The Benny Hill effect: Switching cognitive programmes underlying subjective estimations of the outcomes of bargains concerning distributions of rewards

The pun of a sketch from the Benny Hill show was related to a switch of cognitive in formation processing programmes underlying the interpretation of the scene represented. The audience would be biased to interpret it following a cognitive programme anchored on the constructs self and other (SO-programme), while Benny Hill makes a statement that would impose a cognitive programme anchored on constructs associated with the third pronominal person (3P-programme). In an experiment it was attempted to make subjects to switch from SO- to 3P-programmes (Benny Hill effect) when they were making subjective estimations of outcomes of bargains concerning distributions of rewards. The hypothesis was confirmed that the 3P-programme was activated by providing additional in formation pertaining to substantiate the stimulus persons in such a way as to make them stand out as anchors for the processing of the in formation. However, the data showed also that the mere substantiation of stimulus persons was not yet sufficient to produce the given shift of cognitive programmes. The results are discussed in the light of theories concerning fairness, social values and allocation rules.     

Some aspects of phonological impairment in aphasia

The relationships between expressive and receptive phonemic disorders and between disturbances of phoneme processing and general disorders of auditory comprehension were studied in 69 aphasic patients, by means of a phoneme discrimination test and of a standard aphasia battery. A significant but incomplete correlation between disorders of phonemic output and of phoneme analysis was found. The view is put forth that in some patients only phoneme encoding or decoding is disturbed, whereas in others a central level of phoneme processing is impaired. A significant but partial correlation was also found between disorders of phonological analysis and general disorders of auditory comprehension. This supports the view that, besides sequential phonological analysis, other processes operate in auditory comprehension.     

Do relations between judgment and epistemological beliefs differentiate between mere acceptance and critical evaluation? Comment on Latifian & Bashash (2004)

In 2004 Latifian and Bashash presented Iranian students with questionnaires assessing (a) their epistemological beliefs regarding religion and science as sources of value and truth and (b) their acceptance of a scenario arguing for relative ethics. Acceptance was related to epistemological beliefs in a condition where the scenario was attributed to Freud but not in a condition where it was attributed to Tabatabaee, a highly authoritative theologian. This commentary questions the authors' explanation, particularly their assumption that the participants' reliance on epistemological beliefs would indicate a more critical attitude towards the scenario in the Freud condition than in the Tabatabaee condition.     

Self-Other and Third-person Anchored Modes of Thinking in Psychological Expertise: Cognitive Concomitants of Behaviourist,Client-centred,and Psychoanalytic Concepts

Information about people (A and B) can be processed consistent with two alternative modes of thinking: (1) an SO-mode conceiving of A and B as “self” versus “other,” and (2) a 3P-mode conceiving of A and B as “he/she called A” versus “he/she called B.” Previous research showed strong SO-anchoring biases in laypersons' thinking, so the present study focused on psychological experts' thinking. SO- and 3P-modes were associated with the formation of personalized and depersonalized representations of A and B respectively, so it was hypothesized that thinking in psychoanalytic terms would involve both modes, whereas the use of client-centred and behaviourist terms would trigger the SO- and the 3P-mode respectively. Data obtained from experts in psychotherapy confirmed the hypotheses except that the SO-mode was not less but more dominant in thought shaped in the behaviourist way than in thought shaped in the client-centred way. The results shed light on the role of scientific language and discourse as a general instrument of professional thought and communication.     

Some aspects of eloquence in Descartes's works

In Descartes's philosophy, communicating scientific and philosophical truth does not represent a problem that can be traced back to humanistic rhetoric, meant as the art of persuasion. Descartes states his belief in the eloquence of reason: a clear, precise, and adequately expressed thought cannot fail to convince the listener. This is the measure of the distance between the level of truth and the level of opinion. However, the moment of confrontation with the public is also the very moment when the truth of the new knowledge enters into conflict with other, different conceptions. Education and history influence communication with the result that the distinction between intellectual conviction and persuasion becomes less straightforward. Rational eloquence, as Descartes is well aware, must be articulated in such a way as to avoid any possible language equivocation and to adopt exposition strategies ensuring effective access to readers. The aim of this paper is to illustrate some aspects of this tension as expressed by the writer Descartes with reference to a number of texts (from the Regulae to the Meditationes) that were essential for the elaboration and dissemination of his philosophy.     

Ontology and the construction of systems

After drawing attention to the basic importance of Goodman's workThe Structure of Appearance, this paper turns to a critical analysis of Goodman's claims concerning worldmaking. It stresses that Goodman's acceptance of a multiplicity of actual worlds doesnot involve the belief in an unknowable underlying reality; but that it is due to the non-mysterious fact that constructional systems allow for a multiplicity of disagreeing, right versions. However, from the point of view of truthmaker ontology, most worlds of constructional systems are not genuine worlds; and so far it hasnot been shown that there are genuine truthmaker worlds that disagree.It is suggested that the construction of systems usually involves three conflicting aims: the logical, the ontological, and the psychological. Considering the current interest in cognitive psychology and phenomenology, the implications of the psychological aim, too, deserve to be reexamined.This paper was presented at the Autorenkolloqium with Nelson Goodman and Catherine Z. Elgin, held at the Zentrum für interdisziplinäre Forschung (Zif) of the University of Bielefeld (Germany) between 18–20 March 1991.