Reality compared with its alternatives: age differences in judgments of regret and relief

Three experiments examined developmental change in children's understanding of regret and relief, two second-order emotions whose quality depends on a comparison between reality and "what might have been." In Experiment 1, participants 7 years of age and older, but not 5-year-olds, made regret-related emotion-response judgments that took into account a comparison of reality with its alternatives. In Experiment 2, 5-year-olds judged that an individual would feel better, rather than worse, when a counterfactual outcome was better than what actually occurred (the opposite of the pattern found with older children and adults). Experiment 3 focused on the understanding of relief. In contrast to the findings from Experiment I, the 7-year-olds in Experiment 3 made their judgments solely on the basis of what actually occurred.     

Children's understanding of anticipatory regret and disappointment

The anticipation of regret and disappointment plays an important role in decision making by adults. The anticipation of regret may also lead to a desire to avoid feedback about likely outcomes of non-chosen courses of action, while the anticipation of disappointment is associated with avoidance of risk-taking and the deliberate dampening of expectations. The present study used the context of a simple game to examine children's understanding of these anticipatory regret and disappointment emotion-regulation strategies. It was found that even though children 7/8 years of age were able to understand the situational factors that produce disappointment and regret, it was not until 9/10 years of age that children exhibited an understanding of anticipatory regret emotion-regulation strategies, and even at this age children did not exhibit an understanding of the use of dampening of expectations as a strategy for coping with the anticipation of disappointment.     

A developmental study of attention to auditory and visual signals

Three experiments tested for developmental changes in attention to simple auditory and visual signals. Subject pressed a single button in response to the onset (Experiment 1) or offset (Experiment 2) of either a tone or a light. During one block of trials subjects knew which stimulus would come on or go off on each trial (precue condition) whereas during the other block of trials no precue was provided. In both experiments subjects as young as 4 years old responded more rapidly with precues, indicating that they were able to allocate their attention to the indicated modality. Experiment 3 utilized a choice reaction paradigm (in which subjects pressed different buttons in response to the onset of the light and the tone) in order to examine their attention allocation when no precues were provided. It was found that the adults and 7-year-olds tended to allocate their attention to vision rather than audition when no precue was provided. The results with the 4-year-olds were not entirely consistent, but suggested a similar biasing of attention to vision on their part as well.     

The mental effort requirement of cumulative rehearsal: A developmental study

Three experiments were conducted examining the relationship between the mental effort requirement of cumulative rehearsal and spontaneous utilization of the strategy by children. Mental effort was assessed by measuring the interference produced by cumulative rehearsal with a simultaneously performed secondary task (finger-tapping). It was found in Experiment 1 that second- and third-grade children experienced significantly more finger-tapping interference during instructed cumulative rehearsal than did sixth-grade children, an effect which, Experiment 2 demonstrated, could not be attributed simply to developmental differences in time-sharing performance. In Experiment 3 it was found that, for children in grades 2 through 5, rehearsal set size during spontaneous rehearsal was negatively correlated with amount of finger-tapping interference during instructed cumulative rehearsal, suggesting that spontaneous use of a cumulative rehearsal strategy was negatively correlated with the mental effort requirement of strategy use. These findings support the view that the mental effort requirement of strategy use may influence children's strategy selection on memory tasks.     

Visibility distances with halogen and conventional headlights

Abstract.— Using visibility distance as a criterion, halogen and conventional continental European high and low-beam headlights were compared in a series of field experiments. On high-beam without opposing light the halogen headlights offered about 25% longer visibility distances than the conventional headlights. With both opposing cars using low-beam there was a slight advantage (<5 m) in favour of halogen headlights. The optimal dipping distance was a function of high-beam system (intensity) rather than low-beam system. Small differences in aiming, atmosphere etc. caused larger differences in visibility distance than did the headlight system.     

自尊的毕生发展

自尊是心理学的一个重要研究领域, 文章介绍了自尊的毕生发展研究在近三十年来的进展, 主要探讨了自尊的稳定性及其毕生发展的影响因素, 包括年龄、性别、种族和文化、社会经济地位与家庭教养方式等方面, 指出自尊毕生发展的研究将来应关注自尊的纵向研究和本土化研究, 并注意区分和探讨不同形式自尊的发展变化。     

Memorability judgments for high- and low-frequency words

Five experiments were conducted in order to examine subjects’ judgments of the memorability of high- (HF) and low-frequency (LF) words in the context of a recognition memory task. In Experiment 1, the subjects were provided study/test experience with a list of HF and LF words prior to making memorability judgments for a new list of HF and LF items. The findings were consistent with previous evidence (Greene & Thapar, 1994; Wixted, 1992) suggesting that subjects are not explicitly aware of the greater recognition memorability of LF words. Experiments 2–5 embedded the memorability judgment task within the recognition test itself. In these experiments, the subjects consistently gave higher memorability ratings to LF items. The contrast between the pattern of results found when the subjects made their judgments at the time of list presentation (Experiment 1) and that when they made their judgments during the recognition test (Experiments 2–5) is consistent with recent evidence that even seemingly highly related metamnemonic judgments (e.g., ease of learning judgments vs. judgments of learning for the same items) may be based on very different factors if they occur at different points in the study/test cycle. The present findings are also consistent with the possibility that very rapid retrieval of memorability information for HF and LF words may affect recognition decisions and may contribute to the recognition memory word frequency effect.     

Recency judgments as a function of word frequency: A framing effect and frequency misattributions

The effects of word frequency on judgments of recency of item presentation were examined in two experiments. Subjects in Experiment 1 were presented two mixed lists of high- and low-frequency words followed by a list assignment task for recognized items. It was found that subjects were biased toward assigning low-frequency words to the more recently presented list. Subjects in Experiment 2 were presented a single mixed list of high- and low-frequency words followed by either a relative recency of presentation judgment task or a relative primacy of presentation judgment task. Each word pair on the tests contained one high-frequency word and one low-frequency word. It was found that, for the recency judgment task, subjects were biased to select the low-frequency item as having been presented more recently. However, on the parallel primacy judgment task, there were no effects of word frequency; moreover, overall accuracy levels were higher with primacy than with recency instructions. We interpret the effects of word frequency on recency judgments in Experiments 1 and 2 in terms of a misattribution of frequency-related differences in recollection-based recognition. The finding that recency and primacy instructions produced different patterns of results provides further evidence (Flexser & Bower, 1974) for an effect on performance of the way in which the temporal judgment task was framed.