexible resource that can store either a large number of low-quality representations or a small number of high-quality representations. In contrast, limited-item theories propose that the number of items that can be stored in working memory is strictly limited and cannot be increased by decreasing the quality of the representations. We tested these fundamentally different conceptualizations of working memory capacity by determining whether observers could trade quality for quantity in working memory when given incentives to do so. We found no evidence that observers could increase the number of representations by decreasing their quality in working memory, but observers could make such a trade-off at earlier processing stages. Our results show that the capacity limit of working memory is best characterized as a limit on the number of items that can be stored and not as a limit on a finely divisible resource that simultaneously determines the number and quality of the representations.