Fuzziness of concepts and concepts of fuzziness

It has been a vexing question in recent years whether concepts are fuzzy. In this paper several views on the fuzziness of concepts are pointed out to have stemmed from dubious concepts of fuzziness. The underlying notions of the roles feasibly played byprototype, set, andprobability in modeling concepts strongly suggest that the controversy originates from a vague relation between intuitive and mathematical ideas in the cognitive sciences. It is argued that the application of fuzzy sets cannot resolve this vagueness since they are one sided,viz., defined on sets. An alternative definition based on classes (in the sense of axiomatic set theory) is proposed.     

MMPI profiles of adolescents charged with homicide

Study of adolescent violence has been impeded by failure to distinguish among the circumstances in which youth engage in violent behavior. The present study investigated MMPI profiles of 36 adolescent murderers and a control group of 18 adolescents charged with larceny. Homicide cases were subgrouped into those who committed homicide secondary to another crime (e.g., robbery or rape) and those who acted in the context of interpersonal conflict with the victim. While there were no significant differences between homicide and larceny groups, crime and conflict subgroups were significantly different on scales F, Hs, Hy, and Sc.     

On the concept of language in some recent theories of meaning

The work on this paper was done in the research project V ra begrepp om spr k supported byHumanistisk-samhälls-vetenskapliga forskningsr det. I am indebted to Per Martin-Löf, Hans Ruin, Pär Segerdahl, and Sven Öhman for valuable comments on a previous version of this paper. Thanks to the comments of the anonymous referee I was able to improve some formulations in the paper.     

The relationship between recognition and cued recall in memory of enacted and nonenacted information

Summary An experiment was conducted to determine whether the processes underlying memory for enacted and nonenacted events are the same or different. The experimental paradigm used was that of recognition failure of recallable information. At study subjects were given verbal commands (e.g., break the match, roll the ball), that they were to remember or enact and remember. At test subjects were first asked to recognize the noun in each command in the absence of the verb and then to recall the noun with the verb present as cue. Half the subjects were given the two tests in the reverse order. The results demonstrate that enactment and nonenactment differ with respect to the degree of dependence/independence between recognition and recall. In the enactment condition recognition and cued recall are completely independent and in the nonenactment condition they are almost completely dependent.     

Motivated memory: Dissociation between performance data and subjective reports

Summary Three experiments are reported to test a claim by previous subjects that lack of motivation for performing well in memory experiments yielded less than optimal performance. In each experiment the subjects of one group were informed of monetary incentives prior to study; in a second group they were informed of these incentives after study but prior to the test; no mention of incentives was made to the subjects of a third group. Recall and recognition procedures were used to assess memory performance. The data of all three experiments demonstrated no differences between the three groups with respect to performance. The claim that subjects in regular memory experiments would typically perform less than optimally is thus rejected. Subjective reports, however, revealed that incentives had affected the amount of effort put into the memory tasks. This dissociation between performance data and subjective reports is discussed in relation to the concept of motivation.     

Jung’s Psychoid Monism

Jung’s final psychoid theory of archetypes was an additional attempt to find a solution to the philosophical problem of how to relate mind and matter. In the following essay Jung’s solution is summarized by a set of 17 theses, and Jung’s philosophy will be called psychoid monism. According to psychoid monism, what ultimately and primarily is, is the psycho-physically neutral domain of instinctual experience. The origin of this view can be traced back to Post-Kantian German Idealism (Schopenhauer, Schelling, Hölderlin), and a systematization of the view requires a dialectic approach and, in particular, contradiction-tolerant dialectic logic.     

Scepticism About Scepticism or the Very Idea of a Global ‘Vat-Language’

This paper aims to motivate a scepticism about scepticism in contemporary epistemology. I present the sceptic with a dilemma: On one parsing of the BIV (brain-in-a-vat) scenario, the second premise in a closure-based sceptical argument will turn out false, because the scenario is refutable; on another parsing, the scenario collapses into incoherence, because the sceptic cannot even save the appearances. I discuss three different ways of cashing out the BIV scenario: ‘Recent Envatment’ (RE), ‘Lifelong Envatment’ (LE) and ‘Nothing But Envatment’ (NBE). I show that RE scenarios are a kind of ‘local’ sceptical scenario that does not pose a significant threat to the possibility of perceptual knowledge as such. I then go on to consider the more radical (or global) LE and NBE scenarios, which do undermine the possibility of perceptual knowledge of an ‘external’ world by positing that it is conceivable that one has always been envatted and, hence, trapped in a ‘global’ illusion. I start by assuming that we could be in such a scenario (LE or NBE) and then spell out what we would need to presuppose for such scenarios to be capable of being actual. Drawing on some central insights from Wittgenstein’s anti-private language considerations, I show that the truth of a global scepticism would presuppose the possibility of a private ‘vat-language’, a notion that cannot be rendered coherent. But, if so, then neither can the sceptical scenarios that presuppose such a conception.