A preliminary report on the use of a new method of presenting the Rorschach Test to evaluate the relationship of couples

The authors present a new relational Rorschach Test for couples. First, the Rorschach is given individually, then it is administered to the couple together, when they have the task of agreeing on one interpretation for each card. All ten cards are used. The protocols, transcribed from the video tape, are analysed in order to evaluate:

• the typology of the dyad in the light of the concepts of symmetry and complementarity;

• communication within the dyad in terms of: single messages, single message sequences, and of the evaluation of the subjects capacity to understand each other;

• data obtained through task performance such as, which partner formulates the interpretation agreed on and which one decides on the interpretation.

An application of the method to a couple, one of whom is alcoholic, is presented.     

Self-esteem, self-affirmation, and schadenfreude

In two studies we demonstrated that self-esteem has a negative relationship with schadenfreude toward a high achiever and that this relationship was mediated by the self-threat evoked by this high achiever. Moreover, we showed that this indirect relationship was contingent on an opportunity to affirm the self. When no self-affirmation opportunity was available, low self-esteem participants experienced a stronger self-threat when confronted with a high achiever, and this self-threat increased their schadenfreude, whereas this response was attenuated when they were given an opportunity to self-affirm. These findings indicate that the misfortunes of others can evoke schadenfreude because they provide people with an opportunity to protect or enhance their self-views.     

Trauma and autobiographical memory specificity in depressed inpatients

Research on autobiographical memory has shown that clinical depression is associated with a difficulty in retrieving specific autobiographical memories in response to cue words. This study examined the relation between lack of autobiographical memory specificity and self-reported trauma in a group of depressed adults (N = 23). In addition to the Autobiographical Memory Test (AMT; Williams & Broadbent, 1986) participants completed a number of questionnaires assessing the presence of traumatic experiences in the past, level of depression and neuroticism. The number of specific responses was not related to depression severity, but was significantly associated with the presence and severity of reported physical abuse. Participants who had been victim of physical abuse were less specific than participants who had not been confronted with such physical adversities. The results are discussed in the context of a functional hypothesis about the developmental relations between memory specificity, trauma and depression.     

On the Axiomatisation of Elgesem's Logic of Agency and Ability

In this paper we show that the Hilbert system of agency and ability presented by Dag Elgesem is incomplete with respect to the intended semantics. We argue that completeness result may be easily regained. Finally, we shortly discuss some issues related to the philosophical intuition behind his approach. This is done by examining Elgesem's modal logic of agency and ability using semantics with different flavours.     

Reality monitoring and metacognitive beliefs related to cognitive confidence in obsessive-compulsive disorder

The present study investigated general reality monitoring ability, and selective reality monitoring ability for anxiety relevant actions in a group of individuals with obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) and a group of non-anxious controls. In addition, reality monitoring confidence was assessed, as well as specific meta-cognitive beliefs related to cognitive confidence (by means of the Meta-Cognitions Questionnaire (MCQ)). No differences were found between both groups in actual reality monitoring ability. Unlike previous studies, the reality monitoring task included actions that were related to the individual concerns of the OCD patients and were ideographically selected. Nevertheless, no differential reality monitoring effect was observed for the anxiety relevant stimuli. Data from the MCQ, however, revealed that OCD patients had less overall confidence in their memory for actions and their reality monitoring ability. Analysis of the confidence ratings of the reality monitoring task showed that this reduced confidence was restricted to the neutral actions. No differences were observed for patients that reported low or high frequencies of checking behaviour. The whole of these data do not support memory deficit models of OCD, but are in line with recent emphasis on the importance of memory confidence and other meta-cognitive beliefs in OCD.     

Discrimination of voice versus place contrasts in aphasia

A phoneme discrimination test based upon CCVC (consonant-consonant-vowel-consonant) syllables was administered to 36 aphasics, 91 brain-damaged subjects, and 42 normal controls, in normal listening conditions. Errors in the discrimination of voice and place contrasts were determined, and the scores (voice-minus-place errors) obtained by the four experimental groups were compared statistically. Aphasic patients, when compared with the other groups, show a greater difficulty in discriminating place than voice contrasts. Some implications of these findings are discussed.     

Does Location Uncertainty Modulate Unconscious Processing Under Continuous Flash Suppression?

Previous research suggests that selective spatial attention is a determining factor for unconscious processing under continuous flash suppression (CFS), and specifically, that inattention toward stimulus location facilitates its unconscious processing by reducing the depth of CFS (Eo et al., 2016). The aim of our study was to further examine this modulation-by-attention model of CFS using a number priming paradigm. Participants (N = 26) performed a number comparison task on a visible target number (“compare target to five”). Prime-target pairs were either congruent (both smaller or larger than five) or incongruent. Spatial attention toward the primes was varied by manipulating the uncertainty of the primes’ location. Based on the modulation-by-attention model, we hypothesized the following: In trials with uncertain prime location, RTs for congruent prime-target pairs should be faster than for incongruent ones. In trials with certain prime location, RTs for congruent versus incongruent prime-target pairs should not differ. We analyzed our data with sequential Bayes factors (BFs). Our data showed no effect of location uncertainty on unconscious priming under CFS (BF0+ = 5.16). However, even visible primes only weakly influenced RTs. Possible reasons for the absence of robust number priming effects in our study are discussed. Based on exploratory analyses, we conclude that the numerical order of prime and target resulted in a response conflict and interfered with the predicted priming effect.     

Mind-body dualism and the compatibility of medical methods

In this paper we analyse some misleading theses concerning the oldcontroversy over the relation between mind and body presented incontemporary medical literature. We undertake an epistemologicalclarification of the axiomatic structure of medical methods. Thisclarification, in turn, requires a precise philosophical explanation ofthe presupposed concepts. This analysis will establish two results: (1)that the mind-body dualism cannot be understood as a kind of biologicalvariation of the subject-object dichotomy in physics, and (2) that thethesis of the incompatibility between somatic and psychosomatic medicineheld by naturalists and others lacks solid epistemologicalfoundation.     

Explaining neurocognitive aging: is one factor enough?

As an introduction to the special issue on neurocognitive factors underlying age effects, we discuss a number of recent developments in the literature on aging. The classic distinction between generalized and process-specific cognitive changes with old age has reappeared in the distinctions between the frontal lobe hypothesis and more differentiated views of neurocognitive aging. We argue that neurological decay in the frontal cortex has important implications for cognitive control, but that the frontal lobe hypothesis does not capture the plethora of changes that characterize aging and incorrectly suggests a unitary effect.