Truth approximation,belief merging,and peer disagreement

In this paper, we investigate the problem of truth approximation via belief merging, i.e., we ask whether, and under what conditions, a group of inquirers merging together their beliefs makes progress toward the truth about the underlying domain. We answer this question by proving some formal results on how belief merging operators perform with respect to the task of truth approximation, construed as increasing verisimilitude or truthlikeness. Our results shed new light on the issue of how rational (dis)agreement affects the inquirers’ quest for truth. In particular, they vindicate the intuition that scientific inquiry, and rational discussion in general, benefits from some heterogeneity in opinion and interaction among different viewpoints. The links between our approach and related analyses of truth tracking, judgment aggregation, and opinion dynamics, are also highlighted.     

The subjective effort of everyday mental tasks: Attending,assessing, and choosing

Why are some mental tasks experienced as more effortful than others? Answers to this question about subjective effort have begun to be addressed by researchers investigating why some mental tasks are associated with more ‘elbow grease’ or ‘depletion’ than other tasks. It has been proposed that tasks such as sustained attention should be accompanied by more subjective effort than other tasks, such as assessing (e.g., counting a handful of items) or choosing randomly between two alternatives. In general, these proposals coincide with people’s intuitions regarding how effort should vary by mental task. However, little laboratory data have corroborated these conclusions. In two studies, we cataloged the relative amount of subjective effort associated with some basic and ubiquitous mental activities: attending (most subjective effort), assessing, and choosing (least subjective effort). Results support hypotheses about subjective effort. Because subjective effort is perceived to be experienced by a subject, we explored also the relationship between effort and the involvement of the ‘psychological self.’     

Religious Experience Reconsidered as an example of theoretical assertiveness in the study of religion

The publication of Religious Experience Reconsidered is one more indication that the incoherent mixture of coyness and braggadocio that for decades has characterized the study of religion and other disciplines, is finally giving way to honest theoretical assertiveness. Taves' book is a careful treatment of experience deemed religious that manages to do justice to the recurrent features of what people tend to experience in such contexts, while also taking into consideration the culture-bound components of those experiences. What is especially welcome is that instead of seeking to establish a bland middle ground, she has pursued an independent path, making use of scholarship in a variety of disciplines, especially psychology of religion.     

Religion,Reductionism, and the Seduction of Epistemology

This paper examines phenomenology and its psychological relationship to religious education. It comments on this relationship in the light of the critique of phenomenology which Piaget himself made towards the end of his life (Piaget, 1965), though it also draws attention to other aspects of phenomenology theory which are dissonant with Piagetian psychology. This paper, therefore, is not a broad philosophical critique of phenomenology, though an element of this is included. but concentrates on the philosophical and developmental factors which impede the capacity of young people to perform either of the ‘reductions’ demanded by the phenomenological method.     

Verisimilitude and belief change for nomic conjunctive theories

In this paper, we address the problem of truth approximation through theory change, asking whether revising our theories by newly acquired data leads us closer to the truth about a given domain. More particularly, we focus on “nomic conjunctive theories”, i.e., theories expressed as conjunctions of logically independent statements concerning the physical or, more generally, nomic possibilities and impossibilities of the domain under inquiry. We define both a comparative and a quantitative notion of the verisimilitude of such theories, and identify suitable conditions concerning the (partial) correctness of acquired data, under which revising our theories by data leads us closer to “the nomic truth”, construed as the target of scientific inquiry. We conclude by indicating some further developments, generalizations, and open issues arising from our results.     

Probability,Approximate Truth,and Truthlikeness: More Ways out of the Preface Paradox

The so-called Preface Paradox seems to show that one can rationally believe two logically incompatible propositions. We address this puzzle, relying on the notions of truthlikeness and approximate truth as studied within the post-Popperian research programme on verisimilitude. In particular, we show that adequately combining probability, approximate truth, and truthlikeness leads to an explanation of how rational belief is possible in the face of the Preface Paradox. We argue that our account is superior to other solutions of the paradox, including a recent one advanced by Hannes Leitgeb (Analysis 74.1).